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Introduction and Methodology
Political scientists have traditionally focused their attention on the be-
havior of political elites—those in a society who occupy positions of
authority in governmental institutions. Since the development of public
opinion polling as a research tool during the 1940s, political scientists
have also devoted considerable attention to the political beliefs and
behavior of members of the general public in the United States and other
industrial democracies. Much less attention has been paid to a group
which occupies a crucial intermediate position between the political elite
and the mass public, the informal political activists. These are people
whose involvement in politics extends beyond the act of voting to more
intensive forms of participation such as campaigning for candidates or
contacting public officials.
The informal political activists play a vital role in a democracy because
their interest, attention, and activity allow them to wield disproportionate
influence on political decision-makers. In addition, political decision-
makers are frequently recruited from the ranks of the informal activists.
These informal activists therefore provide an important link between
political elites and the mass public in a democracy.
One of the most important avenues of informal participation in demo-
cratic politics is the party organization. In all modern industrial democ-
racies, party organizations play a crucial role in the recruitment of
political elites. Participation in party affairs provides an opportunity for
interested citizens to influence the selection of political leaders beyond
the limited choice offered in elections. In the United States especially, the
decentralized, permeable party structures provide multiple opportunities
for citizen participation. Only in the United States do members of the
general public have the opportunity to select party nominees in primary
elections. The vast majority of local, state, and national officeholders in
the United States are nominated in primary elections.
In addition to the state and local primaries, the Democratic and
Republican parties provide many opportunities for citizens to participate
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in party activities. One of the most important of these activities, and the
principal one for which the national parties exist in the United States, is
the nomination of presidential candidates. Reforms adopted by both
parties since 1968 have drastically altered the process by which delegates
to the presidential nominating conventions are chosen and increased the
opportunities for citizen participation in this process. In addition to the
proliferation of presidential primaries in 1980—over 70 percent of the
delegates to both the Democratic and Republican national nominating
conventions were chosen in primaries—the rules governing party cau-
cuses and conventions have been changed to increase opportunities for
citizen participation.
The results of the post-1968 reforms of the presidential nominating
process have been controversial. Some scholars and party leaders believe
that these participatory reforms have allowed dogmatic ideological activ-
ists to exercise too much influence over the presidential nomination.
According to the neoconservative critics of party reform such as Jeane
Kirkpatrick and Aaron Wildavsky, the new activists are less representative
of the political views of the electorate and less concerned about the
viability of the party itself than the elected officials and party regulars they
have displaced.
Research on the motivations, characteristics, and political beliefs of
party activists in the United States has concentrated heavily on national
party convention delegates, especially those who attended the 1972
Democratic National Convention, one of the most unusual party gather-
ings of modern times.
The research on which the papers in this volume are based was
stimulated by a desire to broaden the data base on which our knowledge
about American party activists rests. The caucus-convention states
seemed to provide an ideal opportunity to examine the characteristics,
motivations, and beliefs of a broad group of party activists in the
postreform presidential nominating process.
Before the recent era of party reform, American political parties at the
national level were generally characterized as loose-knit coalitions of
state and local organizations controlled by pragmatic politicians for
whom issues and ideology were subservient to the goal of winning
elections. Events since 1968 have led to a thorough revision of this
characterization. The national parties have greatly increased their control
over the rules and procedures used by state and local organizations to
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select national convention delegates. Presidential primaries have prolife-
rated, forcing candidates to appeal directly to the electorate rather than to
state and local party leaders. Reforms of the caucus-convention system
have opened up the process of selecting national convention delegates to a
new breed of issue-oriented activists. Some students of American party
politics have expressed fears that these changes threaten the viability of
the parties as organizations. If the parties are dominated by activists who
are more concerned with promoting issue positions than with winning
elections, who identify more strongly with outside interest groups than
with the party organization, and who owe their primary loyalty to a
particular candidate rather than to party leaders, then these fears may be
well founded.
The chapters in this book deal with a wide range of topics concerning
the role of party activists in the presidential nominating system. All of
these chapters, though, shed light on the condition of the parties as
organizations in the postreform era. While the evidence examined here
lends support to some of the findings of earlier studies concerning the
characteristics and attitudes of contemporary party activists, the contrib-
utors to this book generally reach more optimistic conclusions regarding
the viability of the parties as organizations.
Several of the chapters in this volume present evidence of a continuing
nationalization of the party system. This process can be seen as both a
cause and an effect of the increased centralization of the presidential
nominating system. Abramowitz, McGlennon, and Rapoport ("A State
Analysis") find that party activists in the eleven states included in this
study have similar social characteristics and political beliefs. In all eleven
states, Democratic activists were less affluent and included larger propor-
tions of racial and ethnic minority groups than Republican activists.
Similarly, Democratic activists were much more likely to be active in
labor unions, teachers' organizations, women's rights, environmental,
and civil rights organizations than Republican activists, while the latter
were more likely to be active in business, religious, and anti-abortion
groups. In all eleven states, Democratic activists were substantially more
liberal than Republican activists—the most liberal group of Republican
activists (from Iowa) were considerably more conservative than the most
conservative group of Democratic activists (from Oklahoma).
Two chapters suggest possible explanations for the nationalization of
the party system. Moreland, Steed, and Baker find that substantial propor-
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tions of the activists in several of the states included in the study were
relatively recent migrants. The fact that so many newcomers to these
states were delegates to the party conventions provides evidence of the
permeability long regarded as a key characteristic of the American party
system. In such traditionally one-party Democratic states as Texas, Vir-
ginia, and South Carolina, migrants have contributed to the emergence of
strong Republican organizations. In addition, Moreland, Steed, and Baker
show that Democratic migrants tended to be younger, better educated, and
more liberal than Democratic activists who were long-term residents of
their states. Thus, migration has contributed to the ideological polariza-
tion of the two parties.
In "The Permeability of Parties" Kweit and Kweit investigate another
source of change in the composition of hte parties: conversion. In the
traditionally one-party southern states, many of today's GOP activists are
conservative former Democrats. By using the "exit" option to express
their dissatisfaction with the direction of their traditional party, these ex-
Democrats have contributed to the ideological realignment of party pol-
itics in the South and the emergence of genuine two-party competition.
Furthermore, Kweit and Kweit show that converts to the Democratic
party, especially during the 1960s, tended to be more liberal than activists
who were lifelong Democrats. The net result of conversion has been
increased ideological polarization of the parties.
Despite the increase in ideological polarization brought about by
migration and conversion, the two parties are far from monolithic. Activ-
ists within each party display a wide variety of social background charac-
teristics and represent a wide variety of interest groups. No single interest
group comes close to achieving majority status in either party. In fact,
Francis and Benedict find that multiple group memberships are common
among party activists. This pattern of overlapping memberships may
reduce the likelihood that activists will act as agents of outside interest
groups.
Although diversity is found in both parties, several papers included in
this book find evidence of important differences between the ideological
and coalitional makeup of the two parties. A greater variety of interest
groups are represented among the ranks of Democratic activists. Sim-
ilarly, Brudney and McDonald show that issue and ideological divisions
are much sharper in the Democratic party than in the Republican party. In
1980 many of the issues dividing the Democrats remained submerged
Introduction and Methodology 5
because liberal activists were reluctant to abandon an incumbent presi-
dent who appeared to offer a greater chance of victory than his more
liberal challenger. However, the findings presented by Brudney and
McDonald suggest a greater potential among Democratic activists for
intraparty conflict along ideological lines than among the more ide-
ologically homogeneous Republicans.
Many recent studies have emphasized the increased importance of
ideology as a motivation for activism in the presidential nominating
process since 1968. This volume provides considerable evidence of the
importance of issues and ideology to activists in te 1980 presidential
nominating campaign. In one chapter, Rapoport explores the extent of
issue constraint among activists. His findings suggest a source of in-
creased ideological thinking among contemporary activists: the rising
level of education. Among activists, in contrast to the general public,
issue constraint increases substantially with higher levels of education.
The salience of ideological concerns among contemporary activists
has led to questions about their commitment to the party as an organiza-
tion. Abramowitz, McGlennon, and Rapoport, however, show in "Incen-
tives for Activism" that activists do not view concern with issues and
party loyalty as conflicting values. They find a positive correlation be-
tween purposive (issue and candidate) and partisan motivations among
state convention delegates in 1980. This finding suggests that activists'
pursuit of ideological goals may be tempered by party loyalty. Similarly,
Francis and Benedict find that interest group involvement is not associ-
ated with weaker commitment to the party organization. Even among
delegates who were active in newer ideological groups such as environ-
mental or anti-abortion organizations, party loyalties were generally quite
strong.
Findings reported by Hauss and Maisel call into question the belief that
party reforms, by encouraging participation of new types of activists, have
led to domination of parties by extremist ideologues. They find that
members of these new groups—women, youth, and racial minorities—
were not significantly more likely to embrace extremist ideological
positions or to reject the values of compromise and coalition-building
than other types of activists.
Stone and Abramowitz examine the attitudes of activists toward the
tradeoff between ideology and electoral success. As in previous studies,
when activists were presented with an abstract choice between ideological
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purity and winning elections, most chose ideological purity. Yet these
general orientations, which have been the focus of so much research, had
very little impact on the behavior of activists in choosing among candi-
dates seeking the presidential nomination. Faced with a concrete choice
between candidates with differing ideological positions and electoral
prospects, activists weighed electability more heavily than ideology.
It would be a mistake to conclude from the evidence presented in this
volume that the new breed of party activists behaves no differently than
the party regulars who controlled presidential nominations before the era
of reform. Unlike the party regulars, most of today's presidential activists
are not beholden to party leaders or elected officials for their positions.
Few state convention delegates in 1980 were concerned about advancing
their own political careers. Instead, most were motivated by a desire to
promote their conception of good public policy. In this sense they were, in
James Q. Wilson's terms, amateurs. But they were also realistic enough to
recognize the necessity of compromise and coalition- building in order to
achieve their ideological or policy objectives.
Collectively, the articles included in this volume show contemporary
party activists to have more complex motivations, beliefs, and values than
previous research had suggested, holding strong views on issues along
with strong party loyalties and capable of pursuing ideological goals and
electoral success simultaneously. In reforming the rules of the presidential
nominating system, the parties have attempted to adapt to new demands
arising from their political environment. These studies indicate that the
new participants in the nominating process have also adapted to one of the
most important demands arising from their political environment: the
need for compromise and coalition-building.
METHODOLOGY
The data analyzed in this book come from a survey of delegates attending
party conventions in eleven states between April and June of 1980. These
eleven states all used a caucus-convention system (rather than a primary
election) to select their delegates to the 1980 Democratic and Republican
presidential nominating conventions. Delegates attending the state con-
ventions were responsible for electing the delegates to the national
nominating conventions. In each state, a team of political scientists
distributed and collected self-administered questionnaires at the Demo-
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Completed Questionnaires Returned at Each State
Convention
State
Arizona
Colorado
Iowa
Maine
Missouri
North Dakota
Oklahoma
South Carolina
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Democrats
337
1003
1673
1046
317
623
609
621
440
452
1669
Republicans
387
638
1107
441
380
404
1244
739
564
1218
1716
cratic and Republican conventions. The questionnaires used in every state
were identical except for their covers and a few optional questions dealing
with state issues and political leaders.
The number of completed questionnaires returned at each party con-
vention varied considerably depending upon the size of the convention
itself as well as the response rate among delegates. The acompanying
table shows the number of completed questionnaires returned at each
convention.
A total of 17,628 delegates (8,790 Democratic delegates and 8,838
Republican delegates) returned completed questionnaires. It was not
possible to compute a precise response rate to the survey in each state
since the procedures for distributing the questionnaires (generally attach-
ing them to or placing them on delegates' seats in the convention hall) did
not allow us to determine how many delegates actually received question-
naires. However, the proportion of distributed questionnaires which were
returned varied from approximately 25 percent to approximately 70
percent, with an average of approximately 50 percent.
We were able to compare the delegates who returned questionnaires
with the entire population of delegates at each convention in terms of
geographical distribution and candidate support. In only one case did we
discover a major discrepancy between the survey respondents and the
convention delegates. Among Maine Republicans, delegates from one of
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the state's two congressional districts were overrepresented among the
survey respondents. Although there was very little difference in candidate
support between delegates from the two districts, we weighted the Maine
Republicans to equalize the representation of the two congressional
districts in our sample.
Because of the large variation in the number of respondents at each
convention, unless otherwise indicated, each of the papers included in
this volume uses a weighted sample of delegates in which the representa-
tion of each state party convention is equalized. Therefore, the results
presented in these papers reflect an average of the eleven states in each
party. Many of the analyses presented in these papers were repeated with
the unweighted data and almost no differences were found in the results.
PART ONE
The 1980 Delegate Study:
Context and Overview

The Underexplored
Nomination Process
STEVEN E. SCHIER
As the first comprehensive multistate survey of delegates to state party
conventions, the highest echelon of state caucus-convention systems in
the presidential nomination process, this book augments knowledge of
the presidential nomination system in general and the 1980 nominations
in particular, and provides sorely needed assistance to political scientists'
attempts to fathom this complex, multidimensional process. Such a
description of nomination operations is emphatically not hyperbole, for
the process is as complex in its systemic import as in its baroque
operations. By "systemic import" I mean the various functions the proc-
ess actually performs in the American political system, which will be
enumerated shortly.
This complexity can be illustrated by considering three ways that the
nomination process can be conceived. It is first and most obviously a
method of candidate nomination, essential to the conduct of quadrennial
presidential elections. This most common understanding of the process
focuses upon strategies of the candidates, interpretations of the national
media and the "verdicts" (Marshall 1981, 81) from particular state
caucuses, and primaries labeled of strategic moment by the media and
candidates. These variables interact to produce "front runners" and (since
1952) national convention confirmation of them through first-ballot
nominations. This is the nomination process as most politicos, reporters,
and many political scientists conceive it.
Study of presidential nominations that settles upon the above sort of
conceptualization does not, however, adequately consider other system-
ically important dimensions of political behavior evident within the
process. Presidential nominations are also important exercises in state
politics; each caucus and primary involves a campaign and "election" in a
particular state. This ranks among the more consequential operations
involving state parties, for it serves to represent the candidate preference
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opinions of party activists and to allow the articulation (in caucus-
convention systems) of activist issue positions concerning the national
agenda. Nomination operations within states might be more accurately
described as unique interactions of national and state electoral processes.
States are subject to national media and candidate organization invasions
of varying magnitude, depending on the purported "strategic importance"
of the contest.
It is the politically active segment of a state's electorate, those willing
to vote in a primary or attend a caucus meeting, who are the focus of all
this "outsider" attention. Analysis of their behavior in such instances
informs our knowledge of the attributes of party activists within and
across states. The studies in this volume in particular divulge much
information about that stratum of activists who attend statewide conven-
tions as delegates. This state-level perspective suggests a number of
useful research questions: Do these elites vary in their attributes across
states? Why or why not? What does such variation or the absence of it
reveal to us about differences in electoral politics among these particular
states? Very few nomination process studies have focused on single states
(Marshall 1978; Lengle 1981) or multistate comparisons (Schier 1980).
The data collected here, however, provide ample opportunity for this.
Presidential nominations also can be viewed as a nationwide elite
process involving a hierarchy of political activism. By "elite process" I
mean one involving "that political class that has more influence than
others in shaping specified values through the political process."
(Kirkpatrick 1976, 22) Several strata of participation occur in it, and the
denizens of each in aggregate may vary on average from each other in
certain social, economic, and political characteristics. Some studies have
investigated the attributes of Presidential primary electorates (for exam-
ple, Ranney 1972; Hedlund 1977; Kritzer 1977). National convention
delegates at the top of this participatory structure have been thoroughly
studied as well (Sullivan, Pressman, Page, and Lyons 1974; Soule and
Clarke 1970; Soule and McGrath 1975; Sullivan, Pressman, and Arterton
1976; Jackson, Brown, and Brown 1978; Jackson, Brown, and Bositis
1982; Roback 1975; Costain 1980; Kirkpatrick 1975, 1976). Intervening
echelons with few exceptions (Nyitray 1975; Hutter and Schier 1982)
have been overlooked until the advent of this volume. Additional intra-
elite and elite-mass comparisons are now possible with this 1980 state
convention data, and all of the authors here pursue a variety of them. It is
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this conceptualization of state party conventions that most of the authors
in this book implicitly adopt as the basis for their analysis.
In order for studies of presidential nomination activities to aid the
understanding of broader national political processes, it is necessary to
conceive of the elite behaviors investigated here in reference to their
actual systemic functions. That is, what these elites actually do that is of
consequence to national electoral and policymaking systems should be
specified. The general functional importance of these elites of the
"second order"—those activists below the formal policymakers—was
identified by Gaetano Mosca: "the stability of any political organism
depends on the level of morality, intelligence, and activity that this second
stratum has obtained." (Mosca 1939, 404) Three specific functions that
these elites perform are the act of candidate choice, descriptive and
opinion representation, and opinion leadership. Each will be explained in
turn.
CANDIDATE CHOICE
The most obvious conception of nominations involves the observed
sequence of behaviors directly influencing the choice of nominee. These
choices are made throughout the process hierarchy and constitute its most
systemically consequential decisions. After all, these are the choices that
determine the identity of the two major general election candidates. Pre-
nomination candidate choice has been the object of recent formal theoreti-
cal works (Brams 1978; Aldrich 1980). John Aldrich hypothesizes
choices to be dependent upon "a tradeoff of policy and electability that
many citizens must face in preconvention campaigns," but that the actual
decision depends "upon the specifics of the situation" (1980, 84). He then
suggests that electability will be weighted more heavily later in the
campaign when reliable information about candidate prospects is more
available and costs for nonsupport of particular candidates can be more
clearly perceived.
That these propositions were written in 1980 illustrates the paucity of
our present understanding of exactly how candidate choices are made in
the nomination process. A variety of studies have demonstrated the
association of candidate preference with demographic and ideological
characteristics of national delegates in several nomination years (Soule
and Clarke 1970; Soule and McGrath 1975; Sullivan, Pressman, Page,
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and Lyons 1974; Kirkpatrick 1975, 1976; Jackson, Brown, and Brown
1978; Jackson, Brown, and Bositis 1982). Correlates of candidate prefer-
ence, though, do not tell us how the choice itself is made. Several of these
studies also measure the political "style" of delegates and draw inferences
about candidate choice behavior from responses to abstract questions of
"style."
The concept of activist behavioral "style" originates in the work of
James Q. Wilson (1962, 1973). He identified "amateur" and "profes-
sional" activist styles entailing "mutually supportive sets of attitudes
about principles, procedures and goals that relate to citizen and partisan
political activity." (Roback 1975, 439) The behavior of the amateur is
rooted in a clear expression of what constitutes the public interest and in a
strong commitment to programmatic principles. Professionals in contrast
tend to make political decisons on the basis of their electoral effects, and
they define politics in terms of negotiable concrete events (Wilson 1962,
chapters 1, 10, and 11).
Such styles supposedly manifest themselves in national delegate be-
havior in several ways. A common operationalization of style in delegate
studies (Soule and Clarke 1970; Soule and McGrath 1975; Roback 1975)
involves "no" (amateur) and "yes" (professional) responses to survey
questions asking whether party unity is to be preferred to open participato-
ry intraparty debate at conventions, whether a party worker should
support a nominee even if he disagrees with him, and whether controver-
sial items should be excluded from the party platform to insure party unity.
Delegates were also asked whether one's self-conception is that of a loyal
party worker (professional) or of an issues activist (amateur). The ques-
tion concerning nominee support clearly taps abstract notions about
candidate choice. The inference commonly made about an amateur re-
sponse to this question is that the particular respondent actually chooses
candidates on the basis of ideological proximity rather than electability.
As Walter Stone and Alan Abramowitz point out in their article in this
volume, all recent studies of national convention delegates find them to
respond overwhelmingly as amateurs to this candidate choice question.
This has been the source of no little disquiet among "neoconservative"
critics of post-1968 nomination arrangements, who decry the investment
of authority over candidate choice in delegates who are "less oriented
toward winning." (Kirkpatrick 1976,153) These amateurs (or "purists" to
use Polsby and Wildavsky's terminology) threaten through their choices
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to present to the electorate ideologically extreme candidates, resulting in
extreme policy oscillation between administrations, increasing voter dis-
affection from nominees, and thus ultimately less legitimate and stable
national electoral and policymaking systems. (For an overview and cri-
tique of this perspective, see Nakamura and Sullivan 1981.)
These dire predictions about the dysfunctional effects of the rise of
amateurs depend in large part upon the assumption that responses to
candidate choice-related survey questions strongly correlate with the
actual rationale employed by delegates in their candidate choices. Abra-
mowitz and Stone in this volume are the first to carefully investigate this
relationship, and their findings refute the conventional wisdom. At 1980
state party conventions and the notoriously "purist ridden" 1972 Demo-
cratic National Convention, they find delegates "weighed electability
more heavily than ideology" in their nomination choices, even though the
respondents in their samples overwhelmingly in the abstract "prefer
ideological purity to winning."
This is a major and controversial contribution to our understanding of
candidate choice behavior. Their findings make logical sense; abstract
stated ideals and actual behaviors often diverge in political life. The
broader implication here is that actual delegate choice behavior in the
nomination process may not have altered greatly since the reforms of
1968-1972. This is not to say that similar substantive choices have been
made since the reforms, but rather that a similar choice process has been
employed by new people. The authors do not claim that delegates judge
electability as the old bosses and delegation leaders did, but that, however
conceived, electability loomed as the foremost criterion of candidate
choice among their 1972 and 1980 samples. Thus "new politics" Demo-
cratic liberals and "new right" Republican conservatives may choose
candidates according to a criterion also employed by Mayor Daley and
Boss Cox, but their substantive choice will vary from that of the old
"pros" if they possess differing types of perceptions of what electability
entails.
Neoconservative critics may need to redirect their arguments should
further studies confirm these findings. The root of the neoconservative
objection should perhaps no longer be the amateur choice process itself,
but rather the intensity and substance of amateurs' ideological orienta-
tions as they influence perceptions involved in both this choice process
and other substantive decisions (such as those regarding the platform). A
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common neoconservative criticism of these ideological orientations is
that they are unrepresentative of those of party identifiers (Ranney 1974).
This issue is pursued later in this essay.
Such insights into candidate choice behavior are the result of creative
and careful survey instrument construction. Questions incorporated asked
for relative ideological position and electability judgments concerning
each major candidate. This permitted linkages between candidate prefer-
ences and these evaluative dimensions to be more carefully explored than
in prior studies. Further survey research on candidate choice should
incorporate comparable indicators.
REPRESENTATIVENESS
Representation is clearly a highly important function of electoral systems
in constitutional democracies. Presidential nomination processes, as part
of the American electoral system, have over the last fifteen years been the
target of reformers seeking to alter their representational procedures. The
controversial McGovern-Fraser reforms of the early 1970s ushered into
nomination practice a variety of new procedures: proportional representa-
tion, demographic quotas, and more open participation in party caucuses
and conventions. These procedures derived from divergent normative
theories of representation and engendered much controversy.
What aspects of representation were at issue? The argument revolves
around, in Hanna Pitkin's terms, "what are the politically salient features
to be represented" (1967, 87). American electoral arrangements tradi-
tionally assume the opinions of electors to be the appropriate object of
representation; it is opinion representation upon which modern electoral
practice within American parties is based. Certain recent procedural
reforms in nomination practices—proportional representation and more
open participation—have altered the mechanism for opinion representa-
tion within this process. A rival concept of descriptive representation of
social characteristics, the rationale for the controversial McGovern-Fraser
"quotas" of 1972, remains the basis for the current Democratic national
convention gender quota (half of the delegates must be female). Republi-
cans at the national level currently employ no such descriptively based
procedures. Overall, nomination procedures in both parties now have as
their central purpose the representation of nomination participants' candi-
date preference opinions.
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Candidate preference is but one of several aspects of representativeness
observable of the elites constituting the nomination process hierarchy.
Studies of other aspects of representativeness aid in defining and apprais-
ing the desirability of the particular characteristics of these elites. Political
scientists have made two other aspects of representation the object of
study in recent years: the representativeness of social characteristics and
of issue opinions or ideology. The former involves the degree of similarity
between elites and their mass base of party identifiers concerning social
and demographic characteristics. The latter concerns the degree to which
elites differ from the same mass base on specific issues and overall
ideological orientation.
Major studies of national delegate representativeness (McCloskey et.
al. 1960; Kirkpatrick 1976) show this elite to be socially unrepresentative
of identifiers in all of the characteristics associated positively with politi-
cal participation (education, age, income, and occupational status). Their
findings concerning issue representativeness, however, varied consider-
ably overtime. McCloskey et. al. (1960) found 1956 Democratic national
convention delegates to be ideologically closer to both Democratic and
Republican identifiers than were Republican delegates. Kirkpatrick
(1976) found in 1972 the opposite pattern—Republican national dele-
gates were closer to both sets of identifiers than were Democratic dele-
gates.
Relatively little has been known of the social and ideological charac-
teristics of intervening elites in the nomination process, such as state
convention delegates, until the advent of this volume. As previous re-
search found for national delegates, the state delegates investigated here
are unrepresentative of identifiers in social characteristics that correlate
positively with participation. The studies here also consistently find large
mean differences between Democratic and Republican state delegates on
both ideological self-placement and most specific issue opinions. This
suggests that party nomination elites now are conforming more closely to
the role, long endorsed by responsible party proponents, of advocating
distinct and contrasting programmatic alternatives from which the electo-
rate can choose (Schattschneider 1942; Ranney 1954).
Despite these tendencies, it is in fact unlikely that such a role can be
adequately performed by these elites, considering the at best fleeting
attention given by the electorate to the programmatic statements articula-
ted by national conventions. Presidential candidates themselves remain
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the primary providers of programmatic content of concern to the electo-
rate. Certainly the delegates choose these candidates, but apparently not
simply on the grounds of ideological proximity. The nomination process,
aside from the candidates themselves, gives the electorate less than salient
programmatic information for distinguishing the two parties from each
other.
Notwithstanding this limited programmatic effect by nomination elites
upon general election candidate choices by the electorate, the ideological
unrepresentativeness of national convention delegates was the subject of
repeated criticism by neoconservative analysts of the post-1968 nomina-
tion process. Nelson Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky identified as a primary
goal of purist nomination activists the uncompromised articulation by the
party nominee of their own (often extreme) views. Nomination processes
for purists are exercises in "self expression": "in the purist conception of
things, instead of a party convention being a place where a party meets to
choose candidates who can win elections by pleasing voters, it becomes a
site for finding a candidate who will embody the message delegates seek
to express" (1980, 23). Purists or amateurs threaten the very electoral
viability of parties by their expressive articulation of issue positions that
are extreme in comparison with those of both party identifiers and the
electorate as a whole—the McGovern and Goldwater nominations being
cases in point. This formulation has been echoed by Austin Ranney
(1975) and Jeane Kirkpatrick (1976).
Charles Hauss and Sandy Maisel in this volume identify those purist or
amateur delegate characteristics that are the object of neoconservative
opprobrium and describe their relative frequency among 1980 state
convention delegates. Relatively few delegates are evident who are "extre-
mist" in ideology and who disapprove strongly of candidates' compromis-
ing their principles in order to win. The authors then conclude that reports
of extremist takeover of the nomination process, much like certain ac-
counts of Mark Twain's death, were greatly exaggerated. These con-
clusions depend crucially upon the authors' operational definitions of
extremism, which are certain to spark controversy. Have they in this
erected a straw man?
The controversy over the presence of "extremists" among party activ-
ists is in large part a debate over definitions. How many extremists are
required to constitute a threat, and how extreme must they be? Hauss and
Maisel set high limits on each. An alternative formulation employed by
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McCloskey (1960) and Kirkpatrick (1976) measures the relative degree
of extremism of ideological self-placement by national convention dele-
gates in comparison to that of party identifiers. Which definition is to be
preferred? Relative location informs us more about the location of certain
activists in the ideological space of the electoral system, but more
absolute measures tell us more about activist "outliers" and their dis-
tinctive characteristics. Each, then, has its uses.
Though the specter of rampant purism is somewhat allayed by the
findings of Hauss and Maisel and of Stone and Abramowitz, other recent
tendencies suggest neoconservative arguments should not be entirely
dismissed. Ideological distance between delegates and identifiers is wi-
dening (Farah, Jennings, and Miller 1981). Given such tendencies, the
neoconservative fear of an ideologically unrepresentative nomination
process may be now, in fact, being slowly realized. It is important to
qualify this by noting that ideologically more extreme delegates may not
behave as prototypical purists; Stone and Abramowitz give evidence of
this. To further comprehend the actual political import of this growing
divergence, more research is needed on how ideological attributes of
delegates at all levels influence their nomination process behaviors. This
first requires a more thorough understanding of the degree of ideological
variation among elites located at various echelons of the process hier-
archy.
A number of studies in this volume contribute to such an understand-
ing by investigating state convention delegate ideology and its correlates,
most notably those evident in the social characteristics of the delegates.
Jeffrey Brudney and Jean McDonald discover that 1980 Democratic and
Republican state convention delegates "conceive of the issues in com-
parable dimensions" but from decidedly different perspectives. Candidate
preference strongly relates to ideological grouping among Democratic
delegates, Kennedy supporters being more thoroughly ideological than
any other preference group in either party. Public officeholding among
Democratic delegates also associates positively with ideological modera-
tion. No such difference occurs among the ideologically more homoge-
neous Republicans. Thus the purist specter looms as influencing delegate
behavior more among Democrats. In this party alone did issue con-
stellations, public officeholding, and candidate preference vary together,
and this covariance suggests that Democratic Kennedy delegates who
were not officeholders might most closely fit this purist description.
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Further study of the behavior of this group could more thoroughly test this
proposition.
Robert and Mary Kweit study the "permeability" of state party organi-
zations as evident in the characteristics of state convention delegates.
Their findings imply that the parties have been somewhat permeable—for
example, a substantial number of party "switchers" were 1980 dele-
gates—and that this permeability is enhancing somewhat the ideological
distinctiveness of the two parties, at least at this elite level. Those who
switched parties during the sixties in particular have more extreme ide-
ological positions. Overall, though, the ideological differences between
long-time and less experienced party activists were small. It does not
seem that the presence of new or switcher activists in these states is a
major source of more extreme ideological positions among delegates.
An additional aspect of state party permeability with implications for
the ideological variation of state convention delegates is the influx of new
migrants into state nomination politics. Laurence Moreland, Robert
Steed, and Tod Baker find the new migrants among Democratic delegates
to be more liberal in their responses to a series of issue questions. This
ideological tendency is a function of the youth and high education of these
migrants. Democratic migrants were also less supportive of Jimmy Car-
ter. No substantial ideological or candidate preference differences ob-
tained between Republican migrants and other Republican delegates.
"Upscale" young migrant Democratic delegates thus are more ide-
ologically extreme and prefer a candidate closest to them ideologically.
This is another subgroup worth investigating further for evidence of purist
behavior.
John Francis and Robert Benedict find comparable patterns of Demo-
cratic heterogeneity and Republican homogeneity in their investigations
of the interest group activism of state delegates as it relates to party
support, ideological self-identification, and specific issue positions.
Many Democratic members of newer interest groups—women's rights,
environmental, and civil rights organizations—are both more liberal and
less committed to the party than other Democratic delegates. Anti-
abortion group members are the most divergent Republicans in their
ideological and candidate support perspectives (a small divergence, by
Democratic standards). These Democratic and Republican group mem-
bers also possess supposedly purist attributes, but do they evidence purist
behavior?
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What composite portrait of the ideological and related social charac-
teristics of 1980 state convention delegates is evident from these studies?
The delegates are on average socially and economically elite, a finding
consistent with other studies of nomination activists. Greater ideological
and social homogeneity is evident among Republican delegates in com-
parison to Democrats. Certain types of Democratic delegates may be
more likely to exhibit purist or amateur behavior: party switchers during
the sixties, highly educated younger delegates, and members of newer
interest groups. This hardly indicates, however, that the Democratic party
is now dominated by operational purists. Purist attitudes in the abstract, as
we have noted, do not necessarily entail purist candidate choice behavior.
The types of delegates who potentially might display such behavior
constitute a minority of Democratic delegates in all of the above studies.
Though the degree of operational purism among state Republican
delegates in 1980 remains difficult to assess, the studies here do indicate
that Republican delegates are more uniformly ideologically extreme than
their Democratic counterparts. Republican state delegates in 1980 may
not behave as purists in their candidate choices, and relatively few may
fall at the poles of indicator scales measuring extremism. It nonetheless is
possible that such an overwhelmingly conservative group's perceptions of
electability could differ from that of more moderate party identifiers, thus
making their candidate choices somewhat less representative of identi-
fiers. Such a divergence was evident in the substantive issue choices of
national Republican delegates in 1980, resulting in a national platform to
the right of the issue preferences of party identifiers. Perhaps the ide-
ological homogeneity of Republican delegates threatens to make their
collective behavior more unrepresentative of party identifiers than that of
the Democrats, who are on average equally extreme but more hetero-
geneous.
The Republican and Democratic state delegates possessed on average
two distinctly different programmatic perspectives in a fashion roughly
similar to that desired by "responsible party" advocates. Programmatic
distinctiveness of this sort is somewhat unrepresentative of the party-in-
the-electorate. To what extent is this unrepresentativeness a problem?
After all, nomination procedures provide for representation of candidate
preference opinions of actual participants, not of the issue preferences of
party identifiers. This sort of unrepresentativeness will be dysfunctional
for the broader electoral system if conventions nominate candidates
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widely considered "extreme" on the issues by the electorate. Abramowitz
and Stone demonstrate that candidate choice processes of 1980 state
delegates do not necessarily guarantee this result. We thus must continue
to be concerned with the consequences. If ideologically extreme process
participants choose candidates largely on the grounds of ideological
proximity, electoral dysfunctions—alienated voters, lower turnout—will
probably result. The quality of opinion representation in nomination
processes in this way fundamentally influences the legitimacy of the
American electoral system. Studies of purist nomination behavior (as
opposed to attitudes) therefore must rank high on the agenda of future
research. Future surveys should incorporate, in addition to indicators of
candidate preference behavior such as those used in this 1980 survey,
comparable measures of activities such as platform decisions. These
measures can identify behavior that indicates the degree of represen-
tativeness of nomination activists.
OPINION LEADERSHIP
Opinion leadership is the least commonly acknowledged systemic func-
tion of nomination process elites. By "opinion leadership" I mean direct
or indirect influence upon the opinions of others through the articulation
of one's own opinion. Such leadership commonly operates in two modes:
a personal mode involving personal contact with others that is both direct
and indirect (for example, through friends as intermediaries); and an
impersonal mode entailing direct and indirect contact with others through
media mechanisms. Personal opinion leadership is largely a function of
personal political activism. Through interest group and party activities,
one acquires skills and knowledge that permit personal influence upon the
opinions of others both within and without the nomination process. The
quality of this leadership in specific instances depends also upon a variety
of psychological and social variables as well. The paucity of studies of
opinion leadership of this sort is testimony to the difficulty of systemati-
cally observing such complex and (in the scientific sense) uncontrollable
interactions. Much of our understanding of how this operates in the
nomination process comes from journalistic accounts of such incidents as
activists' interaction with voters. (For example, see White 1961, 1965,
1969, 1973; Witcover 1978; Schram 1977).
Impersonal opinion leadership in the nomination process is more
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commonly the object of academic and journalistic attention. This involves
impersonal dissemination of various symbolic and substantive messages
from nomination process participants through the media, where activists
do not control the content of the disseminated messages to the extent that
they can in personal opinion leadership. Are the delegates united? How do
they stand on important platform issues? Why do they support their
nominee? Answers to these sorts of questions are supplied by the media to
mass audiences throughout the nomination process. This conduit permits
delegates to at least indirectly communicate advocacy of their opinions to
a far larger group than personal opinion leadership can reach. The impact
of impersonal leadership is greatly diluted by its very mechanism of
transmission, however. Not many people seek out media interpretations of
delegate opinions, much less weigh them heavily. As noted earlier, it is
the candidates themselves who inject into the electoral process the
programmatic content to which the electorate actually pays attention.
Delegates in the aggregate nonetheless do create images of national
conventions in the minds of voters which probably influence their elec-
toral choices, the exotic image of the 1972 Democratic national conven-
tion being a case in point (Wattenberg 1973).
Both sorts of opinion leadership perform certain systemic functions
through the nomination process. Personal opinion leadership can serve to
reinforce or alter the opinions of party and group identifiers and to clarify
the programmatic commitments of activists. This contributes to the
patterning of opinion among both nomination process elites and those
party identifiers who regularly interact with them. Impersonal opinion
leadership through the media can influence both the issue opinions and
candidate evaluations of the electorate.
These opinion leadership functions are more thoroughly understand-
able from the perspective of agenda-building theory. Cobb and Elder
(1972) identify two sorts of opinion agendas in the American political
system: a systemic agenda, defined as "all issues that are commonly
perceived by members of the political community as meriting public
attention and as involving matters within the legitimate jurisdiction of
existing governmental authority" (1972, 85), and an institutional agenda,
"that set of items explicitly up for active and serious consideration of
authoritative decision makers" (1972, 86). The authors contend that both
party platforms and media coverage are conduits for the emergence of
issues on the systemic agenda (1972, 91).
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The processes of opinion leadership sketched here involve a set of
behaviors by nomination process activists entailing interactions with
others personally and impersonally that, independent of the actual nomi-
nation candidate contest itself, influence the content of national systemic
and institutional agendas. Issues promoted by these nomination elites are
deemed legitimate by a broader public and accorded systemic and even
institutional attention. How substantial is this activist influence? I have
already suggested that such agenda-influencing attempts are dwarfed by
the influence that party nominees themselves have upon the agenda status
of particular issues. Precious little attention, though, has been paid to such
functions by students of the nominating process. The agenda effects of
personal and impersonal opinion leadership both within and without the
nomination process deserve more systematic scholarly pursuit.
Certain studies in this volume do relate to this research question.
Francis and Benedict's study of interest group affiliations of state dele-
gates identifies several arenas of delegate opinion leadership. Moreland,
Steed, and Baker demonstrate the changing composition of opinion
leaders in state nomination processes resulting from migration of activ-
ists. Ronald Rapoport devotes perhaps the most thorough attention to this
dimension of activist behavior in his analysis of the attributes of at-
titudinal constraint among 1980 state convention delegates. He finds that
attitudinal constraint or consistency in this sample correlates positively
with education, even when controlling for self-professed ideology,
motivation for activism, and previous political involvement. This con-
trasts with earlier studies of mass samples in which constraint was more
strongly related to involvement than to education. The findings suggest
that education among nomination process elites affects their agenda-
influencing activities, since attitude structuring among delegates should
be reflected in their opinion leadership behaviors.
Rapoport also identifies a group of attitudinal purists among the
delegates who possess high levels of constraint. He constructs a purism
index that identifies purists as those delegates who score particularly low
on personalism and pragmatism scales, high on an ideology scale and are
motivated by single issues. Rapoport finds these delegates rank higher in
constraint than those at the opposite ends of the scales of this index.
However, purists consist of only 19 percent of the delegates—hardly a
flood tide. Further research should identify social and demographic
characteristics of these attitudinal purists: do they include the types
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evidencing purist characteristics in other studies in this volume? The
effects of high constraint among this purist group upon actual behavior
also bears investigation, since distinctive purist behavior is the source of
concern for neoconservatives.
The neoconservative critique, then, can be understood as also a crit-
icism of the opinion leadership activities of certain types of delegates.
Ideological extremism and tactical amateurism, if ascendant in both
parties, should serve to broaden the systemic agenda and encourage
polarization around its central issues. This polarization may then in turn
produce massive voter alienation. These speculations are based upon
hypothetical assertions about delegate behavior that as yet have not been
systematically proved or disproved. The studies here by Stone and Abra-
mowitz and by Hauss and Maisel do suggest that such behavior was not
greatly in evidence at 1980 state conventions. We can further understand
opinion leadership by nomination activists only by investigating relevant
behaviors as they relate to the neoconservatives' hypothetical correlates of
constraint, ideology, party support, and motivation. Such analysis should
also encompass an appreciation of the systemic functions performed by
delegate opinion leadership.
In this essay's title I termed the presidential nomination process
"underexplored" because political scientists have not yet thoroughly
pursued the rich and varied theoretical implications of process behavior.
This essay attempted to illustrate several perspectives usefully employable
in the study of nomination participants' activities, and to indicate those
sorts of activist behaviors that particularly bear further scrutiny. If this
essay is of heuristic value, it has fulfilled its purpose.
The studies in this volume in various ways address the theoretical
concerns I have raised here. Certainly much about nomination process
behavior remains to be discovered, but the studies here sizably contribute
to our understanding of who the people in the middle of this process are
and how they behave.
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Between Light and Shadow:
The Political Context
L. SANDY MAISEL
The blood on the streets of Chicago, Mayor Daley gesturing ominously at
Abraham Ribicoff, the frustration of those who worked within the politi-
cal system to unseat Lyndon Johnson only to have his handpicked
successor capture the presidential nomination—these are the indelible
memories of the 1968 Democratic convention. But just as these events left
an imprint on the political minds of all of those who participated in that
troubled convention, so too did they leave a permanent mark on the way in
which we nominate our presidential candidates. Nothing has been the
same since 1968.
When Nelson Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky wrote the first edition of
Presidential Elections (1964), they were undoubtedly convinced that
revision for all subsequent additions would be routine. All that would be
necessary would be to include examples from each successive presiden-
tial election. After all, the process was not constantly under revision. The
rules had remained substantially the same since the Democrats eliminated
the two-thirds rule in 1936. The candidates' strategies did not differ
significantly from year to year. The number of states holding primaries
had remained roughly the same since 1920, and roughly the same
percentage of delegates (about 40 percent) were chosen in primary
elections. The importance of party bosses who controlled large delega-
tions could not be underestimated.
Polsby and Wildavsky themselves have noted how much has changed
in the two decades since their first edition appeared.
Anyone who claims that there is no such thing as real and funda-
mental change in American politics need only glance at our account
of what has happened [since the publication of their first edition]—
procedures for making nominating decisions, the kinds of people
who are influential in making them, the characteristics of the
delegates, and their basic dispositions towards politics have all
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undergone drastic alterations over the years (Polsby and Wildavsky
1980, vii).
Not only has the process changed, but how political scientists study the
process has changed as well. What we know about the "old process"
comes largely from anecdotal material. For example, according to
Schlesinger (as cited in Polsby and Wildavsky 1964, 119) James Farley
opposed the attempt to defeat the two-thirds rule in 1932, "knowing well
that not all delegates who were for Roosevelt were against the rule, and
fearing that a defeat on this issue might set back the whole Roosevelt
drive." How did Schlesinger know that Farley felt this way? How did
Farley get his information? More important, was Farley right? We simply
do not know. We have relied heavily on conventional wisdom, the wisdom
of our elders. Key wrote that state and local party leaders' "influence may
be decisive in the action of state primaries and conventions" (1964, 402)
and that "though the conventions may not be bossed, selection of dele-
gates becomes a matter handled exclusively by party professionals"
(1964,408). Generations of political scientists have explained the process
to their students in these terms or terms similar to them. Key cites no
sources; on what data did he base his findings?
In more recent years delegates to national conventions have been
closely studied. Polsby and Wildavsky know who delegates are and what
they think about politics because these delegates have been studied over
and over (see, as examples, Sullivan et al. 1974; Kirkpatrick 1976;
Sullivan et al. 1976). From the National Election Studies series we know a
great deal about what the voting public thinks as they are deciding whom
to support during the presidential selection process. But we know vir-
tually nothing about the process through which delegates to national
conventions are chosen if they are not chosen through presidential prefer-
ence primaries.
The state convention is part of today's political world, and it is a
fallback to the political world described by V.O. Key and his contempo-
raries. It is a world of party loyalists and political activists; it is a world of
one-time amateur participants. Most important, it gives us a good overall
view of the kinds of people active in politics in the 1980s. Perhaps the best
analogy is to that famous television show of the era when caucus-
convention politics was more prevalent, Rod Serling's The Twilight Zone.
These delegates might not be "between light and shadow, between science
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and superstition," but they are in a twilight zone of politics, between the
formal procedures of the past and those of the present and future, between
boss-dominated parties and participatory democracy, between party loy-
alty and issue, or candidate, activism.
The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate how the process has evolved
to the present state and to describe the part of the process which leads to
state conventions choosing national convention delegates in some of the
states.
THE DELEGATE SELECTION PROCESS
Hubert Humphrey won the Democratic presidential nomination in 1968
without winning a single presidential preference primary. The founda-
tions of the Democratic party and of the presidential nominating process
were shaken during the spring and summer of 1968. First Senator Eugene
McCarthy and then Senator Robert Kennedy asked hundreds of thousands
of Americans to seek to alter the country's foreign policy by working
within the system. Many did work within the system and they succeeded
at the task they were given. They unseated Lyndon Johnson, but the prize
they sought, their party's nomination of a peace candidate, was denied to
them by a complex, archaic, and ultimately undemocratic process.
The convention delegates, even as they were nominating Hubert
Humphrey, saw that the process was badly flawed. They approved a ma-
jority report from the convention's credentials committee which called for
giving Democrats a "meaningful and timely opportunity" to participate in
the selection of their party's nominee, and they also accepted a minority
report of the rules committee which called for changes to guarantee a "full
and timely" opportunity for participation. Shortly after the convention,
National Chairman Fred Harris appointed a Commission on Party Struc-
ture and Delegate Selection (commonly referred to as the McGovern-
Fraser commission after its original chair and his successor) to carry out
the mandate of the convention to alter the rules for delegate selection.
The McGovern-Fraser commission took its mandate seriously. The
sense of urgency which pervaded its deliberations is expressed clearly in
the concluding section of Mandate for Change, the commission's final
report: "If we are not an open party; if we do not represent the demands for
change, then the danger is not that the people will go to the Republican
Party; it is that there will no longer be a way for people committed to
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orderly change to fulfill their needs and desires within our traditional
political system. It is that they will turn to third or fourth party politics or
to the anti-party politics of the street" (McGovern-Fraser commission
1971).
The reforms instituted as a result of the McGovern-Fraser commis-
sion's report took note of the fact that many state parties had no written
rules, that the delegate selection process was often concluded before it
was clear who the candidates were or what the significant issues would be,
and that many rank-and-file Democrats had no opportunity at all to
participate, much less to participate in a full and meaningful way. To
correct these situations, state party rules had to be written down and
widely disseminated, the process could not begin before the calendar year
in which a presidential election was to be held, all meetings had to be
widely publicized and opened to all Democrats, parties had to make
significant efforts to see that those groups traditionally underrepresented
in Democratic party decision-making circles—women, minorities, and
younger voters—were involved in numbers roughly equivalent to their
proportion of the voters in an area, and party meetings had to be run under
rules which guaranteed the fairness of those proceedings.
The McGovern-Fraser commission's recommendations specifically
recognized that states should have a good deal of leeway in determining
how they would choose delegates to national conventions. Primary sys-
tems and caucus-convention systems, each with a number of variations,
could conform with the new rules. However, by adopting these new rules,
the national party sought to assure that certain basic standards were met.
To put the matter most bluntly, the changes had not only the desired
impact, but also far-reaching consequences not envisioned by those who
wrote the rules. This is not the appropriate place to reopen the debate over
whether these rules were dysfunctional for the Democratic party. How-
ever, it is appropriate to note the effects of the McGovern-Fraser reforms
and subsequent reforms on the presidential nominating process. For our
purposes, the most significant consequence is that many state parties
found that the easiest way to conform with the new Democratic party rules
was to hold presidential preference primaries. In 1972, state delegations
were successfully challenged on the basis that the caucus-convention
procedure had not been carried out in a manner which complied with the
new rules. Thereafter, state parties felt that they were on less dangerous
ground if they selected delegates through primaries. Here the rules were
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Table 2.1. Presidential primaries and percentage of delegates chosen,
1964-1980
Year
1964
1968
1972
1976
1980
Democrats
Number of
primaries
17
15
22
30
32
Percentage of
delegates
45.7
40.2
65.3
76.0
71.8
Republicans
Number of
primaries
17
15
21
30
34
Percentage of
delegates
45.6
38.1
56.8
71.0
76.0
Source: 1964 through 1976 comes from Wayne 1981, 84; 1980 derived by the author
from Congressional Quarterly Service sources.
quite simple and could be administered through one central election
mechanism, as opposed to caucuses spread throughout the state and
administered by local officials less concerned about or even aware of the
procedural rules.
The McGovern-Fraser reforms affected only the Democratic party.
However, because delegate selection rules are most frequently written into
state law, changes in how the Democrats operated had effects on Republi-
can party procedures as well. Table 2.1 lists the number of presidential
preference primaries and the percentage of delegates chosen in those
primaries for each party since 1964. The trend toward more primaries in
which an increasing percentage of the delegates are chosen is clear. There
appears to have been a slight aberration for the Democrats in 1980,
because a smaller percentage of Democrats were chosen in these prim-
aries than had been the case in 1976. However, this too can be explained
by rule changes. In 1980 the Democrats were more insistent on closed
primaries than they had been in the past. Michigan, which has tradi-
tionally held a primary, found that it was unable or unwilling to change
state law to conform to Democratic party rules. Consequently, the Michi-
gan Democrats held a nonbinding primary on the same day that the
Republicans held their primary. However, the delegates to the national
convention were elected in separate caucuses, which had been held nearly
a month earlier. If Michigan's 141 delegates were added to the total
selected in primary elections, the upward trend would have continued.
It should be further noted that there are a number of different kinds of
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presidential preference primaries. Those listed in Table 2.1 are only those
primaries through which delegates are actually chosen to the national
convention. New York Republicans are included in this list, even though
the delegates' presidential preferences are not listed on the ballot. So too
are those states such as Illinois in which the presidential preference poll
and the delegate selection poll are conducted separately, though at the
same time. I have also included the Vermont Republican primary, which
determines the delegates chosen only if one candidate receives 40 percent
of the votes cast, which did not happen in 1980. Nonbinding presidential
preference primaries held by Idaho, Michigan, Texas, and Vermont
Democrats and by Montana and District of Columbia Republicans are not
included in the table.
Most, but not all, of the largest states are included in the group which
holds presidential preference primaries. However, twenty states for the
Democrats (plus Guam, the Virgin Islands, Democrats Abroad, and Latin
American Democrats) and eighteen for the Republicans (including Ver-
mont, which really had a dual system) selected their national convention
delegates through some sort of caucus-convention system.
These systems too can be usefully broken down, with different cate-
gorization schemes appropriate depending on the problem confronting
the analyst. In some cases a tiered-caucus system exists, one in which
delegates are elected at one caucus level to go on to the next caucus level
and so forth up to the state convention which chooses delegates to the
national convention. For instance, Oklahoma Democrats met first at the
precinct level, then at the county level, then at the congressional district
level, and only finally at the state convention. Some of the delegates were
chosen at the district conventions, which in fact convened at the site of the
state convention. Others were chosen as the state convention met as a
body. In other cases, for example both Republicans and Democrats in
Maine, local caucuses elected delegates directly to the state convention at
which national convention delegates were selected. In the case of the
"nonstate" Democrats, such as those on Guam, delegates to the national
convention were elected directly at the caucus, with no intermediate step.
Another useful way to categorize caucuses deals with the amount of
competition. Senator Howard Baker referred to the January caucuses in
Iowa as "the functional equivalent of a primary" (Germond and Witcover
1981, 93ff.). The same could be said of the caucuses in Maine and
perhaps in other states. A second distinct group includes those states in
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which there was competition for delegate slates, but not intense competi-
tion. These states can be separated from those above by factors such as
personal effort by the presidential candidates and/or turnout (though only
estimates are available for turnout in many states). Colorado and North
Dakota Democrats seem to fit into this category. Finally, there were
several caucus states in which there was essentially no competition. This
seems to have been the case in many Republican states, e.g., Oklahoma or
Vermont, whose caucuses were held after it was clear that Ronald Reagan
had the nomination in hand.
However, the clearest distinction seems to be between the Democratic
party caucuses and the Republican party caucuses. They differed in terms
of formal rules and informal norms as well as level of competition. In an
effort to place the data on which the rest of this book is based into as clear
a context as is possible, a discussion of some of the important differences
between Democratic and Republican activities in caucus-convention
states follows.
THE 1980 CAUCUSES
The rules governing the Call to the 1980 Democratic National Conven-
tion specified the ways in which delegates chosen through the caucus-
convention system were to be selected. Specifically, the rules mandated
that the Democrats in a particular state convene all caucuses on the same
day, that the presidential preference of the delegates at each successive
stage in the selection of delegates to the national convention accurately
reflect the presidential preferences of those participating at the next lower
stage (except that those preferencees receiving less than 20 percent of the
expressed support need not receive delegates to the next higher level) and
that at least three-quarters of the delegates be chosen in a district not
larger than a congressional district. Within these guidelines states had a
good deal of leeway; however, these rules themselves were quite deter-
minative of the composition of delegations to state conventions, all of
which were chosen through a process the rules of which were restricted by
the national rules.
Because delegates at each stage in the process had to reflect the
presidential preferences of those at earlier stages, the first stage in the
total process was the most important. Thus it was the Iowa caucuses on
January 21, not the county or district caucuses held later in the process,
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Table 2.2. Democratic caucuses and presidential preferences of
delegates
State
Iowa
Maine
Minnesota
Delaware
Hawaii
Washington
Alaska
Oklahoma
Mississippi
South Carolina
Wyoming
Virginia
Idaho
North Dakota
Michigan
Missouri
Texas
Colorado
Utah
Vermont
Date of
first stage
January 21
February 10
February 26
March 9
March 9
March 9
March 11
March 11
March 15
March 15
March 15
March 22
April 17
April 19
April 26
April 22/May 6
May 3
May 5
May 19
May 24
Presidential preference of
national delegates
Carter
31
11
38
10
15
36
0.6
34
32
34
8
59
8
2
70
57
104
19
10
5
Kennedy
17
11
—
4
4
21
1.8
3
—
1
3
5
5
4
71
5
38
13
4
7
Other
22
—
37
—
—
1
8.6
5
—
2
—
—
4
8
—
15
10
8
6
—
Source: Congressional Quarterly articles at time of caucuses and on the eve of the
Democratic National Convention (August 9, 1980: 2268).
which received the most press attention and which in fact determined the
composition of the Iowa State Democratic Convention and the Iowa
delegation to the Democratic National Convention. Because of the impor-
tance of the local-level caucuses, it is important to note when these were
held. These dates are listed in Table 2.2.
It is important to note that the first stage in twelve of the twenty caucus-
convention states was held early in the presidential nominating process.
The Iowa caucus, of course, received the most publicity. However, cau-
cuses in other states were also hotly contested between supporters of the
various presidential hopefuls. Records were set in state after state for
caucus attendance. Those at the caucuses were often encouraged to come
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to support their presidential favorite in much the same way that party
faithful are prodded into voting on primary day in other states. The
delegates elected at these caucuses were elected because of their support
for one presidential hopeful or another, or because they were well-known
party workers who preferred to stay uncommitted and convinced a signifi-
cant proportion of those at the caucus to do the same. However, they did
not go on to the next stage, nor eventually to the state conventions, just
because they were long-time party faithfuls. They had to play an active
role in the 1980 presidential selection process to be selected to go on.
In other states, however, the caucuses were less hotly contested. In the
southern caucus states, for instance, Senator Kennedy's campaign did not
make a major effort because they did not feel such an effort would bear
fruit. These states typically do not have a history of contested, open
caucuses such as that which exists in Iowa, Maine, or Minnesota. There-
fore, caucuses were less well attended, contests less frequent, and dele-
gates more like those conforming to the conventional wisdom of years
ago, loyal party followers and workers, receiving rewards for past efforts.
In still other caucus states the first round was not held until after it was
clear that President Carter had built an insurmountable lead over Senator
Kennedy and would be renominated. The experiences in those states
differed according to local factors. In Missouri, as an example, the
candidates did little active campaigning, but supporters of Senator Ken-
nedy—union liberals (especially the International Association of Ma-
chinists), pro-abortion and pro-ERA supporters, blacks, and others—
persisted in their campaigns, particularly in the local enclaves where they
had most support, even though by late April and early May when the
Missouri caucuses were held it was evident that their candidate would not
be the nominee. In Michigan, on the other hand, the Kennedy campaign
worked hard and had strong support from labor. The Michigan caucuses
were strongly contested by the Kennedy campaign because they were
viewed as a last-ditch effort. Kennedy strategists saw that they could gain
a symbolic victory quite cheaply, largely because the caucuses were
poorly advertised, poorly understood by the voters, and consequently
poorly attended. The organizational efforts of the pro-Kennedy unions
paid significant dividends. In other states with late caucuses, however, the
fight was over before it began. The campaigns did not wage major battles,
and the caucuses were poorly attended. The delegates selected tended to
be those who had been active in party organization in the past.
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A number of factors stand out in looking at the experiences in the states
in which the Democratic party elected delegates to the national conven-
tion through the caucus/convention method. First, of course, the rules
played a major role. There was no chance for delegates to switch their
presidential preference after the first stage in the process was completed.
Thus those delegates from early states could not respond to the campaign
as it unfolded. More important for our point of view, the delegates selected
to state convention were supporters of particular presidential candidates
and often viewed their role primarily in that light. Thus, it is unclear
whether they would have wanted to change their presidential preference
even if they had had the opportunity.
However, the rules were not the only factor influencing the choice of
delegates. Level of competition was also important. Determined by dif-
ferent factors in different states, level of competition was to some extent
determined by outside forces—i.e., did the major presidential contenders
put significant campaign resources into these caucuses? In some cases
they felt this was necessary because of the timing of the caucuses and the
media attention; Iowa and Maine stand out as examples here. In other
cases the effort was either put in or not put in because of perceived payoffs.
However, factors peculiar to individual states also determined the level of
competition. This was particularly apparent in those states which have a
rich history of caucuses and meaningful state convention. In North
Dakota, despite the fact that the first-level caucuses were not held until
mid-April and no presidential hopeful made a major effort in the state,
delegates at the state convention fell into five separate camps—Carter
supporters, Kennedy supporters, uncommitted delegates, and delegates
not committed to either presidential hopeful but united under the banner
in one case of the state's education lobby and the other of the Prairie
Campaign for Economic Democracy. The last two groups received two
and six presidential delegates from the state convention respectively.
The delegates to Democratic state conventions, then, represent a
diverse group. They are Carter loyalists and Kennedy loyalists. They are
party regulars and one-time activists. They are those who fought hard for
the positions they received and those who attended conventions almost as
a matter of routine. They are those active in their state party and those
whose activity was stimulated by others outside of their states. They are
certainly not a unified bloc, but they do represent the wealth of experi-
ences which define activists in a political system as decentralized as ours.
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Table 2.3. Dates of Republican caucuses and presidential preferences
of delegates
Date of
Presidential preferences of
national delegates
January 21
February 2
February 21
February 26
all of February
March 9
March 22-29
April 7
April 13
April 22
May 10-13
May 3
May 5
May 10
May 15
May 17
June 6
June 28
37
9
19
26
—
4
34
34
34
16
51
28
31
16
12
3
20
21
State first stage Reagan Bush Other
Iowa
Arkansas
Alaska
Minnesota   17
Maine   6 4
Delaware   — 2
Missouri  3 4 — 3
Oklahoma
Washington   2 1
Vermont   — 3
Virginia
Arizona
Colorado
Wyoming   — 3
North Dakota   1 4
Hawaii   — 11
Montana
Utah
Source: Congressional Quarterly articles on eve of Republican National
Convention. (July 12, 1980: 1928). Many delegates switched to Reagan at the
convention as other candidacies collapsed.
Politicians and political scientists spend a good deal of time and effort
attempting to differentiate Republicans from Democrats. One very clear
difference has emerged strikingly in recent years: the Republicans have
specifically rejected the Democratic National Committee's efforts to
dictate how states should select delegates to national nominating conven-
tions. The Republicans have had a reform commission; they do encourage
more participation by women and minorities. However, they have assidu-
ously avoided requiring their state party organizations to follow any
particular rules or guidelines. "And that," as the Mad Hatter said, "has
made all the difference."
Table 2.3 lists the Republican states which held caucuses in 1980,
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along with the dates of the first stage of the caucus-convention process
and with the allocation of delegates among presidential candidates after
the state convention. Only seven of the eighteen states held the first round
of their caucuses relatively early in the nominating season. The other
eleven states held their first caucuses well after the Reagan nomination
was assured. Even more important is recognition of the fact that the first
stage of the nominating process is not as significant for the Republicans as
it is for the Democrats. While the Democrats insist that the presidential
preference of those at the first stage in the nominating process is reflected
at the next and subsequent stages, the Republicans mandate no such
representation. To the contrary, in many states those attending the first
round caucuses are not even asked their presidential preference. In Iowa,
where the Republican caucuses probably were given more media attention
than those of the Democrats, presidential preference was determined.
George Bush went from the position of an asterisk in public opinion polls
to that of a legitimate challenger to Ronald Reagan because of his showing
in those caucuses. However, the Iowa Republicans do not freeze delegates
selected at the local caucuses into their presidential choice for the rest of
the process. There was a good deal of shifting away from Bush and toward
Reagan at subsequent county and district conventions, before the final
delegation to the national convention was chosen.
Even with that shifting permitted, Iowa is somewhat atypical of the
Republican pattern. Colorado is perhaps most typical. In the case of
Colorado, Republicans, as identified by registration procedures outlined
in state law, caucused at the precinct level in order to elect delegates to
county conventions. Approximately 3 to 5 percent of the eligible Republi-
cans attended the caucuses, though no accurate turnout statistics were
reported. Those attending the precinct caucuses were not polled as to their
presidential preference. At the county conventions, delegates were
elected to the state and congressional district conventions. Again the
norm was for straw polls not to be taken; even when they were taken, these
votes on presidential preference were not used to allocate delegates to the
next stage convention.
But even the Colorado example shows more "regularity" than was seen
in other Republican states. In Arizona, for example, rank and file Republi-
cans had virtually no say in the process at all. In the spring of 1978, rank
and file Republicans elected precinct committeemen. These individuals
were the only ones eligible to attend the first round of the Arizona caucus,
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held in May of 1980. Thus the total potential electorate for the county
caucuses for Arizona Republicans was only about 200. Oklahoma pro-
vides another interesting case for the Republicans. All registered Republi-
cans are permitted to attend the precinct meetings, which were held on
April 7 in 1980. Delegates were elected at these meetings to attend county
conventions; at those conventions delegates were elected to the district
and state convention, regardless of whether they were elected by the
county conventions or not. Thus the process stays open to a larger number
of party activists for a much longer period of time.
It is not necessary or appropriate to make value judgments on the
differences between Republican procedures and those of the Democrats.
It is not far from accurate to say that the Republican caucus state pro-
cedures in 1980 look very much like those which the Democrats em-
ployed prior to 1972. The main changes within the Republican party have
involved states moving from caucus-convention systems to primary sys-
tems, often following changes in state laws which were implemented
because of the needs of the Democrats to comply with their party's
national rules. Thus the Republican party caucus states have not had to
comply with the rules of the McGovern-Fraser commission and have not
done so. In not doing so, they have not had the benefits of those reforms in
terms of openness and timeliness and the like; nor have they had to deal
with the problems caused by those reforms and commented on so fre-
quently by critics of the new Democratic procedures.
What one can say with some certainty is that, compared with Demo-
cratic delegate selection, the process by which the Republican delegates
to the 1980 state conventions were chosen looked a lot like the process in
operation throughout the nation before the reforms. But were the results
the same as before the reforms? If so, we might expect the delegates to be
party regulars and party workers attending the convention as a reward for
past work, joining in a statewide meeting with others who share their
views, to reinforce those views, to rebuild the spirit of the party which will
carry them on to the fall campaign. As we shall see, findings on these
points are not so clear cut.
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide some background for
those reading the chapters drawn from analysis of the survey of delegates
to state conventions in 1980. Certainly these delegates do not stand as a
random sample of political activists. They were chosen as part of a process
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which itself is undergoing change. They represent only one group out of a
number who together constitute the decision-makers that process has
designated. Moreover, because these delegates come from different states
which chose delegates with different political situations, they are not
homogeneous.
However, they are an important group of political activists to examine
for the exact reason that they represent a wide range of political activists.
The Republicans, particularly, represent something of a throwback to the
politics of another era. As such, they are undoubtedly different from
Republicans who are active in states which do not maintain the caucus-
convention system. The Democrats themselves represent a diverse group,
some not unlike their Republican counterparts, some not unlike their
copartisans in primary states.
The presidential nominating process is often criticized because it lacks
coherence. The diversity of rules—and consequently the diversity of types
of people chosen as delegates—is symptomatic of this lack of coherence.
The delegates analyzed in this study do represent activists who have
played key roles in state and local political organizations, but perhaps
without decision-making power. So long as we understand what these
delegates represent and what they do not, they do stand as an important
group to study in order to learn more about those active on the American
political scene.
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An Analysis of
State Party Activists
ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, JOHN McGLENNON,
RONALD B. RAPOPORT
The question of how best to study American state and local parties has
long been in dispute. Some scholars (e.g., Burnham 1970) have relied
heavily on aggregate election results; others (e.g., Gibson, Cotter, Bibby,
and Huckshorn 1981) have sought information about the staffing, bud-
gets, and other operating details of party organizations. In between are
studies of county chairmen (Jackson and Hitlin 1981), and of state
chairmen (Huckshorn 1976). Gibson et al. (1981) are clearly correct in
their contention that organizations can be fruitfully studied in terms of
"institutional party strength," but it is also true that this party strength is,
over a period of time, dependent on the financial and manpower support of
large numbers of volunteer activists. It is this group of activists at the state
level that we propose to examine.
State party activists are not homogeneous across the United States. As
Frank Sorauf recently noted, "what we blithely call the national parties are
merely coalitions of jealous, wary, and diverse state and local party
organizations" (Sorauf 1980, 109). In spite of this diversity, however, we
will argue that there are some very important commonalities among the
activists in each state party—commonalities in the demographic makeup
of the activist group and in the ideological and issue positions of activists.
Furthermore, we will show that much of the regionalism of the party
system, discussed by Key and those who followed (Key 1949; Lockhard
1959; Fenton 1966) is no longer so prevalent. Findings at the mass level
(Beck and Lopatto 1982) indicating that even the South has become much
less distinct, also apply at the level of party activists. In the second part of
the article, we will focus on how state party differences in past and present
electoral success have produced parties with distinctive activist bases.
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DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
More than in other countries, political activity in the United States is
highly correlated with social class (Nie and Verba 1975, 42). Whether we
look at voting or more demanding activities, education and income are
strongly related to participation (Milbrath and Goel 1977). It should not
be surprising then to find that the incomes and education levels of our
activists are substantially above the average for their states. Overall, 18
percent of our activists earn $45,000 or more a year, while only 16 percent
earn under $ 15,000. In every state, at least 10 percent of the activists earn
over $45,000. In terms of education, the unrepresentativeness of the
activists is, if anything, more apparent. Over half are college graduates,
and more than 80 percent have at least some college.
More interesting than the aggregate findings, however, are party and
state differences in demographics. Traditionally, among mass samples,
Republican voting has borne at least a mild relationship to income, race,
and education (Miller, Miller, and Schneider 1980). However, among
eligible voters, the relationship with income and education has dimin-
ished substantially in the last two decades, particularly among the young
(Abramson 1974; Ladd 1982). What we should expect to find for elites,
across states, is not self-evident. Particularly in states dominated by one
party or the other, we might expect to find class differences more com-
monly expressed in factional disputes within the majority party rather than
between the parties. Samuel Patterson (1963) found that in Oklahoma, a
Democratic dominated state, Democratic activists were substantially
higher in income, education, and age than were their Republican counter-
parts. Patterson then argued that a dominant state party might be expected
to draw on the dominant social group. If so, states in our study like South
Carolina and Texas might be expected to show the same reversal that
Patterson found, rather than reflecting the traditional partisan coalitions.
As Table 3.1 shows, however, party activist differences in income do
reflect traditional differences in the coalitional bases of the parties. In all
eleven states, Republican activists are wealthier. They are both more
likely to make $45,000 or more (23 percent compared to 13 percent for
Democrats) and less likely to make under $15,000 per year (13 percent
compared to 19 percent for the Democratic activists). It is important to
note that this difference is not determined by the degree of minority
representation among Democratic activists, as it is found in all states,
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Table 3.1. Income and education of activists
State
Arizona
Colorado
Iowa
Maine
Missouri
North Dakota
Oklahoma
South Carolina
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Percentage
over $45,000
Repub- Demo-
lican
17.9
26.2
22.1
15.7
21.0
34.3
21.7
20.2
37.8
11.7
27.7
crat
10.5
11.2
8.8
6.4
14.7
16.1
13.7
12.9
16.7
9.0
21.3
Percentage
under $15,000
Repub- Demo-
lican
14.1
9.7
10.5
20.9
14.0
11.7
16.0
13.4
8.7
17.6
9.3
crat
21.1
19.1
22.1
28.2
16.4
22.0
14.3
19.8
15.0
18.5
15.3
Percentage
college grad
Repub-
lican
45.5
58.9
56.6
59.4
45.4
44.8
40.4
60.9
59.0
59.0
56.9
Demo-
crat
58.1
57.6
45.9
53.6
40.7
50.2
37.0
60.0
60.0
56.1
59.1
Ns*
Repub- Demo-
lican
387
638
1107
441
380
404
1244
739
564
1218
1716
crat
337
1003
1673
1046
317
623
609
621
440
452
1669
*This is the total N for each state party. In cases of missing data percentages are
calculated on the basis of a reduced N throughout the paper. In no case are Ns reduced by
more than 20 percent.
regardless of whether blacks number less than 5 percent of the Demo-
cratic delegates as in North Dakota, or over 30 percent of the Democratic
delegates as in South Carolina.
Our support for Patterson's hypothesis is rather weak. Although the
four most Republican states according to Ranney's Index of Party Compe-
tition (Ranney 1976) do show four of the five highest Republican income
advantages, Democratic dominant and majority states do not show par-
ticularly small Republican advantages. More striking is the relationship
between Republican and Democratic incomes across states (r = .74
between percentage of Democrats under $25,000 in a state, and the
percentage of Republicans earning under $25,000). Consistently then,
Republicans earn more than do Democratic activists, and those states
with wealthier Republican activists also have wealthier Democratic activ-
ists.
Studies of party elites have consistently found small differences be-
tween educational attainment of Democratic and Republican elites (Jack-
son and Brown 1982, 12). Ours is no different. This is not surprising given
the overall high level of education among our activists, and the in-
creasingly large role played by public school teachers in the Democratic
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State
Arizona
Colorado
Iowa
Maine
Missouri
North Dakota
Oklahoma
South Carolina
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Percentage
female
Repub- Demo-
lican
46.7
39.7
37.4
43.5
42.8
33.9
47.7
35.7
44.8
22.3
46.6
crat
47.1
50.3
50.4
52.1
48.7
46.6
53.4
58.7
40.0
37.6
50.8
Percentage
minority
Repub-
lican
1.8
2.9
1.2
0.0
*
1.3
3.6
1.5
3.1
0.8
1.9
Demo-
crat
20.4
9.4
2.0
1.6
2.0
12.5
38.3
16.5
4.8
18.0
Percentage
under 30
Repub- Demo-
lican
4.3
8.3
14.2
*
15.6
9.0
19.7
18.0
12.6
22.0
14.7
crat
22.0
18.1
22.9
15.8
23.5
18.3
14.2
21.1
22.5
18.6
Percentage
over 60
Repub- Demo-
lican
30.7
14.2
15.2
*
22.0
18.2
18.4
15.3
13.2
9.5
17.9
crat
18.0
12.0
11.9
*
15.5
18.6
15.9
13.1
10.8
13.9
17.3
*Data unavailable for state party.
party (an average of one in four Democratic delegates were active in
educational organizations, compared with less than one in seven at the
Republican conventions). Once again state differences are rather small, as
Table 3.1 shows.
Although openness of the parties without regard to age, race, and sex
categories is specifically mentioned in the charters of both parties
(Harmel and Janda 1982), the Democratic commitment to affirmative
action is unmatched in Republican party rules. Recently, the Democratic
party has debated, and, at various times, instituted quotas for women and
minorities (Ranney 1978).
This might lead to an expectation of a substantially higher percentage
of young, women, and minority delegates at Democratic state conven-
tions. However, while race has consistently and strongly been related to
vote, this has not been the case for either age or sex (Miller, Miller, and
Schneider 1980). We should expect then that party differences in race will
be reinforced by both electoral coalition composition and by affirmative
action guidelines, while only the latter will affect sex and age distribu-
tions (Mitofsky and Plissner 1980, 43). This should lead to large party
differences in minority representation, but much smaller age and sex
differences.
Table 3.2 strongly supports this expectation. In every state with a
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sizable nonwhite population, Democratic activists mirror or exceed the
percentage of minority group members in the population, while for
Republicans, the percentage of nonwhite activists is almost entirely
unrelated to the percentage of nonwhites in the state population. For
example, Iowa Republicans, with 2.6 percent nonwhites in the state, had
1.2 percent minority representation at their convention, while South
Carolina, with 31.2 percent minorities, had only 1.5 percent minority
representation at their Republican convention.
Youth and female representation are less related to party. In ten of
eleven states, Democrats had more female activists than did Republicans.
However, because of affirmative action mandates, it is difficult to infer
from this that a higher percentage of Democratic activists are female.
Overall, Democrats had an average of 49 percent female delegates and
Republicans 40 percent. Within each party female representation was
quite consistent across states, with the exception of Utah, which is heavily
influenced by a strongly patriarchal Mormon Church. Once again we see
consistent (although in this case small) differences between parties, and
broad homogeneity across states.
Age differences, as Table 3.2 shows, are even less consistent. Al-
though a majority of states show more Democratic delegates under thirty,
the differences exceed 10 percent for only Arizona and North Dakota. The
Republican advantage in delegates over sixty, although present in a
majority of states, reaches 5  percent in only Arizona and Missouri.
Unlike income and education, in which delegates come from the higher
echelons, age and sex breakdowns of delegates are much less skewed, al-
though, not surprisingly in view of participation research (Verba and Nie
1972), the young are underrepresented in both parties. Women are slightly
underrepresented in the Republican party, but not in the Democratic party.
PARTISANSHIP AND IDEOLOGY
But demographic attributes, important as they may be symbolically, are
clearly important to issue representation. The study of social background
characteristics is often based on the assumption that they will affect the
issue positions supportive of the groups represented (Putnam 1976).
American political parties are often viewed as ideologically decen-
tralized, even comprising different political cultures (Elazar 1972). We do
know, for instance, that Southern Democrats vote consistently more
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State
Arizona
Colorado
Iowa
Maine
Missouri
North Dakota
Oklahoma
South Carolina
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Ideological
placement3
Repub- Demo-
lican
4.40
4.30
3.80
3.78
4.32
4.07
4.41
4.38
4.53
4.38
4.27
crat
2.25
2.34
2.32
2.43
2.67
2.36
2.80
2.47
2.35
2.47
2.51
Issue
scaleb
Repub- Demo-
lican
4.4
5.4
8.3
9.7
5.2
6.3
4.7
4.3
3.9
4.6
5.5
crat
16.4
15.5
17.1
15.8
13.0
16.2
12.3
13.5
15.0
13.7
14.4
Percentage
strong
national
partisans
Repub- Demo-
lican
93.3
87.3
80.1
71.7
83.6
93.5
83.9
84.9
88.4
79.3
85.0
crat
83.6
62.8
75.9
63.2
85.7
61.5
78.6
70.9
77.7
55.6
77.8
Percentage
strong
state
partisans
Repub- Demo-
lican
93.6
85.7
78.4
70.8
79.2
92.7
80.6
78.1
81.2
74.5
82.5
crat
85.7
71.7
74.0
61.5
82.7
74.2
81.4
81.3
79.4
69.6
81.7
"On this scale 1 is very liberal and 5 is very conservative.
bOn this scale 0 means that all 13 issues responses were in the conservative
direction; 26 would mean that all issue positions were in the liberal direction.
conservatively than do northern Democrats in the Congress (Manley
1973). Kenneth Janda (1980), comparing U.S. parties with forty-two
others in Western Europe, found the U.S. Democratic and Republican
parties to be the two lowest in centralization of power. On the other hand,
surveys of national convention delegates have found wide differences
between mean positions of the delegates from the two parties. This
finding applied to the pre-amateur days of the 1950s (McClosky et al.
1960) as well as for the radically altered environment of the 1970s
(Kirkpatrick 1976; Farah et al. 1981). In our survey, we had respondents
rate themselves on a one-to-five scale ranging from very liberal (one) to
very conservative (five). In addition, we asked them for their positions on
thirteen national issues, on the basis of which we computed a liberalism
scale.1 As Table 3.3 shows, the most striking differences are between
parties in a given state. On the five- point scale the average difference in
self-placement between Democratic and Republican delegates was 1.8
units. Although interparty differences are not the same in all states, the
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smallest difference is still substantial (1.34 units in Maine). Furthermore,
the most conservative Democratic party (Oklahoma) is still to the liberal
side of center on the ideological scale, and is closer to the most liberal
Democratic party (Arizona) than it is to the nearest Republican party
(Maine). Similarly the most liberal Republican Party (Maine) is still
closer to the most conservative Republican party (Texas) than it is to the
nearest Democratic party.
Of course self-placement is a subjective matter. Liberal in Texas may
not mean the same as in Maine. Turning to our objective measure of
ideology (based on the thirteen issue responses), we find almost identical
results. In fact, the correlation (r) between mean state party score on self-
placement and objective ideology is — .88 for the Democrats, and — .98
for the Republicans (because the scales are in opposite directions, the
correlations have negative signs). Again, although there is a range on our
liberalism scale among Democrats (from 12.3 to 17.1) and among
Republicans (from 3.9 to 9.7), the most liberal Republican Party (still
Maine) is substantially more conservative than the most conservative
Democratic Party (still Oklahoma). Furthermore, each state Democratic
party is substantially more distant from its Republican counterpart than it
is from any other Democratic party, and the same holds for each state
Republican party.
What stands out from this examination of ideology of activists is the
consistent liberalism of the Democrats and the consistent conservatism of
the Republicans. Even in the most conservative Democratic state, dele-
gates are much more likely to call themselves liberals than conservatives,
while even in the most liberal Republican state, delegates are more than
seven times as likely to call themselves conservatives as to call themselves
liberals. Activists in traditional strongholds of conservative Democrats,
like South Carolina, Virginia, and Texas, are not even clearly more
conservative than those in states like Maine, North Dakota, and Iowa.
American party politics has clearly become less regional and more
national, at least at the party activist level.
Nationalization of parties, however, implies not only ideological sim-
ilarity, but loyalty to the national party as well. To what degree do these
convention delegates identify with the national party whose state conven-
tion they are attending? While it is clearly the case that we would not
expect many delegates at a party convention to identify with the other
party, we might expect to find, given the tradition of regionalism and
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localism, that the degree of identification with the national party would
vary across states. There has recently been a rebirth of regional caucuses in
the Congress (Arieff 1980) and during Carter's term westerners, even
Democrats, were known to be unhappy with many of his programs
(Fenton, Cook, and Buchanan 1980). This could produce lower levels of
national identification, even given the high level of ideological homoge-
neity within each party.
Our measure of the degree of party identification in a state is simply the
percentage of delegates from that state party convention saying that they
strongly identify with that party. (We asked respondents about their
identification with national and state parties in different questions.) Even
at a national convention we might expect to find some variance on
partisan strength. Lee (1981) reports that 74 percent of 1976 Democratic
National Convention delegates and 72 percent of 1976 Republican dele-
gates were strong partisans. Overall, the level of national partisanship
among our activists is even higher than Lee found; an average of 78
percent of our respondents were strong identifiers (72 percent among
Democrats and 85 percent among Republicans). There is, however, sub-
stantial variation across states, particularly among the Democrats.
The percentage of Democratic delegates calling themselves "strong
Democrats" ranges from slightly over half (56 percent) in Utah to 86
percent in Missouri. What is particularly striking is the lack of aggregate
relationship among state parties between ideology and national par-
tisanship. Oklahoma, which was the most conservative Democratic party,
is the third most partisan at the national level. Equally surprising is that, of
the five border and southern states, four are above average (72 percent) for
Democrats in their national partisanship, and even South Carolina is only
1 percent below average. Southern parties look increasingly like other
Democratic parties outside of the South. Although the South does not
show low partisanship, however, two of the three western states do (Utah
and Colorado).
Low levels of national partisanship can be a result of a differentiation
between state and national parties or of simply a low identification with
party in general. Of the four states lowest in national partisanship, three
(Utah, Colorado, and North Dakota) show substantial increases in loyalty
when we look at state partisanship.2 Only Maine does not. What sets
Maine apart from other Democratic parties is its large number of dele-
gates who are new to the process. More than one-half of Maine Demo-
52 The 1980 Delegate Study
cratic delegates had been active less than five years, and almost 60
percent had been active in few or no recent political campaigns.3
Republicans show substantially less variation in partisanship across
states. In every state except Maine, 79 percent or more of the delegates are
strong partisans. Maine Republicans resemble Maine Democrats in that
almost half (46 percent) have been active less than five years, and in that
over 60 percent are usually active in few or no campaigns. Once again, it is
the absence of previous party contact, either national or state, which is
responsible for the low level of partisanship (which does not increase at
the state level). One surprising fact about Republicans, compared with the
Democrats, is that state partisanship is weaker than national partisanship
in ten of the eleven states. Clearly regionalism plays less of a role in the
Republican party. This lack of regionalism may be attributed to the
ideological homogeneity of the national Republican party (Ladd 1982), as
well as to the greater visibility of national Republican organizations such
as the Republican National Committee, giving the party members a more
national focus.
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
In addition to regional and party differences among our activists, our data
also allow us to look at organizational differences among state party
organizations and to examine how party activists in different organiza-
tional situations might differ from one another. Parties may differ in a
variety of ways. The differences we will examine relate to changes in party
dominance (measured by the Ranney index) over the last thirty years. If a
minority party has any hope of eventual success, it is under pressure to try
to expand its appeal, both to the voting electorate and to the set of more
involved or involvable activists. Over the last forty years, party competi-
tion has increased markedly across the country. This is reflected in our
eleven states. Using 1946-1963 data, Ranney categorized twenty-five
states as either one-party states or modified one-party states, and twenty-
three as two-party competitive states (Ranney 1965). Eight of our eleven
states were either one-party or modified one-party states. On the basis of
1962-1973 data, only sixteen states—including only five of our eleven—
still had scores that would put them in these categories using the criteria
Ranney used in 1965 (Ranney 1976).
In order to increase levels of competition, the minority party had to
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State
Arizona
Colorado
Iowa
Maine
Missouri
North Dakota
Oklahoma
South Carolina
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Percentage
childhood
out of state
Repub-
lican
78.0
64.1
23.4
46.3
31.0
17.8
39.5
52.3
*
*
55.8
Demo-
crat
62.5
55.1
22.7
47.6
18.6
17.9
25.2
23.7
*
39.6
Percentage
switching
parties
Repub- Demo-
lican crat
19.5 5.4
24.0 17.5
18.1 16.7
* *
22.2 7.0
9.5 19.0
31.1 11.0
29.2 9.4
35.8 9.8
17.9 27.1
31.0 12.6
Percentage
pragmatic
Repub-
lican
37.9
31.4
41.7
37.3
31.1
52.9
27.6
31.8
36.1
20.3
38.7
Demo-
crat
39.5
33.6
30.8
26.8
38.9
36.5
32.9
34.5
39.8
35.0
45.6
*Data unavailable for state party group.
recruit partisans from the majority party, recruit voters and activists
disproportionately among migrants to the state, or recruit heavily among
the young. Our data allow us to examine the first two of these processes in
detail. If we take as our base point for party strength the average of the
1946-1973 period (averaging the 1946-1963 and 1962-1973 Ranney
indices), we find Democratic majorities (average index ratings over .55)
in South Carolina, Texas, Oklahoma, Arizona, Virginia, and Missouri.
Republican majorities (average index ratings of .45 or lower) existed in
North Dakota, Colorado, Maine, and Iowa. Utah was closely divided
throughout the period. In all states with a majority party, except for
Missouri, which showed little change, and Colorado, in which the Repub-
lican position improved, the minority party has registered substantial
gains over the baseline period (Jewell and Olson 1982, 25-27).4
As Table 3.4 shows, with the single exception of Iowa, there are strong
effects of either migration, conversion, or both, benefiting the erstwhile
minority party. In states of the South, conversion effects are particularly
strong with an average of one-third of Republican delegates from Vir-
ginia, Texas, and South Carolina having switched from the Democratic
party. By comparison, only about 10 percent of Democratic delegates
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from the same states had been Republicans. The South also shows strong
migration effects with a majority of both Virginia and South Carolina
Republicans having spent their childhoods out of state. Missouri and
Oklahoma, border states, show similar trends, and both trends are strong-
er in Oklahoma where the Republican gains have been greater. In states
with Democratic gains, similar processes have clearly been at work to the
advantage of the Democrats. Because these are states with less immigra-
tion, migration effects are rather low for both parties and do little to
differentiate between the parties. Unfortunately, data on conversion were
unavailable for Maine, but in North Dakota, Democrats were twice as
likely to be former Republicans as the reverse. Iowa provides the only
negative findings.
Colorado shows that the majority party may, in increasing its majority,
be dependent on conversion and migration, just as the minority party
would be. Both migration and conversion differences favored the Colora-
do Republicans over their Democratic counterparts. We are able, then, by
looking at the background of activists, to get some handle on processes of
change in the party systems of the various states.
But changes in the status of parties should be expected to affect not
only the formerly disadvantaged party. Activists who have seen their state
party's dominance evaporate over a period of time could be expected to
regroup and begin to look for ways to stop the decline. It is to be expected
that among such parties we should find particularly high levels of prag-
matism, since such parties should be particularly interested in expanding
their base and in winning elections even at the price of ideological purity.5
Five states ranked as modified one-party states over the 1946-1963
period moved into two-party competition over the 1962-1982 period.
Three are Republican (Iowa, North Dakota, and Maine), and two are
Democratic (Virginia and Arizona). In our eleven-state sample, an aver-
age of 35.8 percent of Democrats and 35.2 percent of Republicans rated
high on pragmatism. Each of our five declining state parties rated above
the average for either party and above the pragmatism level of the
opposing party in their state (by an average of 9.3 percent). In only one
other state did differences between pragmatism levels of the parties
exceed 8 percent, and that was Utah where the difference can again be
ascribed to the extremely heavy influence of Mormon delegates in the
Republican convention compared with the Democratic. Even though this
use of cross-sectional data to infer a dynamic process (increasing prag-
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matism) is far from conclusive, it does suggest an interesting and plausi-
ble organizational adjustment to the partisan environment.
We see then that changes over time in the electoral success of parties
result in parties with a different makeup from their forerunners. The
improving minority party becomes more reliant on converts and outsiders;
the declining majority party may become less purist and more pragmatic.
Organizational factors are, then, reflected in the activists who make up the
party elite.
At first glance, our findings seem inconsistent. In many ways activists
are all similar to one another. Regardless of party, activists are highly
educated and are well-off relative to others in their state. Although
Democrats are, in general, likely to have more women and youths in their
ranks, the differences are not particularly striking. Only on race do we
find consistently strong party differences.
But demography can certainly not explain the strong ideological
differences we consistently find between the parties. Even in the most
conservative states, Democratic activists are consistently more likely to
call themselves liberals rather than conservatives and to take issue posi-
tions far different from those of their Republican neighbors. American
parties may, as Janda (1980) suggests, be decentralized, but even without
central direction, Democratic and Republican activists are broadly similar
in ideology to their fellow partisans in other areas of the country. Further-
more, these state party activists, with a few exceptions, show consistently
high levels of identification with the national party—higher, in the aggre-
gate, than delegates to the 1976 national conventions (Lee 1981).
Finally, in spite of ideological differences, state organizations from
both parties are subject to the same organizational imperatives. The rising
parties must find new recruits from converts and migrants, and the
declining party must try to expand its base of support by broadening its
appeal and becoming more pragmatic. Clearly, then, American state party
activists are in some ways similar to others of their party, in some ways
similar to other activists in their state, and in some ways similar to other
party activists simply because their respective state parties confront the
same organizational problems.
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NOTES
1. The issues included were ERA, abortion, defense spending, National
Health Insurance, nuclear power, domestic spending cuts, affirmative action for
minorities, oil deregulation, wage-price controls, inflation, the draft, SALT II,
and U.S. presence in the Middle East. Liberal responses were counted as 2,
neutral responses as 1, giving the scale a range of 0 to 26, with 13 being the
equivalent of all neutral responses. In Maine the National Health Insurance
question was not asked and all respondents were coded at the neutral point.
2. These four states are also distinguished in that they are the four lowest in
terms of the percentage of respondents saying that a very important motivation in
becoming active was "to support my party."
3. Maine is unusual in that Brown, Crane, and Anderson did particularly well
in these states. The strength of these insurgent, outsider candidates might mean
that Maine delegates were less representative of the Maine party activists in
general than is true for other states.
4. Ranney's index is based on vote for governor, seats in the state legislature
held by each party, and control of the state legislature and governorship. Change is
ascertained by comparing the 1946-73 period with the 1960-82 period. This latter
classification is taken from Jewell and Olson (1982) who use the same criteria as
Ranney, including as well the percentage of offices contested by each party.
Because the periods of comparison overlap, our measure is intrinsically conserva-
tive.
5. The pragmatism index consists of a simple additive scale based on five
Likert-type questions (question 14 in the appendix). The questions asked about
the relative importance to the delegate of winning elections versus ideological
purity. The resulting scale ranged from 5 (all ideology oriented responses) to 25
(all winning oriented responses). The scale was then trichotimized into high,
medium, and low pragmatism categories.
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INCENTIVES
AND MOTIVATIONS

4
Incentives for Activism
ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, JOHN McGLENNON,
and RONALD B. RAPOPORT
One of the central tenets of organization theory is that the incentives that
motivate individuals to participate in an organization have important
consequences for the character of that organization (Clark and Wilson
1961). Many studies in recent years have pointed to a shift in the types of
incentives that motivate individuals to participate in party politics in the
United States. There is broad consensus among students of American
political parties that material rewards and party loyalty have been declin-
ing in importance as incentives for activism while candidates and issues
have become increasingly important as motivations for participation in
party affairs (Wilson 1962; Hirschfield et al. 1962; Bowman et al. 1969;
Ippolito 1969; Wiggins and Turk 1970; Roback 1974; Polsby and Wild-
avsky 1980; Sorauf 1980). Moreover, this shift in the nature of the
incentives for activism is generally seen as having negative consequences
for the vitality of the parties as organizations. The "new breed" of issue-
oriented activists have been characterized as dogmatic purists more
concerned with advancing their issue concerns within the party than with
maintaining the effectiveness of the organization in order to win elections
(Wildavsky 1965; Sullivan et al. 1974; Soule and McGrath 1975; Polsby
and Wildavsky 1980; Kirkpatrick 1976, 1978). In addition, it has been
argued that purposive motivations (defined as concern with candidates
and issues) are unlikely to sustain long-term involvement in party affairs:
individuals whose involvement is stimulated by a particular issue or
candidate are unlikely to remain involved once that issue or candidate is
gone. Activists motivated by idealistic goals may also easily become
disillusioned by the bargaining and compromise necessary in politics.
Hence, party organizations which rely on purposive motivations to attract
activists are likely to suffer high rates of attrition (Wilson 1962; Conway
and Feigert 1968; Sorauf 1980).
The involvement of issue-oriented activists in party affairs has been
particularly evident in the presidential nominating process as a result of
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reforms which have reduced the ability of elected and party officials to
control the selection of delegates to the national conventions (Ranney
1974; Polsby and Wildavsky 1980; Marshall 1981). The proliferation of
presidential primaries and the democratization of party caucuses and
conventions have made it possible for individuals with little or no com-
mitment to the party as an organization to influence the selection of a
candidate and even to become delegates to the national conventions. In
1972, for example, many of the McGovern and Wallace delegates at the
Democratic national convention expressed very little loyalty to the Demo-
cratic party as an organization. Their commitment was to their own
candidate and the issue concerns represented by that candidate
(Kirkpatrick 1976). On the basis of her massive study of Democratic and
Republican national convention delegates in 1972, Jeane Kirkpatrick
concluded that "by 1972 the attenuation of attachment to party had
affected the elites of both parties and all elite factions but was especially
strong among newcomers to politics and the elite supporters of Wallace
and McGovern. Because attachment to party is related to many aspects of
political behavior, a continued trend away from solidary incentives will
probably mean a major and fundamental change in the American political
system" (1976, 114).
Examining evidence from a survey of 17,628 delegates attending
twenty-two state party conventions in connection with the 1980 presiden-
tial nominating campaign, this chapter will argue that the fears expressed
by Kirkpatrick and other scholars concerning the dangers to the parties
from the growing involvement of issue-oriented activists have been gener-
ally exaggerated. While our evidence does support the conclusions of
earlier studies regarding the importance of purposive motivations among
contemporary party activists, we also find strong party attachments
among these activists. Moreover, there was a positive correlation between
purposive and partisan motivations among state parry convention dele-
gates in 1980 and both purposive and partisan motivations were related to
length and regularity of party involvement. Finally, we show that party
loyalty played an important role in determining the outcome of the
Democratic nominating campaign among these activists by dampening
the influence of ideology on candidate preference.
MOTIVATIONS OF PARTY ACTIVISTS
In order to assess the motivations for participation of delegates to state
party conventions in 1980, our survey included a question, similar to
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71
8
21
32
14
52
(7602)
67
84
80
4
13
22
8
53
(7772)
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Table 4.1. Motivations of state convention delegates
Democrats Republicans
Party loyalty
Issues
Candidate
Career
Excitement
Meet people
Visibility
Civic duty
(minimum N)
Note: Each entry is percentage of delegates rating motivation as "very important.'
those used in other studies of party activists, asking delegates to rate the
importance of various motivations for their decisions to participate in the
1980 nominating campaigns (see appendix, question 15). When the
responses were factor analyzed, two distinct factors emerged.' The first
factor included four items: career advancement, the excitement of par-
ticipating in the campaign, the opportunity to meet other people with
similar interests, and the visibility of serving as a delegate. While
seemingly disparate in content, all of these items involve personal bene-
fits received from participation in the campaign. The second factor
included only two items: advancing issue concerns and working to
nominate a particular candidate. These two items clearly correspond to
the more impersonal or purposive motivations for participation. Finally,
two items—party loyalty and civic duty—did not load clearly on either
factor. The results of the factor analysis were generally consistent with
previous studies of motivations among party activists, which have distin-
guished between personal and impersonal goals. Since party loyalty and
civic duty were not clearly tied to either set of motivations, these items
were analyzed separately.
Table 4.1 presents the delegates' ratings of the importance of each of
the eight motivations included in the survey. As other recent studies had
led us to expect, purposive motivations were rated as the most important
by delegates in both parties; overwhelming majorities of Democratic and
Republican delegates rated issues and candidates as "very important"
factors in their decisions to participate in the 1980 nominating campaigns.
What is somewhat more surprising is that party loyalty was rated right
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behind purposive motivations in importance. In contrast, the personal
benefits received from participation in the nominating process were rated
much lower in importance by delegates in both parties. Although Demo-
cratic delegates rated the personal motivations as somewhat more impor-
tant than did Republican delegates, while Republican delegates rated
purposive motivations somewhat higher in importance than did Demo-
cratic delegates, activists in both parties clearly saw party loyalty along
with concern with issues and candidates as the primary reasons for their
involvement in the nominating campaign.
We have seen that Democratic and Republican state convention dele-
gates rated the importance of party loyalty almost as high as the impor-
tance of issue and candidate concerns as a motivation for their in-
volvement in the nominating campaigns. Moreover, there was a positive
correlation between partisan and purposive motivations in both parties
(r= .23 for Democratic delegates, r = . 13 for Republican delegates). Of
the delegates in each party who rated both issue and candidate concerns as
"very important" motivations for participating, 70 percent also rated party
loyalty as a "very important" motivation. Thus our findings do not support
the contention of scholars like Kirkpatrick that the growing importance of
purposive motivations has led to a decline in party loyalty among activists.
Among the delegates in our survey, these two orientations were quite
compatible with one another. Like the local committee members studies
by Burrell (1982), most of these state convention delegates were con-
cerned about issues and candidates and loyal to their party.
Table 4.2 shows the relationships between partisan and purposive
motivations (appendix, question 15) and a variety of political background
characteristics and attitudes.2 Not surprisingly, there was a strong rela-
tionship between strength of party identification (question 11) and par-
tisan motivation. The prevalence of partisan motivation among
Democratic and Republican activists was a reflection of the fact that the
large majority of these activists (72 percent of Democratic delegates and
85 percent of Republican delegates) were strong party identifiers. There
was also a fairly strong positive relationship between strength of party
identification and purposive motivation. Among these delegates, issue
and candidate concerns were not only compatible with party loyalty, they
were actually stronger among delegates with strong party loyalties. More-
over, purposive motivations were just as prevalent among party and
elected officials as among other delegates. "Professionals" were no less
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Table 4.2. Motivations correlated with political experience
Party identification
Conservatism
Years active in party
Regularity of campaign
involvement
Organizational experience
Electoral experience
Democrats
(minimum N
Partisan
motivation
.77
.09
.46
.43
.30
.29
= 7072)
Purposive
motivation
.31
- . 1 0
.16
.18
.04
.07
Republicans
(minimum N = 7548)
Partisan
motivation
.76
.11
.32
.33
.24
.24
Purposive
motivation
.27
.37
.12
.18
.02
.03
Note: Entries shown are gamma coefficients.
concerned about candidates and issues (although they were more con-
cerned about their party) than were "amateurs."
The findings presented in Table 4.2 do not support the contention that
purposive motivations become less important the longer one remains
active in the party. In fact, issue and candidate concerns were positively
related to both length of involvement in the party (question 2) and
regularity of campaign participation (question 8). Far from being the
"morning glories" derided by Tammany Hall leader George Washington
Plunkitt, purposive activists tended to be the most experienced and
dedicated party workers. Nor is there any evidence in our data that
personal motivations tend to replace purposive motivations with longer
involvement in the party, as Conway and Feigert (1968) argued in their
study of members of local party committees in Maryland and Kentucky. In
fact, there was no relationship between strength of personal motivations
and either length of party involvement or regularity of participation
among Democratic or Republican delegates.3 The only group of delegates
who demonstrated significantly stronger personal motivations in both
parties were the very youngest age group)—those under the age of twenty-
five. It was among these political novices, almost all of whom were
participating in their first convention, that the excitement, social contacts,
prestige, and career opportunities associated with the campaign loomed
largest in importance.4 Among the older and more experienced delegates,
these personal benefits were much less significant attractions. Thus,
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while personal benefits may play an important role in stimulating initial
involvement in party affairs, they appear to have little to do with sustained
and regular participation. Frequent and sustained involvement in party
affairs appears to be motivated by concern with issues and candidates and,
especially, by party loyalty.
The findings presented in Table 4.2 provide further evidence for the
crucial role of party loyalty as a motivation for political activism. Partisan
motivation was strongly related to both length and regularity of participa-
tion in party affairs among Democratic and Republican delegates. Of
course, partisanship may be both a cause and an effect of party activity.
Partisanship can stimulate activity on behalf of the party and its candi-
dates. In addition, involvement in party affairs probably reinforces and
strengthens partisan orientations. Whatever the direction of causality, it is
clear that despite the decline of party loyalties in the electorate, par-
tisanship remained an important motivation for political participation
among these activists.
MOTIVATIONS AND CANDIDATE PREFERENCE
Thus far we have demonstrated that partisan motivations were an impor-
tant stimulus to participation among state party convention delegates in
1980 and that strong party loyalties were quite compatible with strong
purposive orientations among these delegates. We are also interested in
whether these motivations had any impact on the most important activity
of these delegates—the selection of a presidential candidate. Kirkpatrick
and other scholars have argued that activists with strong purposive
orientations will seek to nominate candidates who represent their own
issue concerns, regardless of the electoral consequences for the party.
However, if party loyalty is an important consideration in the minds of
activists, it may temper their enthusiasm for candidates who appeal to
their issue concerns but who threaten to undermine the party as an
organization.
The 1980 campaign for the Democratic nomination provides a par-
ticularly good opportunity to test the relationship between issue concerns
and party loyalty, because it involved a challenge to the renomination of
the incumbent president.5 Although he had originally campaigned for the
presidency in 1976 as an outsider without close ties to the Washington
establishment or to the leadership of his own party, in 1980 Jimmy Carter
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clearly sought to identify himself with the traditions and past leaders of
the Democratic party. Carter appealed to loyal Democrats for support as an
incumbent whose relatively moderate record and positions offered the
party the best hope of retaining the White House. In general, we would
expect party loyalty to lead activists to rally behind an incumbent presi-
dent of their own party when the incumbent is challenged for the nomina-
tion; the incumbent president is the national leader of his party and a
successful challenge to the incumbent would be seen by party loyalists as
a repudiation of the party's leadership and record.
Edward Kennedy's challenge to Jimmy Carter for the Democratic
presidential nomination in 1980 was based largely on his outspoken
support for liberal positions on general issues. As a result, we would
expect Kennedy to have appealed primarily to liberal activists with strong
purposive orientations. We are interested in whether party loyalty reduced
support for Kennedy among these purposive liberal activists.
In contrast to the Democratic contest, neither of the two major candi-
ates seeking the Republican nomination could stake out a clear claim to
the support of activists based on party loyalty. Despite the backing of some
party leaders associated with former President Ford and the tacit support
of the ex-president himself, George Bush had never held an elective office
which would have established him as the recognized leader of the Repub-
lican party. However, because of his long association with the conservative
cause, Ronald Reagan should have appealed strongly to purposive conser-
vative activists in the Republican party.
Table 4.3 shows the joint effect of purposive and partisan motivations
on support for the two major candidates in each party among state
convention delegates. As expected, among Republican delegates, pur-
posive motivation was related to support for Reagan, while partisan
motivation had no effect on candidate support. Moreover, the relationship
between purposive motivation and support for Reagan remained fairly
strong after controlling for ideology. As a candidate long noted for his
issue-oriented appeal, Ronald Reagan appealed to Republican activists
with strong purposive orientations. Even among moderate-to-liberal Re-
publicans, purposive motivation was related to support for Reagan. Only
32 percent of moderate-to-liberal Republicans with low purposive
motivation supported Reagan compared with 53 percent of moderate-to-
liberal Republicans with high purposive motivation. Apparently, despite
their ideological differences with Reagan, purposive Republican moder-
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Table 4.3. Candidate preference and motivation
Partisan motivation
Low
High
Low
High
Low
Purposive motivation
Medium
Democrats (percentage for Kennedy)
21
(N = 441)
14
(N = 384)
Republicans (percentage
63
(N = 246)
58
(N = 263)
35
(N = 667)
21
(N = 817)
for Reagan)
75
(N = 503)
71
(N = 685)
High
50
(N = 1123)
28
(N = 2928)
86
N = 1439)
87
(N = 3342)
Note: Only delegates supporting Kennedy or Carter for Democratic nomination and
Reagan or Bush for Republican nomination are included.
ates were attracted by Reagan's personal style and issue-oriented ap-
proach.
Among Democratic delegates, purposive motivation was related to
support for Kennedy, as expected. However, party loyalty clearly worked
against Kennedy's challenge to the incumbent among these activists.
Table 4.4 shows that the effect of partisanship was greatest among the
most liberal activists in the Democratic Party—those who belonged to
Kennedy's natural ideological constituency. Support for Kennedy was
thirty percentage points lower among "very liberal" Democrats with
strong partisan motivations than among "very liberal" Democrats with
weak partisan motivations.
It appears that party loyalty caused many liberal Democrats to ignore
their ideological inclinations and back the incumbent. Among liberal
Democratic delegates (including those who described themselves as
either "very liberal" or "somewhat liberal"), 63 percent viewed Edward
Kennedy as closer to their own ideological position than Jimmy Carter
while only 18 percent viewed Carter as closer to themselves (questions 16
and 20).
Yet these liberal Democratic activists supported Carter over Kennedy
for the nomination by a decisive 58 to 42 percent margin. Why did
Kennedy receive so little support from his own ideological constituency
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Table 4.4. Preference for Kennedy among delegates
Very Somewhat Moderate to
Partisan motivation liberal liberal conservative
Low 78 42 21
(N = 453) (N = 947) (N = 843)
High 48 29 16
(\ = 720) (JV = 1737) (N = 1905)
Note: Based on delegates supporting either Kennedy or Carter for Democratic
nomination.
within the Democratic party? The main reason was that 58 percent of
these liberal activists viewed Jimmy Carter as having a better chance to
win the November election while only 24 percent believed that Kennedy
would have a better chance of winning (question 23). Contrary to the
image of contemporary party activists as dogmatic ideologues, our evi-
dence indicates that in choosing a nominee, many of these delegates were
quite willing to sacrifice ideological purity for the sake of a greater chance
of victory in November. (The following chapter, which provides a full
analysis of the impact of ideology and electability on candidate choice,
shows the much greater.effect of electability.)
In conclusion, then, party loyalty, along with issue and candidate
concerns, were the most important motivations for participation in the
presidential nominating campaign among state party convention dele-
gates in 1980. Personal benefits such as career advancement, social
contacts, prestige, and the excitement of the campaign were rated as much
less important reasons for participation by these delegates. The impor-
tance of candidate and issue concerns to these activists did not undermine
their attachment to their party, as some studies of party activists would
have led us to expect. In fact, there was a positive correlation between
partisan and purposive motivations. The large majority of Democratic and
Republican delegates in our survey were interested in issues and candi-
dates and in achieving success for their party.
Our evidence did not support the contention that personal motivations
tend to replace purposive motivations over time. Both partisan and pur-
posive motivation were positively related to the length and regularity of
participation in party affairs among these delegates. Personal motivations
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for participation were actually most prevalent among the very youngest
delegates in both parties, suggesting that these motivations may stimulate
a person's initial involvement in party politics but do not play an important
role in sustaining a long-term commitment to the party. Partisanship itself
seems to be the most important factor in maintaining a high level of
involvement in party affairs over a long period of time.
Our evidence indicates that party loyalty was also an important factor in
the outcome of the contest between Jimmy Carter and Edward Kennedy
for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1980. Kennedy's challenge
to the incumbent, based largely on his outspoken support for liberal
positions on a wide range of domestic and international issues, might
have been expected to appeal strongly to issue-oriented liberal activists
within the Democratic party. But most of these liberal activists were also
motivated by party loyalty, which made many of them reluctant to repudi-
ate their party leader, even though they preferred the challenger's ide-
ological stance.
Neither of the major contenders for the Republican presidential nomi-
nation in 1980 was able to appeal for support on the basis of party loyalty,
since neither George Bush nor Ronald Reagan had held national elective
office. Reagan was supported by the large majority of Republican activists
in our survey because of his conservative ideological appeal and, pri-
marily, because he was viewed as more electable than George Bush (see
the chapter by Stone and Abramowitz in this volume). Reagan had come
very close to defeating the incumbent president, Gerald Ford, for the
Republican nomination, but Ford's position as an incumbent who had
never been chosen by his own party probably weakened the impact of
party loyalty on Republican activists. In general, we would expect par-
tisanship to influence activists most strongly when an incumbent presi-
dent is seeking renomination. To a lesser extent, a vice-president or
former vice-president may be able to appeal to activists for support on
partisan grounds as the heir to the position of national party leader.
In general, our findings indicate that partisanship is alive and well
among presidential party activists. Perhaps these findings reflected condi-
tions peculiar to the 1980 Democratic and Republican campaigns or to the
states included in our study. But this does not appear very plausible. The
contests in both parties in 1980 involved candidates—Edward Kennedy
for the Democrats and Ronald Reagan for the Republicans—with strong
appeal to issue-oriented activists. While the eleven states we studied
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cannot be described as "typical" of the country, they did vary considerably
in size, regional location, economic development, and partisan orienta-
tion.
The rather pessimistic view of party activists which is prevalent in the
political science literature is based to a large extent on the 1972 Demo-
cratic National Convention. This convention has unquestionably been
studied more thoroughtly than any other party gathering. As the first
presidential campaign following the major reforms adopted by the Demo-
cratic party in the aftermath of the 1968 presidential election, it was
believed that the 1972 Democratic nominating campaign and convention
would establish a pattern for future postreform nominating campaigns.
Yet in some ways the 1972 contest for the Democratic nomination was
extremely unusual. George McGovern was an unusually strong "insur-
gent" candidate who skillfully exploited the new rules and appealed to
issue-oriented liberal activists largely on the basis of his dovish stance on
the war in Vietnam. The McGovern delegates at the 1972 Democratic
convention tended to be liberal newcomers with relatively weak party ties.
In 1976, however, the Democrats chose the relatively moderate Jimmy
Carter as their standard-bearer and in 1980 they rejected a challenge to the
incumbent's renomination from the most visible and glamorous spokes-
man of the party's liberal wing.
On the basis of our evidence, party activists do not appear to be
dogmatic purists. They are motivated by concern with issues and candi-
dates but they are also motivated by loyalty to their party. In choosing a
candidate for the nomination, they appear to be concerned about elec-
tability as well as ideology. In a period of mass-media campaigns, single-
issue interest groups, and declining party identification in the electorate,
the party activists are one of the last remaining bastions of partisanship.
Far from being a threat to the viability of the parties, our evidence
indicates that these activists are the life of the parties. As far as these
activists are concerned, columnist David Broder was wrong—the party
isn't over.
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NOTES
1. After a varimax rotation was performed the following factor loadings were
obtained:
Factor 1 Factor 2
Party loyalty
Career
Excitement
Meeting people
Candidate
Issues
Visibility
Civic duty
.226
.522
.737
.642
.005
- .100
.686
.209
.287
- .054
.026
.233
.568
.566
.058
.263
2. Delegates were classified as high in partisan motivation if they indicated on
question 15 that party loyalty was a "very important" reason for their involvement
in the campaign. All others were classified as low in partisan motivation. Pur-
posive motivation was measured by combining the candidate and issue motivation
items. Delegates were classified as high in purposive motivation if they indicated
that concern with issues and support for a candidate were both "very important"
reasons for their participation. Delegates who indicated that only one of these
factors was very important were classified as moderate in purposive motivation
and delegates who indicated that neither factor was very important were classified
as low in purposive motivation.
3. The correlations (Pearson's r) between personal motivations (combining
career advancement, excitement, visibility, and social contacts) and length of party
activity were - .05 for Democratic delegates and - .04 for Republican delegates.
The correlations between personal motivations and regularity of participation
were — .05 for both Democratic and Republican delegates.
4. Among Democratic delegates under the age of 25, 54 percent indicated that
three or four of the personal motivations were at least "somewhat important"
compared with only 31 percent of all other delegates. Similarly, among Republi-
can delegates under the age of 25, 51 percent indicated that three or four of the
personal motivations were at least "somewhat important" compared with only 17
percent of all other delegates.
5. Our analysis will focus on the choice between the two leading contenders
for the 1980 nomination in each party: Jimmy Carter and Edward Kennedy for the
Democrats, and Ronald Reagan and George Bush for the Republicans. Almost 90
percent of the delegates in each party supported one of the two leading candidates
and no other candidate in either party was supported by more than two percent of
the delegates.
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Ideology, Electability,
and Candidate Choice
WALTER J. STONE,
ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ
Since the 1960s, the American party system has undergone dramatic
change in response to the emergence of new issues such as Vietnam,
abortion, and women's rights, and the involvement of growing numbers of
issue-oriented activists in party affairs. Both parties have reformed their
rules governing presidential candidate selection and these reforms have
helped to increase the influence of issue-oriented activists in the presiden-
tial nominating process (Marshall 1981). The new activists frequently
have seemed unwilling to compromise their ideological principles for the
sake of appealing to a larger constituency in the general election. The
presidential candidacies of Barry Goldwater, Eugene McCarthy, and
George McGovern relied heavily on the support of activists whose ide-
ological concerns appeared to outweigh their interest in winning the
November election.
The increased role of "amateurs" (Wilson 1962) and "purists" (Polsby
and Wildavsky 1980) in the presidential nominating process may have
dangerous consequences for the parties. Party activists are often unrepre-
sentative of the general electorate in their policy preferences (McClosky,
Hoffman, and O'Hara 1960; Nexon 1971; Verba and Nie 1972; Farah,
Jennings, and Miller 1981; and Jackson, Brown, and Bositis 1982). The
single-minded pursuit of ideological goals by such activists may contrib-
ute to the fragmentation of the political parties. If their loyalties are to a
particular candidate because that candidate is perceived to agree with
their ideological views, they may have little or no loyalty to the party
organization. Thus supporters of candidates who lose the nomination may
not actively support the party nominee in the general election campaign
(Johnson and Gibson 1974; Abramowitz, McGlennon, and Rapoport
1980).
A large number of studies, focusing primarily on national convention
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delegates, have pointed to the changing character of American party
activists since the 1960s (see, for example, Soule and McGrath 1975;
Roback 1975; Kirkpatrick 1976; and Jackson, Brown, and Brown 1978).
This literature is unanimous in supporting the hypothesis that since 1972,
party activists have tended to be "purist" in their orientation, supporting
the candidate who best represents their ideological views rather than the
candidate with the best perceived chance of winning the general election.
Soule and McGrath (1975) showed that the proportion of "amateurs" at
the Democratic National Convention in 1972 was more than twice the
percentage in 1968.' Their concluding sentence sounded a warning for
the party organizations commonly found in the literature: "American
centrist parties have survived ideological conflict in the past, but with the
added ingredient of political amateurs, compromise and unity will be-
come more problematic in the future" (p. 516). Kirkpatrick's massive
study of the 1972 conventions reached similar conclusions with respect to
the changing character of party activists: "in 1972 we were moving away
from a traditional organizational style toward one featuring parties that are
less permanent, less broadly based, and less oriented toward winning"
(Kirkpatrick 1976, 153).
The evidence which we will present does not support the predominant
view of contemporary party activists as dogmatic ideologues more con-
cerned with nominating a candidate who represents their issue concerns
than with winning the November election. We believe that the literature on
party activists has substantially underestimated the importance of elec-
tability because it has relied on general measures of purism vs. prag-
matism which involve asking activists to consider, in the abstract, the
tradeoff between ideology and electability.2 We will show that such
questions do not predict the behavior of party activists in selecting a
presidential candidate. Despite a strong tendency among our respondents
to opt for ideological purity over electability in the abstract, our data from
1980 indicate that Democratic and Republican activists were actually
more concerned with electability than with ideology in choosing a party
nominee.
ELECTABILITY VS. IDEOLOGY IN 1980
Activists in both parties in 1980 had to confront a potential conflict
between ideology and electability. The Democrats were "blessed" with an
incumbent president running for renomination. The problem for them was
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deciding whether Jimmy Carter was more blessing than curse. Incum-
bents are normally a good bet in the general election, but Carter's ratings
in the polls had been low, his competence was widely questioned, and his
administration was saddled with the blame for nearly unprecedented rates
of inflation. Carter was, however, viewed as more of a centrist than
Senator Edward Kennedy in a year when liberalism was widely perceived
to be a liability. Kennedy could claim to be more electable than President
Carter because he was not the incumbent, because he had clearly sepa-
rated himself from the administration, because of the Kennedy name, and
because he had a loyal personal following within and beyond the party. Of
course, apart from his relative "extremism," his liabilities included se-
rious questions about his character and his abilities as a national leader.
On the Republican side, similar ambiguities faced activists attempting
to weigh their ideological preferences and their desire to regain control of
the White House. Ronald Reagan, the clear frontrunner for the nomination
following his strong challenge to Gerald Ford in 1976, a familiar national
figure, and a popular former governor of the most populous state in the
nation, was perceived by many to be too "extreme" to be a viable
presidential candidate. Former President Ford was claiming as late as the
spring of 1980 that Ronald Reagan was not electable, raising in the minds
of some Republicans the specter of "another Goldwater." George Bush,
the principal alternative to Reagan, could plausibly claim to be more
electable because he was more a centrist. His major problems were his
limited national visibility and an electoral record much less impressive
than Reagan's.
Thus activists participating in the state conventions were faced with
choices between candidates offering plausible claims to being the most
electable candidate in their party, and presenting clear ideological
choices. Many political scientists, familiar with the work of Anthony
Downs (1957) and the literature on the "purist" character of contemporary
activists, would be likely to assume that supporters of relatively "ex-
treme" candidates like Ronald Reagan in 1980 and George McGovern in
1972 sacrificed electability in order to protect their ideological interests.
This assumption, however, errs by linking attitude on the electability-
ideology tradeoff directly to the support of a particular candidate. We will
show that many of the supporters of Reagan in 1980 and McGovern in
1972 were concerned with supporting an electable candidate even if that
meant compromising their personal ideological interests.
We begin by replicating the work of others and presenting the results of
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Table 5.1. Support for ideological purism
Item (purist response) Democrats Republicans
A political party should be more concerned
with issues than with winning elections
(agree)
A candidate should express his convictions
even if it means losing the election
(agree)
I'd rather lose an election than compromise
my basic philosophy (agree)
The party platform should avoid issues that
are too controversial or unpopular
(disagree)
Broad electoral appeal is more important
than a consistent ideology (disagree)
Note: Entries are percentage of delegates giving a purist response to each item plus
one-half of the percentage of delegates with no opinion. The largest percentage of no
opinion was 15 percent and the average for all items was 7 percent with no opinion.
Table 5.2. Candidate preference by ideology
76
(N = 8278)
86
{N = 8350)
76
(N = 8255)
80
(N = 8283)
63
(N = 7958)
70
(N = 8318)
86
(N = 8456)
77
(N = 8426)
80
(N = 8442)
70
(N = 8223)
Candidate preference
Carter
Kennedy
Total
Bush
Reagan
Total
Very
liberal
(N = 1217)
40
60
100
Moderate to
liberal
(AT = 734)
51
49
100
Democrats
Fairly
liberal
(N = 2756)
66
34
100
Republicans
Fairly
conservative
(N = 3168)
22
78
100
Moderate to
conservative
(N = 2830)
85
15
100
Very
conservative
(N = 2977)
5
95
100
Note: All entries are percentages.
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a series of general questions measuring "purism vs. pragmatism" among
party activists. These questions posed the tradeoff between ideological
satisfaction and electoral success in the abstract. As in other recent
studies, the results presented in Table 5.1 show that party activists appear
overwhelmingly to prefer ideological purity to winning. Findings such as
these have led observers of the presidential nominating process to con-
clude that party activists threaten the ability of the parties to nominate
presidential candidates with broad electoral appeal.3
Abstract generalizations such as those incorporated in our measures of
"purism vs. pragmatism" may seem attractive but fail to predict the
specific behavior (candidate support) in which we are interested. We also
have measures of ideological proximity and estimated chances of victory
in November associated with each major contender for the nomination.
The question is, do activists follow their general purist inclinations when
faced with specific choices between candidates?
IDEOLOGY AND CANDIDATE CHOICE
Democratic and Republican delegates in our survey were sharply polar-
ized in their ideological preferences. When asked to place themselves on a
five-point liberal-conservative scale, the majority of Democratic dele-
gates described themselves as either "very liberal" (19 percent) or "fairly
liberal" (39 percent). Republican delegates overwhelmingly described
themselves as either "very conservative" (41 percent) or "fairly conserva-
tive" (46 percent). Moreover, delegates' ideological preferences were
strongly related to their positions on thirteen national issues ranging from
the Equal Rights Amendment and national health insurance to draft
registration and the SALT II Treaty with the Soviet Union.4
Table 5.2 demonstrates that delegates in both parties based their
decisions to support a candidate for their party's nomination at least
partially on ideological grounds.5 Among Democratic activists, liberals
were much more likely to prefer Senator Kennedy over President Carter
than were moderates or conservatives. However, fully two-thirds of the
Democratic delegates who labeled themselves "fairly liberal" backed
Jimmy Carter's renomination, and even among those who described
themselves as "very liberal," two-fifths supported the incumbent over his
more liberal challenger. While there was a clear relationship between
ideology and candidate preference, the failure of Senator Kennedy's
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challenge to President Carter in these caucus states was due to his inability
to gain the support of more than a minority of the liberal activists who
constituted his natural ideological constituency.
Ideology was also an imperfect predictor of candidate support among
Republican activists. Although Ronald Reagan's strongest backing came
from delegates who described themselves as "very conservative," he was
also supported by a large majority of delegates who were "fairly conserva-
tive," and by almost half of the delegates who described themselves as
moderate-to-liberal in ideology. Like Edward Kennedy, George Bush
failed to gain the support of many of those activists in his party who
belonged to his natural ideological constituency.
In addition to asking delegates to describe their own ideological
leanings, we also asked them to place each of the major contenders for
Democratic and Republican nominations on the same five-point liberal-
conservative scale. By combining these questions, we can determine the
relative ideological proximity of the delegates to the two major candidates
for their party's nomination. Based on these proximity measures, Edward
Kennedy and George Bush should have received much greater support
than they actually did. Among Democrats, 40 percent placed themselves
closer to Kennedy than to Carter, while 44 percent placed themselves
closer to Carter and 16 percent placed themselves equally close to both
candidates. Of the delegates who described themselves as "very liberal,"
86 percent placed themselves closer to Kennedy while only 5 percent
placed themselves closer to Carter. Even among those who were "fairly
liberal," 51 percent placed themselves closer to Kennedy while only 24
percent placed themselves closer to Carter. If the Democratic delegates in
our survey had chosen a candidate on the basis of ideological proximity,
the result would have been close to an even split between Carter and
Kennedy rather than an easy victory for the incumbent.
A similar result occurs when we examine Republican delegates. Fifty
percent placed themselves closer to Ronald Reagan, while 26 percent
were closer to Bush, and 24 percent were equally close to both candidates.
Among moderate-to-liberal Republicans, 71 percent were closer to Bush
while only 6 percent were closer to Reagan. Even among those delegates
describing themselves as "fairly conservative," Bush was perceived as
closer in ideology by 37 percent compared with 28 percent who perceived
Reagan as closer. Only among "very conservative" Republicans was
Reagan clearly seen as closer in ideology than Bush (by a margin of 86 to
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1 percent). If Republican delegates had based their candidate choice
solely on ideology, George Bush would have lost to Ronald Reagan by a
much narrower margin than he actually did.
THE IMPACT OF ELECTABILITY
In addition to our measures relating to ideology, we included a series of
questions asking delegates to rate each of the major candidates' chances
of winning the November election, if the candidate were nominated by his
party. By combining these questions, we can measure delegates' percep-
tions of the relative electability of the contenders for their party's nomina-
tion. Among Democrats, 67 percent rated Jimmy Carter as more electable
than Edward Kennedy, while only 18 percent rated Kennedy as more
electable and 15 percent gave Carter and Kennedy an equal chance of
winning the general election. The incumbent, despite his political lia-
bilities, was seen by the large majority of Democratic activists as more
likely to win in November than his challenger. What is perhaps more
surprising is that Republican delegates overwhelmingly viewed the con-
servative Ronald Reagan as more electable than the relatively moderate
George Bush. Seventy percent of Republican delegates gave Reagan a
better chance of winning, while only 8 percent gave Bush a better chance
of winning, and 22 percent gave them an equal chance of winning the
November election.
Delegates' perceptions of the relative electability of the candidates
seeking their party's nominations were moderately related to their ide-
ological leanings (a point we explore in more detail below). But even
among Democratic delegates who were ideologically closer to Kennedy,
Carter was seen as more electable than Kennedy by a margin of 44 to 34
percent. Likewise, among Republican delegates who placed themselves
closer to George Bush on the liberal-conservative scale, Reagan was
viewed as more electable than Bush by a margin of 46 to 19 percent.
Moreover, the perceptions of Democratic and Republican delegates re-
garding the relative electability of the candidates seeking their own party's
nomination were consistent with the perceptions of the opposing party's
activists: Republican delegates saw Carter as a stronger opponent than
Kennedy (by a margin of 66 to 5 percent) and Democratic delegates saw
Reagan, despite his conservatism, as a stronger opponent than Bush (by a
margin of 55 to 11 percent). Thus there was widespread agreement among
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Table 5.3. Candidate preference by perceived electability and
ideological proximity
Closer to
Carter
Equal
distance
Closer to
Kennedy
Closer to
Reagan
Equal
distance
Closer to
Bush
Carter more
electable
98
(N = 2180)
94
(N = 643)
78
(N = 921)
Reagan more
electable
99
(N = 2348)
91
(N = 776)
83
(N = 586)
Democrats
Both equally
electable
57
(N = 148)
57
(N = 106)
18
(N = 409)
Republicans
Both equally
electable
75
(N = 257)
60
(JV = 324)
29
(N = 422)
Kennedy more
electable
7
(N = 128)
4
(N = 91)
2
(N = 760)
Bush more
electable
24
(N = 34)
8
(N = 76)
2
(N = 217)
Note: Entries are percentages of Democratic delegates supporting Carter and percen-
tages of Republican delegates supporting Reagan.
activists in both parties that Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan would be
the strongest candidates for their parties in the November election. As a
result, many delegates (about two-fifths in each party) faced a conflict
between their ideological inclination and their judgment about which
candidate in their party was most electable.
Table 5.3 shows the joint effect of ideological proximity and perceived
electability on candidate support among Democratic and Republican
delegates. It is clear that delegates' perceptions of the candidates' chances
of winning in November had a greater impact on their candidate prefer-
ence than did their perceptions of the candidates' ideological proximity.
Regardless of which candidate delegates found more ideologically com-
patible, they tended to support the candidate they felt was more electable.
Among Democrats who were closer to Kennedy in ideology but who
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Table 5.4. Base of candidate support by candidate preference
83
Electability
Ideology
Both
Neither
Total
Democrats
Carter
delegates
(TV = 3734)
35
3
58
4
100
Kennedy
delegates
(N = 1652)
13
32
44
11
100
Republicans
Reagan
delegates
(N = 4060)
31
5
56
8
100
Bush
delegates
(N = 980)
11
38
22
29
100
Note: All entries are percentages.
thought that Carter was more likely to win in November, fully 78 percent
supported Carter for the nomination. Similarly, 83 percent of the Republi-
cans who were closer in ideology to Bush but viewed Reagan as more
electable, gave their support to Reagan. Ideological proximity had a
marked impact on candidate preference only among the minority of
delegates who saw no difference between the candidates' chances of
victory. The overriding importance of electability in determining candi-
date preference is evident in these results and directly contradicts the
impression, based on the findings presented in Table 5.1, that the 1980
delegates tended to be ideological purists with little interest in winning
the November election.
We are able to analyze the bases of support for the major candidates by
examining the consistency of delegates' candidate preferences with ide-
ology, electability, both of these factors, or neither one (see Table 5.4).
For example, 35 percent of the Carter delegates viewed their candidate as
more electable than Edward Kennedy but were just as close or closer in
ideology to the Massachusetts senator (Table 5.4, column 1). Only 3
percent of the Carter delegates were closer to their candidate in ideology
but viewed Senator Kennedy as equally or more likely to win the Novem-
ber election.
Table 5.4 suggests that there were substantial differences in the criteria
on which supporters of the two leading candidates in each party based
their decisions. Among the Democrats, over a third of the Carter delegates
apparently based their choice on electability alone (even though they
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viewed themselves as closer to Kennedy in ideology), while very few
Carter supporters preferred their candidate for purely ideological reasons.
In contrast, almost a third of the Kennedy delegates favored their candi-
date because of his ideological stance and despite viewing Carter as more
electable, while very few Kennedy delegates based their choice solely on
electability.
From the beginning of his campaign for the nomination, Senator
Kennedy emphasized his liberal record and positions as the basis of his
challenge to the incumbent, so it is not surprising that his support was
based largely on ideological grounds. In contrast, President Carter ap-
pealed to Democratic activists as an incumbent whose moderate record
and positions offered the best hope of retaining control of the White
House. Our results for Republican delegates are somewhat surprising,
however. The candidate taking the more extreme position (in this case
Ronald Reagan) might be expected to appeal to party activists (who are
relatively extreme themselves) on ideological grounds and the more
moderate candidate (George Bush) to attract the support of those activists
concerned with electability. Table 5.4 shows that just the opposite was
true among Republican party activists in 1980. Very few Republican
delegates supported Ronald Reagan for purely ideological reasons, but
almost a third of the Reagan delegates apparently based their decision on
electability (despite viewing themselves as closer to George Bush in
ideology). In contrast, a plurality of the Bush delegates supported their
candidate for ideological reasons (despite viewing Ronald Reagan as more
electable). In the Republican party, it was the moderate candidate whose
appeal was based primarily on ideology and the conservative candidate
who attracted the support of party activists concerned primarily about
electability. That both Edward Kennedy and George Bush were soundly
defeated suggests that candidates whose appeal to party activists is limited
to ideology have little chance of success.
We have contrasted the results of our analysis of the impact of ide-
ological proximity and electability on candidate support with the con-
clusions suggested by our attitudinal measures of purism vs. pragmatism.
In order directly to examine the relationship between attitudinal purism-
pragmatism and candidate support, we have combined our five classified
delegates according to their score on this index as "purist," "mixed," or
"pragmatic" in orientation.6 Table 5.5 presents the results of a discrimi-
nant analysis of the effects of ideological proximity and electability on
Ideology, Electability, and Choice 85
Table 5.5. A discriminant analysis of candidate preference
Predictor
variable
Electablility
Ideological
proximity
% Correctly
classified
(N)
Purist
.886
.399
91
(1680)
Democrats
Mixed
.910
.349
90
(1873)
Pragmatic
.916
.371
89
(1429)
Purist
.850
.444
88
(1684)
Republicans
Mixed
.869
.385
86
(1684)
Pragmatic
.856
.422
84
(1276)
Note: Entries are standardized discriminant function coefficients.
candidate support, controlling for the purism-pragmatism score.7 Re-
gardless of where delegates were classified on the purism-pragmatism
index, electability was far more important in determining candidate
preference than ideological proximity. Even delegates who consistently
subscribed to the purist ideal in the abstract were much more influenced
by their perceptions of the candidates' electability than by ideological
proximity when they faced the problem of deciding whom to support for
their party's nomination. There was little variation in the effects of
electability and ideological proximity with position on the purism-prag-
matism index, which supports our contention that these general items do
not measure the criteria used by activists to select a candidate for the
nomination.
ELECTABILITY AS A RATIONALIZATION
We have noted that activists' judgments about candidate electability and
their perception of ideological proximity to the candidate are correlated,
although the correlation is hardly perfect. Almost two-fifths of the dele-
gates in each party perceived a conflict between their ideological prefer-
ence and electability, and among those who did experience this conflict,
over two-thirds in each party resolved it in favor of the candidate they
viewed as more electable. But since ideological proximity and electability
are correlated, what are the implications for our analysis?
One plausible hypothesis for the correlation is that activists tend to
perceive the candidate whom they are closest to ideologically as most
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Table 5.6. A path analysis of the rationalization hypothesis
.444
/
/
Ideological
proximity
Democrats
(N = 5386)
Electability
/ \
/ \
.205
R2 = .66
^ 9 7 .389
X /
Candidate Ideological
preference proximity
Republicans
(N = 5040)
Electability
/ \
/ \570
\
.229 '
R2 = .48
Compound path analysis
Democrats Republicans
Candidate
preference
Ideological
proximity Electability
Ideological
proximity Electability
Direct effect
Indirect effect
Total effect
.205
.309
.514
.697
—
.697
.229
.222
.451
.570
—
.570
Note: Coefficients are standardized regression or "path" coefficients.
likely to win. Judging the electability of presidential aspirants is a difficult
business because so many imponderables are involved, including the
candidates' credibility outside the parties, personality factors, the rele-
vance of past electoral record, and, of course, the ideological positions of
the candidates. Activists may maintain cognitive balance simply by
rationalizing their ideological favorite as the most electable. If the evi-
dence supports this hypothesis, the postreform interpretation of activists
as predominantly purist could be salvaged, despite our criticism of the
indicators prior studies have employed.
The analysis presented in Table 5.6 permits a test of the rationalization
hypothesis.8 For this analysis we assume that ideological proximity is
causally prior to perceived electability, an assumption which is most
antagonistic to our substantive argument. As the analysis in the figure
shows, the direct effects of electability in both parties outweigh the direct
effects of ideology. The figure also shows that ideology and electability
are related. Both of these findings are consistent with the analysis we have
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presented so far. But even under the relatively unfriendly assumptions of
this analysis, the compound path analysis shows that among both Demo-
crats and Republicans the effect of electability on candidate preference
was greater than the effect of ideological proximity. If we were to ac-
knowledge that judgments about electability may also affect perceived
ideological proximity, the relative effect of electability would increase.
However, even the model most compatible with the "purist" hypothesis
cannot prevent the conclusion that these presidential activists in 1980
were more influenced by their desire to nominate a winner than they were
by their ideological interests.
ELECTABILITY VS. IDEOLOGY IN 1972
We are inevitably led to speculate about the generality of our findings. Is
the concern with electability evident in our data a development among
party activists after a period of idealism in which concern with victory was
subordinated to ideological goals? Are these results somehow applicable
only to the stratum of state party activists which we have studied? Or,
because caucus-convention states do not constitute a fully representative
subset of all states, can it be said that these results apply only to these
states where party organizations may be relatively strong? These are
legitimate questions which cannot be addressed fully without a complete
replication and a new design. We do assert at the outset, however, that any
attempt to explain away our findings would have to deal with the fact that
the activists in our study subscribed overwhelmingly to "purist" values
when offered the choice, in the abstract, between ideology and elec-
tability. That, coupled with the results of our analysis of the impact of
electability and ideological proximity on candidate choice, gives us
considerable confidence that our findings are not merely peculiar to 1980
or to the activists we happened to study.
Although a complete replication of our study is not possible with the
data available from past surveys of party activists, the CPS survey of
delegates attending the 1972 national nominating conventions did include
questions which permit a partial replication. The 1972 Democratic Na-
tional Convention offers a particularly interesting point of comparison
because that convention followed on the heels of the reforms in the
Democratic party which have often been linked to the increased influence
of purists in the presidential nominating process. There was significant
88 Incentives and Motivations
competition for the Democratic nomination in 1972 with the eventual
winner, George McGovern, commonly seen as having depended almost
exclusively on the support of liberal purists. Indeed, scholars like
Kirkpatrick (1976) and Soule and McGrath (1975) relied on studies of the
1972 Democratic convention delegates in pointing to growing purist
influence in the presidential nomination process. Analysis of the 1972
data permits us to compare our findings on party activists in eleven states
with those from a truly national sample of higher level activists in the
presidential nominating process.
As among the state convention delegates in our study, ideology was
clearly related to candidate choice among the 1972 Democratic conven-
tion delegates. Among those who described themselves as either "radical"
or "very liberal" in ideology, 83 percent indicated that George McGovern
was their first choice for the nomination. Forty-six percent of those
describing themselves as "somewhat liberal" supported a McGovern
candidacy, and only 13 percent of moderate to conservative delegates
favored the South Dakota senator. These results are consistent with our
understanding of the 1972 Democratic contest as highly ideological in
character.
Fortunately for our replication, delegates were also asked to indicate
which candidate from a list of nine had the best chance of winning the
November election. They were not asked to judge the electability of each
candidate separately, so the question is not identical to ours, but the
concept being measured is certainly the same. This measure of electability
is strongly related to support for McGovern: 86 percent of the delegates
who judged McGovern as most likely to win the election in November
supported him, while only 21 percent of those who thought some other
candidate most likely to win supported Senator McGovern for the nomi-
nation. However, the most important results are presented in Table 5.7,
which compares the effects of ideology and electability on candidate
choice.9 The effect of ideology, while strong, is exceeded by the effect of
electability. Comparing the left and right ends of the ideological spec-
trum, we find a difference in support for McGovern of 37 percent among
those who gave him the best chance of winning and a difference of 47
percent among those who gave another candidate the best chance of
winning. However, the difference in support for McGovern between those
who rated him as the most electable candidate and those who did not is 43
percent, 58 percent, and 54 percent within each of the three categories of
McGovern more
electable
Other more
electable
Radical to
very liberal
93
(N = 625)
50
(N = 182)
Somewhat
liberal
74
(N = 234)
16
(N = 228)
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Table 5.7. Candidate preference among Democratic National
Convention delegates, 1972
Ideology
Moderate to
very conservative
57
(N = 63)
3
(N = 253)
Note: Entries are percentage of Democratic delegates supporting McGovern.
ideology. Thus, on average, the effect of electability was greater than the
effect of ideology in this most ideological of postreform national conven-
tions.10
We have now examined the effects of electability and ideology on party
activists' support for candidates seeking their party's presidential nomina-
tion. These two factors are widely recognized in the literature but they
have been analyzed on the basis of rather general and abstract measures.
We have used more specific measures of ideological proximity and
electability tied to the individual candidates. These allow us directly to
assess the relative impact of ideology and electability on candidate
support. While the general attitudinal measures appear to tap a wide-
spread feeling among activists that philosophical principles should not be
compromised in order to increase the chances of winning the election,
these same activists are quite willing to do just that in practice.
We believe that this conclusion has important implications for the
vitality of American political parties in the years ahead. If we assume from
evidence like that presented in Table 5.1 that the parties are dominated by
activists of a purist stripe, it is not difficult to imagine disastrous con-
sequences for the party organizations. If activists are unwilling to com-
promise, if they choose candidates purely for ideological reasons, and if
they hold views more extreme than the electorate at large, then the parties
are likely to nominate candidates whose views are unrepresentative of the
vast majority of ordinary citizens. Moreover, the task of reuniting warring
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ideological factions after the convention may be extremely difficult. But
these consequences, commonly speculated upon in the literature, should
not be as likely to occur if activists are primarily interested in winning the
election. An important next step in researching this question will be to
investigate the post convention behavior of presidential activists in order
to determine precisely how divisive the prenomination campaign is, and
whether activists supporting nomination losers because they judged them
more electable do in fact switch their support to the nominee of the party.
Given our findings, how can we explain the support by party activists
in previous nomination campaigns for such candidates as Barry Gold-
water and George McGovern? We have no data from 1964, but our glance
at the 1972 Democratic convention suggests that party activists simply
miscalculated Goldwater's and McGovern's chances of winning. Our data
indicate that activists are concerned about nominating a winner, not that
their perceptions of who is likely to win are always accurate. Indeed,
among the Democratic delegates in 1972, 58 percent thought that
McGovern was the most likely of all candidates (Democratic and Republi-
can) to win the November election. Judging a candidate's electability is
never easy, for future events in the campaign or the world in general
cannot be predicted. In one sense, Democratic delegates who supported
McGovern thinking he was most electable were not very "pragmatic." Yet
prior to the Eagleton fiasco, and without the benefit of hindsight, many
Democrats might reasonably have believed that public discontent over
Vietnam could carry George McGovern to the White House.
We think it quite possible that the relative effects of ideology and
electability vary over time according to the kinds of issues on the agenda,
and the kinds of candidates seeking the nomination. In many respects,
1980 is an ideal year to examine the relative weight of ideology and
electability in the decision-making of party activists because the principal
contenders in both parties were divided along ideological lines, and their
claims to being most electable were plausible. In 1964, however, the
contest for the Republican nomination probably involved a deeper ide-
ological split between the moderate and conservative wings of the GOP
than in 1980. Likewise, the Democrats in 1972 were sharply divided over
Vietnam and other emotional issues, a fact which may account (dif-
ferences in question wording aside) for the apparently greater effect of
ideology in that year than in 1980. Similarly, Coleman (1973) has
suggested that activists in the party out of power, facing a popular
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incumbent in the opposing party, may weigh electability less in their
decision-making and opt for a candidate who best represents their ide-
ological preferences.
These ideas are worth pursuing in future research on party activists.
But while there may be variations in the effects of ideology and elec-
tability over time, we do not believe that party activists will ignore
electability, however deep their commitment to a set of ideological princi-
ples. The presidential nomination process is an example of coalition
building, and we can therefore expect participants to base their decisions
in part upon their estimates of likely outcomes. That our evidence shows
1980 party activists to be quite interested in selecting candidates with
broad voter appeal suggests they realized that compromising some of their
ideological interests in order to have a better chance at winning is
preferable to maintaining strict ideological purity and suffering defeat.
Moreover, as the experience of the Republicans in 1980 demonstrates,
concern with electability need not result in the nomination of "me too"
candidates. Moderation in the pursuit of victory is not always a virtue.
Giving the voters a choice and not an echo is sometimes pragmatic
strategy.
NOTES
1. They classified 23 percent of the 1968 Democratic delegates and 51 percent
of the 1972 delegates as amateurs. Note that the questions Soule and McGrath
used to classify delegates included more than the ideology-electability issue.
2. While we agree with DeFelice when he argues that the "amateur-profession-
al" dimension in the literature confounds a number of concepts not necessarily
related empirically, his operational indicator of the tension between ideological
principle and electability is typically broad and abstract (DeFelice 1981, 798):
"whether or not the respondent thinks that a candidate campaigning for office
should be 'willing to change his position in order to secure the support needed to
win the election; or refuse to change, even though his views are so unpopular that
he will then be defeated.' "
3. The items we employ in Table 5.1 are very similar to those used by previous
studies. For example, Soule and Clarke (1970) built an "amateur-professional
index" which included the following Likert agree/disagree items (among others):
"The principles of a candidate are just as important as winning or losing an
election"; "I would object to a candidate who compromises on his basic values if
that is necessary to win"; "Controversial positions should be avoided in a party
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platform in order to insure party unity"; "Party platforms should be deliberately
vague in order to appeal to the broadest spectrum of voters." These items have
been used in a number of other studies (e.g., Roback 1975:468; Hitlin and Jackson
1977) which have contributed to the literature arguing contemporary activists
prefer ideological purity to compromising their principles even to nominate a
winner.
4. The correlations (Pearson's r) between liberal-conservative identification
and issue positions ranged from .32 to .66 with an average of .48.
5. All analyses of candidate preference will be restricted to the two major
candidates in each party. In both parties, almost 90 percent of the activists
supported one of the major contenders as their first choice for the party nomina-
tion. No other candidate in either party was the first choice of more than 2 percent
of our respondents.
6. We have combined the five purism-pragmatism items in Table 5.1 into an
additive index. We trichotomized the index into three groups of approximately
equal size. Because the inter-item correlation (Pearson's r) among the items range
from .07 to .49 with an average of .23, we replicated the analysis reported in Table
5.5 sotting each of the purism-pragmatism items separately. The results are
identical to those reported in Table 5.5 with the effect of electability consistently
outweighing the effect of ideology, and no systematic variation in the relative
effects of the two variables with position taken on the individual purism-prag-
matism items.
7. Among the Democrats, the dependent variable is the dichotomous candi-
date choice (prefer Carter, prefer Kennedy), while among Republicans, the depen-
dent variable is preference for Reagan, or preference for Bush. The independent
variables are the relative electability and ideological proximity measures for each
candidate in the party. These are scored to produce a positive coefficient when the
electability or ideology comparisons favor Carter among Democrats, or when they
favor Reagan among Republicans. Because the dependent variable is di-
chotomous, we report a discriminant analysis rather than using ordinary least
squares (although OLS yields identical substantive results). For an explanation of
discriminant analysis and a comparison with OLS, see Aldrich and Cnudde
(1975).
8. We perform path analysis with a dichotomous dependent variable because it
is the most straightforward technique for assessing the relative causal effects (both
direct and indirect) of the independent variables. Gillespie (1977) compares OLS
with log-linear techniques when the dependent variable is dichotomous and
argues that while log-linear techniques correct for some of the statistical problems
associated with using OLS in this situation, these techniques do not permit the
researcher to decompose the causal effects as we wish to do. Gillespie (1977;
109-10) suggests that OLS is the appropriate technique when this is the purpose of
the analysis: "The researcher who uses dummy dependent-variable regression can
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. . . multiply the regression slopes that represent the links in one or more causal
chains in order to measure the indirect effects of an antecedent variable on another
variable further down the causal chain." When the estimated OLS coefficients are
not in the extremes (a range of between . 2 and . 8 is commonly cited), the estimates
are very close to those provided by nonlinear techniques.
9. The 1972 study did not include a measure of ideological proximity; thus, we
employ the position of the respondent on the ideological scale. The study did
include proximity measures on four issues of the day: inflation, busing, Vietnam,
and the rights of accused criminals. Analysis of proximity scores on these issues
does not disturb the conclusions we present here. Indeed, with issue proximity and
ideology controlled, the effects of electability on candidate choice remain very
strong.
10. Replicating the path analysis in Table 5.6 for the Democrats in 1972
results in the following:
. Electability .
^ -
.440
- ^ ^ - ^
Ideology ^ Candidate
Preference
.339
R2 = .52 (TV = 1585)
Compound Path Analysis
Direct effect
Indirect effect
Total effect
Once again, the direct effect of electability on candidate preference outstrips the direct effect
of ideology, but the total effect of ideology under the assumptions of this model does
outweigh the total effect of electability. Whether the differences between the estimated
effects of the independent variables in 1972 and in 1980 can be attributed to changes in the
parties or to differences in the measures used in the two studies is impossible to tell. We do
believe, however, that the results of our analysis of the 1972 Democratic Convention
delegates portray them as considerably less attached to ideological purity—and more
interested in supporting a winner—than the literature would have us believe.
Ideology
.339
.222
.561
Electability
.504
—
.504
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PART THREE
Groups and
Representation

Issue Group Activists
at the Conventions
JOHN G. FRANCIS,
ROBERT C. BENEDICT
The rise of the new single issue groups has presented the Republican and
Democratic parties with a novel challenge to their historic roles as broad-
based coalition parties. Both parties now confront groups within their
ranks that demand of party nominees a strict commitment to the position
held by the group on a specified issue. We will examine the extent to
which party delegates who are active in the new issue groups are distin-
guished from other delegates in their party commitment, issue positions,
and ideological orientation. In short, have state party conventions been
penetrated by new issue group activists, lacking any broader interest in or
commitment to the party? We draw two conclusions from our analysis
below: First, delegates in new issue groups are also active in other interest
groups within their respective parties. This suggests that while delegates
may belong to single issue groups, they may not have single issue political
orientations. Second, delegates active in newer social issue groups can be
distinguished from other delegates within their respective parties on
certain measures of commitment, but nonetheless such delegates are
clearly differentiated in their party orientation from delegates in the other
party who are active in similar interest groups.
The two main American political parties, of course, are legally obli-
gated to maintain open memberships and to maximize participation in the
nominating process (Ranney 1975, 1978). Over the years both parties
have come to enjoy the status of semistate agencies—that is, both the
judicial and legislative branches have recognized that parties perform a
critical role in the selection of the nation's leadership (Francis and Warr
1980). In return for this recognition, the parties have been obliged to
remain relatively open to a large array of individuals and groups who opt
to participate in the nominating process of either or both parties.
Over most of this century, economic issues have generated the princi-
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pal cleavages between Republicans and Democrats (Sundquist 1972;
Burnham and Chambers 1975). Well-established business and labor
groups have long played important roles (albeit at sharply different levels)
in both parties. In the past two decades, however, new issues have become
salient—issues that are social and/or moral in nature. Along with the
older established groups, issue groups such as the anti-abortionists,
women's rights advocates, and environmentalists have sought to play
important roles in American party politics.
There is some concern that the new social issue groups are inimical to
the traditional conception of American parties (Commager 1980; Sam-
uelson 1979). The new groups, it is argued, for the most part are com-
mitted to a very limited set of issues, have little interest in the broader
range of concerns that make up national political parties, and are only
willing to judge candidates or parties on the issue stance of concern to the
group.1 (Vinovskis 1979; Keller 1980; Crotty and Jacobson 1980;
Weintraub 1980). In contrast, the older established economic groups such
as labor or business are experienced in dealing with a range of diverse
issues and have developed the art of compromise in working within the
broad coalitions that are the two main political parties.
It might be presumed that the rise of a new issue group would have an
equal chance of acceptance or rejection by each party in a two-party
competitive system. But few issues are received with equal interest by the
respective parties, nor is a new issue completely rejected by one party and
fully accepted by the other. A party's commitment to a new issue area is,
in part, dependent on the constellation of forces within the existing two
parties. It may well be that a new social issue group in its relationship to
the parties is quite similar to older, established groups when they started
out; that is, an initial neutrality toward the system is followed by a
gradually greater identification with one party rather than the other. An
illustration is the environmentalist movement. When the environmen-
talists emerged as a major force in the late 1960s, they adopted a stance of
strict party neutrality. Environmentalist issues were widely perceived as
consumer issues requiring strong federal regulatory solutions. This per-
ception of the problem made environmentalist concern understandable
and appealing to many groups within the Democratic party who them-
selves favored strengthened federal regulatory intervention. It is in-
creasingly apparent in the early 1980s that many environmentalist groups
have decided to actively involve themselves in the Democratic party. Thus
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members in a new issue group are likely to be in the process of sorting out
their group's relationship to the two main parties.
Of course, it is likely that political activists may belong to more than
one interest group. Indeed, one way a new interest group may stand apart
from, or be a part of, the broader coalitions that make up the two parties is
the extent to which its members are also active in other groups. If, for
example, activists in one group are also active in other organizations, then
there is a greater chance they will share understanding of the various
groups' concerns (Verba and Nie 1971). On the other hand, if the
delegates who are active in one group are not noticeably active in any
other groups, then the prospects for isolation from the party coalition are
greater. We discuss below patterns of plural interest group membership
and the implication for coalition-building within each party.
We examine three sets of questions concerning the relationships be-
tween interest groups and their political parties. First, what differences
exist in terms of levels of support for the party among those who belong to
an old or a new issue group? For example, are the activists in the new
single issue groups less supportive of their political party than delegates
who are not members of such groups? Second, what variations are evident
in the issue positions of members of old or new groups? Would there be
substantive differences between the issue positions of activists in a new
single issue group and activists in the established economic groups?
Finally, what is the extent of shared ideological orientation among mem-
bers of the old or new groups? From answers to these questions we draw
some tentative conclusions about the extent to which delegates with
memberships in several groups enhance the integrative abilities of the
political parties.
We test the following hypotheses in the exploration of activists' at-
titudes to their respective political parties:
Party support: Delegates who are active in new interest groups will be less
likely to be supportive of the party than are delegates in the established
economic interest groups.
Ideological Orientation: Delegates who are members of a new issue
group will be ideologically distinct from other delegates at the conven-
tion.
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Issue Orientation: Delegates who are active in new issue organizations
will be distinct from other delegates at the convention on particular issue
positions.
It is precisely because American political parties are so closely identi-
fied with the electoral system that a single issue group—indeed, any
group wishing to influence the course of American politics—finds it less
costly to devote some of its efforts to working within either or both parties.
However, as the first hypothesis predicts, large numbers of delegates at a
party convention who belong to a single issue group would increase the
probability of greater fragmentation within the party. Less consensus on
issues or candidates and less commitment to the party as an organization
deserving of support in its own right would be expected. It is fairly
apparent, for example, that a number of single issue groups have been
increasingly active in the Democratic party in the past two decades. In one
of the few empirical studies dealing with this subject Jeane Kirkpatrick
surveyed delegates to the 1972 Democratic National Convention. The
"interest group specialists," that is delegates who focused activity almost
exclusively on the new social interest groups, were notable for their
political style combining "high policy concern with little or no interest in
party preservation or solidarity" (Kirkpatrick 1976; Polsby 1981). The
first hypothesis, based upon the Kirkpatrick findings, predicts that the
Democrats would be a party of policy divisions, that is, a party composed
of a number of autonomous groups.
Moreover, the longer a group has enjoyed an association with a
political party, the greater may be that group's strength of identification
with that parry. The economic groups have had, for the most part, long
records of association with the two parties. What we are proposing is that
there is a parallel between individual level socialization and party mem-
bership and group level socialization and party orientation. Some obser-
vers have stipulated that the longer an activist remains in the political
party the greater the likelihood that there will be a shift in incentives
(Wilson 1973, chapter 6). Initially some activists are activated by ide-
ological considerations, but over time solidary and tangible rewards come
to play larger parts in inducing activists to remain with a party (Roback
1980; Moe 1981, 1980). We suggest that interest groups' members also
change in their orientation to the party over time. Group members come to
establish social and political relationships with other activists in the party.
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A network of relationships develops that socializes the new group mem-
bers into a sympathetic appreciation of the problems of an electoral
organization and its need to come up with viable candidates and issues
capable of creating winning electoral coalitions (Kirkpatrick 1976). In
turn, the party over time becomes more attuned to the demands of the
group.
As grounding for the second hypothesis, we note that the new issue
groups are likely to attract individuals of diverse backgrounds who are
united only on the issue position held by the group (Kirkpatrick 1976,
224). These activists may come to the party from a range of ideological
backgrounds. In contrast, party activists who are members of the older
established economic groups or who are not active in groups at all are
more likely to share broadly similar ideological orientations. Our data
suggest that in terms of self-placement the Democrats are more likely to
be found to the center-left while Republicans are to the center-right.
Finally, the third hypothesis is built on the assumption that the issues
that confront social interest groups may be less susceptible to compromise
than economic interests since they are more frequently presented in moral
terms. For example, environmentalists may see the preservation of the
public lands as a goal of incalculable value, of an order different from the
bargaining and negotiation that takes place between business and labor
groups. Similarly, if the anti-abortionists wish to secure the nomination
and election of candidates who share the group's position on abortion,
then group members would become politically active in the Democratic
and Republican parties. If abortion is the only issue of concern to group
members, then it is probable that no real pattern of issue compatibility
will exist between delegate members of the anti-abortionist group and
other delegates at the convention.
As described in the introductory chapter, the activists surveyed come
largely from states located in the South and West. In most of these states
political conventions are meaningful political activities. In these ide-
ologically conservative regions the Republican party has enjoyed growing
electoral success. Many of these states have seen major controversies
during the last decade over such new issues as the environment, the Equal
Rights Amendment, and abortion.
For the purposes of our analysis we examined the responses of dele-
gates by party but not by state. Our justification for treating the eleven
states as a whole is that it permitted us to explore the attitudes of delegates
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in a range of groups. If we had engaged in a state-by-state analysis, certain
groups simply lacked sufficient representation in the Republican party to
allow us to perform our analysis. By massing the delegates by party we
were able to explore all groups in both political parties. We created two
delegate subgroupings. The first is composed of delegates who are
politically active in the new issue groups. We identified four such groups:
opponents of abortion, advocates of women's rights, environmentalists,
and civil rights activists. The last group, civil rights activists, presents
some problems in classification. The civil rights groups may be il-
lustrative of groups in transition. That is, they have a long record of
association with the main political parties, principally the Democratic
party, and have come to embrace a range of issues, many of which are
economic in focus.
Our second category is composed of delegates who report that they are
active in the traditional economic interest groups. We identified three
such groups: labor unions, business organizations, and farm associations.
We discuss educational groups as well as traditional economic groups,
although we recognize that the category embraces both professional and
civic-minded organizations. These economic groups, particularly labor
in the Democratic party and business in the Republican party, have been
important components of the national parties for the past fifty years.
Our analysis relies on what delegates themselves tell us about their
political activities. Indicators of strength of partisan identification, degree
of party support, campaign activity and ideological placement are all self-
reported. We recognize that there may be a good deal of variance to the
delegates' reports of their activity in various interest groups. Such activity
could be interpreted as attendance at meetings or it could suggest that the
delegate holds an active leadership role in the group. We also recognize
that delegates were asked to respond to group categories rather than to
particular groups such as, say, the Sierra Club. Categories such as
conservation, ecology groups, woman's rights groups, or civil rights
groups can embrace a variety of organizational possibilities.
With one exception, the data do not support our hypotheses. It does
appear that social issue group delegates, particularly in the Democratic
party, are less supportive of their party than are delegates who are not
politically active in social issue groups. But single issue group delegates
are not lacking in ideological relevance to their respective parties, al-
though they may fall to one side of the party's ideological spectrum. Nor
Issue Group Activists 105
Table 6.1. Delegates reporting interest group activity (percent)
Economic Groups
Labor unions
Business organizations
Professional organizations
Farm organizations
Educational organizations
Social Groups
Civil rights groups
Environmentalists
Women's rights groups
Anti-abortionist groups
Democrats
18.4 (1841)
15.4 (1557)
23.1 (2321)
12.6 (1291)
27.9 (2827)
19.6 (1990)
15.8 (1566)
18.6 (1861)
5.9 (596)
Republicans
2.8 (291)
27.5 (2765)
23.5 (2381)
13.3 (1329)
14.4 (1474)
2.1 (227)
7.7 (779)
4.2 (423)
10.7 (1115)
are they divorced from the issue positions of their fellow delegates. We
thus must reject the hypotheses predicting issue divergence and lack of
ideological congruence between activists in the newer interest groups and
their parties.
PATTERNS OF GROUP MEMBERSHIP
On the question of group membership, in Table 6.1 over 60 percent of all
delegates surveyed claim to be active in groups outside their respective
parties.
No one will be surprised to learn that interest groups do not enjoy equal
representation in both parties. Democrats are involved in a wider, more
diversified range of groups than the nearly 28 percent of the delegates
professing activity in educational organizations; by contrast, Republican
educationists come in at just under 15 percent. Some 18 percent of
Democratic delegates identify themselves as labor activists—six times
the representation of labor activists among Republicans. Just over half of
all Republican delegates are active in either business (28.5 percent) or
professional (23.5 percent) organizations—by far the largest groupings of
Republican activists—but some 23 percent of Democrats identify them-
selves as involved in professional organizations, and 15 percent claim
activity in business organizations. Farm organizations claim relatively
Table 6.2. Democratic activists in selected groups
Labor
union
Business
organization
N
Farm
organization
% N
Educational Women's rights
organization group
N N
Ecology
group
7c N
Anti-Abortion
group
% N
Labor
union
Business
organization
Farm
organization
Educational
organization
Women's rights
group
Ecology group
Anti-abortion
group
18.5 297
16.4 224
17.2 506
21.3 412
21.4 346
27.3 172
15.6 297
24.2
14.5
21.8
331
427
14.8 288
16.6 269
137
11.8 224
20.6 331
15.2 447
11.0 214
18.9
25.6
307
161
26.6 506 21.6 412
26.6 427
32.7 447
39.1
18.2 346
17.9 288 16.8 269
15.7 214 22.4 307
25.7 757
757
19.1
33.4
564
648
34.8 564 40.0 648
31.6 199 22.3 140 26.9 170
9.0
8.6
11.8
6.7
7.2
10.5
172
137
161
199
140
170
Note: Entries are percentages of groups reporting membership in other groups. For example, 15.6% of
union members were in business organizations.
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similar levels of involvement from delegates in both parties, 12.5 percent
among Democrats and 13.3 percent among Republicans.
In the area of social issues, the events of the past twenty years have had
more impact on group activities of Democratic delegates than on ac-
tivities of Republican delegates, with one major exception, the abortion
issue. Just under one-fifth of the Democrats report political activity in
civil rights groups. Over 18 percent are active in women's rights groups.
Somewhat below 16 percent are in the environmentalist movement. Such
issue groups clearly constitute major forces in Democratic state conven-
tions.
By contrast, the Republicans contain many fewer activists from these
social issue groups. Just over 2 percent of Republican delegates are active
in civil rights groups. Women's rights supporters constitute somewhat
over 4 percent of the delegates. Next to the anti-abortionists, the environ-
mentalists are the largest social group at nearly 8 percent. Significantly,
the only issue category represented in double digits for the Republicans is
the anti-abortion movement, which includes just over 10 percent of
Republican delegates. In contrast, just under 6 percent of the Democrats
report political activity in anti-abortion groups. This finding is surprising,
for studies of the anti-abortion movement have described it as being
successful in recruiting blue-collar Catholics, a group historically within
the Democratic tradition. In another sense, however, the anti-abortionists
are clearly conservative in their reaction against a change in social
practice that was triggered by the Supreme Court decision legalizing
abortion in Roe vs. Wade.
In analyzing the relationships between interest group activists and
their parties, it must also be borne in mind that delegates who are active in
one interest group tend to be active in others as well. In Tables 6.2 and 6.3
the pattern of plural or overlapping group membership is apparent in both
the Republican and Democratic conventions. Read horizontally, the tables
show the percent of activists of one type—for example, labor union
activists—active in groups of other types such as business or farm
organizations. In order to obviate the danger of overreporting, the catego-
ries selected in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 are ones that are less likely to have been
confused with each other by the delegates. For example, the category of
"civil rights groups" is not included in the analysis of overlapping group
membership because members of women's rights groups might quite
naturally have reported themselves as members of civil rights groups as
well.
Table 6.3. Republican activists in selected groups
Labor
union
N
Business
organization
% N
Farm
organization
% N
Educational Women's rights
organization group
N N
Ecology
group
% N
Anti-Abortion
group
% N
Labor union
Business
organization
Farm
organization
Educational
organization
Women's rights
group
Ecology group
Anti-abortion
group
3.0
3.2
4.9
5.7
4.9
5.0
87
28.7
45 34.2
74 23.3
87
479
354
14.9 45 24.5 74
16.6 479 12.3 354
20.0 2.80
18.4 280
26 27.3 122 14.5 65
41 35.6 292 28.2 232
57 27.9 317 15.2 172
31.7
23.1
18.7
142
190
213
8.4
4.2
4.6
9.4
10.4
9.7
26
122
65
142
86
110
13.3
10.1
16.5
12.5
19.1
41
292
232
190
18.6 57
11.0 317
12.3 172
14.0 213
9.6
86 24.7
13.3
109 _
110
109
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In both parties, interest groups that attract the membership of large
numbers of delegates appear to have a commanding position in serving as
the center of a network of common issue concerns. A useful illustration is
delegate membership in educational organizations in the Democratic
party. In Table 6.2 between 26.6 percent and 39.1 percent of delegates in
the other selected group categories also claim to be activists in educa-
tional organizations. This network of membership means that certain
issues and interests in the area of education are likely to attract considera-
ble attention among delegates at the several Democratic state conven-
tions. In contrast, the network of the anti-abortionist groups among
Democratic delegates is much more restricted. Only 6 percent of Demo-
cratic delegates claim to be active in anti-abortionist organizations. Those
delegates are, themselves, active in many other interest groups. But their
voice in the other organizations is not numerically strong, certainly in
comparison to the educationists. The percentage of activists in the other
types of organizations who are also active members of anti-abortionist
organizations range from only 6.7 to 11.8 percent.
In the case of the Republican delegates, a different pattern of overlap-
ping membership emerges. Active membership in business organizations
appears to be the focal point for Republican delegates. In Table 6.3
between one-quarter and one-third of Republican delegates claiming to be
active in the other selected groupings claim to be active in business
organizations as well. The greater strength of the anti-abortionists in the
Republican parry is apparent as well in the pattern of overlapping mem-
bership. Between 11 and 24.7 percent of delegates claiming to be active in
the other six groupings also claim activity in anti-abortion groups.
Of course, group membership is not necessarily equated with a specif-
ic issue central to the group leading the delegates to participate in the 1980
election campaign. Nonetheless, single issues apparently are an impor-
tant source of motivation. Just under half of all Democratic delegates
(48.2 percent) and nearly 60 percent of all Republican delegates (58.8
percent) claim that a single issue caused them to become involved in the
1980 campaign. An analysis of the issues by area, however, reveals that
social issues are not the central motivators of delegates' participation in
the 1980 elections. In Table 6.4, although the category of morality and
conduct includes such issues as abortion and women's rights, overall the
category attracted only 10 percent of delegates in both parties. The
economy and government were the principal motivators of active par-
ticipation in the 1980 elections.
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Table 6.4. Issues motivating delegates to join the 1980 campaign
(percent)
Economic issues
Social welfare
Energy
Morality and conduct
Race
Defense
Government
Foreign relations
No issue
Democrats
21.3
9.1
6.9
11.2
0.9
3.2
26.1
3.6
17.7
100.0
Republicans
33.0
2.8
2.5
10.4
0
6.2
28.2
4.5
12.4
100.0
If we turn to specific groups of delegates active in social issue groups,
it is quite apparent that such groups are not composed of delegates
motivated solely by the issue that is presumably central to the group's
concern. Among Democrats active in women's rights groups, 62.8 per-
cent claim to be participating in the 1980 election because of a specific
issue, but only 18.9 percent of those delegates state that it is the women's
rights issue. A similar pattern is found for Democrats active in anti-
abortion groups: while 60.4 percent of such delegates claim to have
become active in the election because of a specific issue, only 20 percent
identify it as the abortion issue per se. A similar pattern holds for the
Republican delegates. Republican activists in women's rights groups and
anti-abortion groups claim by 62.3 percent and 66.4 percent respectively
to have become active in 1980 in response to a specific issue. However,
only 18.3 percent and 15.6 percent of the two groups of issue-motivated
delegates attribute their activity to the women's rights or abortion issues
respectively.
PARTY SUPPORT AND GROUP MEMBERSHIP
The heart of our concern is the extent to which delegates who are
politically active in the new single issue groups are less party oriented than
delegates in the more traditional economic or occupational organizations.
Table 6.5 does reveal that delegates to both sets of state conventions are
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Table 6.5. Delegates expressing strong partisan identification
Democrats % Republicans %
Economic groups
Laborunions 81.5(1406) 73.0(197)
Business organizations 72.1(1060) 79.1(2342)
Professional organizations 74.5(1615) 86.0(1954)
Educational organizations 72.8(1906) 79.1(1097)
Farm organizations 75.9(895) 88.2(1281)
Social groups
Civil rights groups 77.0 (1417) 66.4 (204)
Environmentalists 68.7 (1015) 82.5 (612)
Women's rights groups 75.1(1313) 70.6(287)
Anti-abortionist groups 69.0(382) 81.2(837)
All delegates 72.1(6763) 84.5(8136)
strong party identifiers. Republicans more so than Democrats express a
strong sense of party affiliation; the figures are 80 percent and 70 percent
respectively.
An examination of the groups in which Democratic delegates are
active indicates that labor union activists, women's rights supporters, and
civil rights group activists are among the strongest Democratic party
identifiers. Labor union delegates lead all other groups in the strength of
their identification, 81.5 percent. In contrast, the average for the party is
72.1 percent. The only two groups that fall below the party average are the
environmentalists (68.7 percent) and the anti-abortionists (69.0 percent).
All of the economic groups are either at the party average or just above.
In the Democratic party we found that delegates who are active in
labor, civil rights, and women's rights groups are supportive of their party
to an extent that is not apparent among Republican delegates active in
those same groups. Republican activists supporting labor, civil rights, and
women's groups are some ten percentage points below their fellow Repub-
licans in expressing strong partisan affiliation. In contrast, Republican
environmentalist and anti-abortionist activists are at 82.5 percent and
81.2 percent, just about the party average, in expressing a strong sense of
identification. Business, professional, and farm groups are the three most
strongly partisan of all the Republican groups.
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Table 6.6. Support for party as motive for attending convention
Economic groups
Labor unions
Business organizations
Professional organizations
Educational organizations
Farm organizations
Social groups
Civil rights groups
Environmentalists
Women's rights groups
Anti-abortionist groups
All delegates
Democrats %
70.6 (1300)
68.6 (1067)
62.9 (1460)
58.9 (1664)
68.5 (885)
59.5 (1185)
51.5 (799)
60.4 (1123)
60.9 (363)
61.9 (6281)
Republicans %
56.4 (170)
67.8 (1893)
64.5 (1538)
61.3 (906)
70.6 (950)
54.5 (123)
63.5 (505)
59.9 (254)
56.6 (617)
66.6 (6765)
Table 6.5 indicates that delegate groupings that are both large and
influential within the party are more likely to contain strong party identi-
fiers than groups with less successful records and smaller numbers of
adherents in the party. Women's rights activists and labor unionists, for
example, have not enjoyed much success in Republican state parties. In
contrast, such groups have been important components of the Democratic
party.
Reported strength of party affiliation is one measure of party commit-
ment.2 Another indicator that is more to the point in an analysis of the
impact of interest group membership upon importance of party support is
the motivation to attend caucuses. In Table 6.6, we see that Republicans
are more inclined to believe that supporting the party was an important
motivation than are Democrats. In the Democratic party, traditional
economic groupings are more likely than newer social issue groups to
emphasize support for the party. Both labor and business groups are over 9
and 8 percent higher, respectively, in assessing the importance of party
support than the party delegates in general. In contrast, civil rights,
women's rights and anti-abortionist groups are close to the party average.
Environmentalists were much less motivated to participate by support for
the party, falling 10 points below. In some sense the environmentalists are
the least party-oriented of the Democratic groups; their group behavior
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most conforms to the prediction that single issue groups are not highly
supportive of the party.
For the Republicans in Table 6.6, the pattern that was observed in
regard to party affiliation by group activists is also apparent on the
question of support for the party. Traditional economic groups are more
likely to emphasize support for the party than are social issue groups. The
single exception to this division between social and economic issues is
Republican labor activists. Along with civil rights activists, they remain
noticeably less motivated by support for their party. Republican anti-
abortionists are next weakest in party motivation, remaining 10 percent
below the average for Republican delegates.
Tables 6.5 and 6.6 provide some confirmation of our first hypothesis
that social issue groups are less motivated by support for their respective
political parties than are delegates in economic groups. Presumably,
commitment to social issue groups can and does draw support away from
the party. But any account of conflicting loyalties between group and party
must be seen in the larger context of the success enjoyed by the group in
the two parties. The more influential the interest group, the more its
delegates were motivated by party loyalty.
IDEOLOGY AND PARTY MEMBERSHIP
In testing our second hypothesis—that is, the extent to which single issue
group delegates are actually ideologically sympathetic to the party in
which they are located—we examined the ideological self-placement of
delegates in each party. The range for Republicans was from somewhat
liberal, middle of the road, and somewhat conservative to very conserva-
tive. Democrats ranged from somewhat conservative to very liberal.
A survey of Table 6.7 shows three distinct ideological locations for the
interest groups we have examined in the Democratic party. Economic
organizations are skewed to the left of center. Among these groups, labor
union activist delegates are the most liberal, while farm and business
groups are the least liberal. The social issue groups, with the important
exception of the anti-abortionists, are to the left of the economic groups
and are therefore a strong liberal presence in the party conventions. There
is a remarkable degree of ideological similarity among the women's rights
groups, the civil rights activists, and the environmentalists. Members of
each of these groups who claim to be middle of the road or somewhat
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Table 6.7. Ideology of Democratic delegates in interest groups
Interest groups
Economic
Labor union
Business
Professional
Educational
Farm
Social
Civil rights
Environmentalist
Women's rights
Anti-abortionist
All Democrats
Very
liberal
25.6 (465)
15.0 (233)
21.9 (500)
19.5 (558)
14.1 (193)
38.6 (766)
37.1 (574)
35.0 (652)
17.9 (107)
19.1 (1935)
Ideological self-placement (%)
Somewhat
liberal
39.3 (713)
32.1 (499)
39.6 (905)
43.2 (1233)
35.1 (464)
41.9 (832)
39.3 (610)
44.2 (823)
26.7 (159)
39.4 (3987)
Moderate
20.4 (369)
23.5 (366)
21.1 (482)
20.5 (584)
23.3 (307)
11.2 (223)
12.0 (187)
12.4 (231)
23.3 (139)
22.1 (2240)
Somewhat
conservative
14.6 (265)
29.3 (456)
17.5 (400)
16.8 (479)
27.0 (356)
8.2 (163)
11.6 (179)
8.3 (155)
32.2 (192)
19.4 (1970)
Note: Percentages are row percentages.
conservative do not exceed 25 percent. In contrast, among the Democratic
economic groups, "right wings" range between 35 and 55 percent of their
members.
The Democratic social issue groups appear in large part to be the left
wing of the party. Their delegate members are on average more liberal
than delegates in general attending the convention. Delegates active in the
economic interest groups, by contrast, are at the party average. The anti-
abortionist group is the most conservative in the party and stands out in
comparison with other social groups. Nonetheless, the anti-abortionists
are conservative Democrats, not all that ideologically distinct, for exam-
ple, from Democrats who are active in farm groups. Thus, anti-abor-
tionists are still ideologically more in tune with the Democrats than with
the Republicans.
A survey of the distribution of Republican ideological positions by
groups (Table 6.8) indicates, first, that there is more homogeneity within
the Republican party than the Democratic party. The Republican delegates
taken as a whole are overwhelmingly conservative, falling between some-
what and very conservative in ideological self-placement. Only just over
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Interest groups
Economic
Labor union
Business
Professional
Educational
Farm
Social
Civil rights
Environmentalist
Women's rights
Anti-abortionist
All Republicans
Somewhat
liberal
7.9 (24)
2.9 (81)
4.4 (103)
6.2 (93)
3.4 (46)
16.0 (36)
7.2 (58)
16.4 (70)
1.6 (18)
3.8 (388)
Ideological self-placement (%)
Moderate
11.4 (34)
8.3 (235)
9.9 (236)
12.6 (188)
9.2 (125)
16.0 (36)
12.7 (102)
20.6 (88)
3.5 (39)
9.0 (929)
Somewhat
conservative
46.1 (137)
48.7 (1372)
49.0 (1172)
52.8 (787)
50.3 (686)
47.4 (106)
48.1 (384)
35.8 (154)
35.0 (385)
46.6 (4802)
Very
conservative
34.5 (103)
40.1 (1128)
36.7 (872)
28.4 (424)
37.1 (505)
20.5 (46)
32.0 (255)
27.1 (116)
59.9 (659)
40.7 (4197)
Note: Percentages are row percentages.
13 percent of the delegates opt for either a somewhat liberal or moderate
position. It should be recalled that membership in civil rights groups,
women's groups, and labor unions is found only among a quite small
subset of Republican delegates. Such groups are a good deal more
moderate in their ideological placement than are the other much larger
economic groups within the Republican party. As among Democrats, the
most conservative group found in the Republican ranks is the anti-
abortion group of delegates; only about 5 percent see themselves as
somewhat liberal or moderate, whereas just short of 60 percent view
themselves as very conservative.
The social issues groups we have selected have failed to take form as
major organizational forces in the Republican party in the same way as
they have for the Democrats. Civil rights, women's advocates, and en-
vironmental activists, are not potent forces in the Republican party. The
great exception is the anti-abortion group, the largest social issue group-
ing among the Republican delegates. Ideologically it is the most conser-
vative, and the least vigorously supportive of the party.
The configuration of ideological orientations on the one hand clearly
Table 6.9. Ideological Positions of Democratic group members
Economic issues
Non-defense budget cuts
Wage and price controls
Reduce inflation even if it
increases unemployment
Deregulate oil
More rapid development of
nuclear power
Social issues
Equal Rights Amendment
Anti-Abortion Amendment
Affirmative action
Foreign and defense issues
Reinstituting the draft
Ratification of Salt II
Increased U.S. military presence
in the Middle East
Women's rights
-23 .6
- 7 . 6
- 6 . 8
- 8 . 4
-28.1
-87.5
-57 .0
-39 .6
-17 .4
-23 .0
- 9 . 7
Ecologist
-21 .7
- 1 . 3
- 9 . 9
-14.2
-46 .0
-65.3
-47.0
-27.4
-24 .3
-19 .0
-14.5
Anti-abortionist
+ 0.3
- 8 . 3
- 4 . 3
- 5 . 8
-10.4
+ 3.7
+ 55.6
+ 6.5
+ 24.2
+ 1.9
+ 7.8
Labor
- 9 . 5
- 5 . 8
-15.1
-17 .5
- 7 . 4
-28 .4
-16 .3
-22 .9
+ 7.4
- 5 . 4
+ 9.3
Business
- 2 . 4
- 2 . 9
+ 5.8
- 8 . 0
+ 4.7
-29 .9
-16.1
-12 .8
+ 22.1
- 2 . 3
+ 17.1
All delegates
-6 .1
-2 .1
- 2 . 6
-5 .1
-11 .8
-40 .0
-21 .0
-16.9
+ 5.0
- 8 . 5
+ 3.5
Note: Each entry is the percent strongly agreeing minus the percent strongly disagreeing with the issue.
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distinguishes the several social and economic issue groups within the
respective parties. On the other hand, clear cut ideological divisions exist
between the two parties and their respective sets of social and economic
groups.
Our second hypothesis, which predicts that members of new issue
groups would not show ideological congruence with their party, is thus
unsupported. We can further explore the relative congruence between
members of new interest groups and their parties by testing a third
hypothesis, that members of the newer groups are less likely to share issue
positions with others in their party.
ISSUE POSITIONS AND GROUP MEMBERSHIP
There are sharp differences between the two parties on a whole range of
issues, particularly questions of social policy. The most outstanding
difference is that Republicans are strongly unified on nearly every issue.
Republicans have clear-cut, definite positions on most of the questions
asked. In contrast, the Democrats exhibit very little unity on economic,
defense, or foreign policy issues. The only area that reveals some issue
consensus on the part of Democrats is that of social policy.
It is a seeming paradox that the Democratic party, transformed into a
majority party nearly forty years ago by the economic crisis of the 1930s,
now seems to lack any sense of agreement on economic policy. In
contrast, the Republicans (at least in the summer of 1980) exuded a great
deal of confidence in their prescriptions for economic policy.
Our study of issue positions is reported in tables 6.9 and 6.10. We
employed a measure on policy position agreement that is used in
Kirkpatrick (Kirkpatrick 1976, chapter 9). We have examined eleven
issues: five in the area of economic policy, three social issues and three
foreign and defense questions. Each score reported in the tables is the
result of subtracting delegates who were strongly in favor of an issue
position from those who were strongly opposed. A positive score should
be interpreted as indicative of a conservative ideological position. A
negative score should be understood as favoring a liberal position. An
example is the proposed constitutional amendment to prohibit abortions
except when the mother's life is endangered. A conservative position is
interpreted to mean the delegate favors the amendment. If a + 100 score is
calculated for Republican delegates on this issue, then all Republicans
Table 6.10. Ideological Positions of Republican group members
Economic issues
Non-defense budget cuts
Wage and price controls
Reduce inflation even if it
increases unemployment
Deregulate oil
More rapid development of
nuclear power
Social issues
Equal Rights Amendment
Anti-Abortion Amendment
Affirmative action
Foreign and defense issues
Reinstituting the draft
Ratification of Salt II
Increased U.S. military presence
in the Middle East
Women's rights
+ 28.8
+ 28.0
+ 13.8
+ 25.6
+ 16.5
-24.6
-20.5
+ 2.3
+ 16.0
+ 38.5
+ 14.8
Ecologist
+ 34.5
+ 37.2
+ 18.2
+ 35.3
+ 23.8
+ 19.3
+ 9.6
+ 23.2
+ 24.3
+ 46.5
+ 17.3
Anti-abortionist
+ 47.9
+ 44.7
+ 19.5
+ 40.2
+ 37.3
+ 79.8
+ 77.2
+ 29.7
+ 22.7
+ 68.2
+ 20.1
Labor
+ 26.0
+ 32.7
+ 12.1
+ 24.2
+ 29.8
+ 32.2
+ 6.8
+ 28.5
+ 30.9
+ 60.6
+ 24.5
Business
+ 43.7
+ 49.3
+ 23.3
+ 45.1
+ 40.2
+ 36.6
- 3 . 6
+ 26.9
+ 32.0
+ 45.6
+ 25.7
All delegates
+ 38.1
+ 40.3
+ 21.0
+ 37.5
+ 32.9
+ 38.5
+ 18.2
+ 24.5
+ 28.5
+ 54.9
+ 22.1
Note: Each entry is the percent strongly agreeing minus the percent strongly disagreeing with the issue.
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strongly favor such a constitutional amendment. A weakness in this
scoring device is that a very low score could reflect either a deeply divided
party or a party with only a limited interest in the issue at hand.
Before examining the scores on issues by delegates active in interest
groups, we will examine the respective issue stances of Republicans and
Democrats in general in order to establish a comparative context for the
analysis of the social and economic groups. First, for Democrats, it is
apparent in Table 6.10 that none of the economic issues elicits consensus.
No clear-cut Democratic position emerges on such issues as the
desirability of nondefense budget cuts, deregulation of oil, or wage and
price controls. The lack of Democratic party unity on these issues may
reflect the set of states available in the survey. But such disharmony is
clearly not to be found among the Republicans drawn from the same
states.
On economic issues, the Republicans hold very strong views. In Table
6.10 there are remarkably high levels of support to deregulate oil, cut the
budget, oppose wage and price controls, and fight inflation even at the
expense of increased unemployment. Many of these proposals have, of
course, been realized by the Reagan administration. On social issues,
Republicans exhibit somewhat less unity, particularly if opposition to the
Equal Rights Amendment is set aside. Some divisions do exist among the
Republican delegates on abortion and affirmative action, but these divi-
sions are not large.
It is only on social issues that the Democrats reveal much party unity.
The new social issues that made their way into the Democratic party in the
1960s and the 1970s have clearly won for themselves a base of support
extending beyond the delegates who are politically active in the new
single issue groups. There is widespread support for the Equal Rights
Amendment among Democrats. Indeed, it is the issue beyond all others
that generates a party consensus. On two other highly divisive issues, we
find the Democrats exhibiting more agreement in support of affirmative
action and in opposition to a constitutional amendment outlawing abor-
tion than on all economic and foreign policy issues.
Foreign policy and defense issues fail to generate much unity or
commitment among Democrats. There is little support among Democrats
for ratification of SALT II even though the Carter administration had
invested considerable time and political capital in the treaty. The issues of
reinstituting the draft and increasing U.S. military presence in the Middle
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East do not elicit much commitment from Democratic delegates. In
contrast, it is in opposition to the SALT II ratification that the highest
issue agreement is reached among Republican delegates.
The Republican party consistently reveals consensus on the topical
issues of the day. Such consensus may easily flow not only from the
greater ideological unity of the Republican delegates, but from the under-
lying demographic homogeneity found in the Republican party. The
Democrats are a far more diverse party, but as we have seen, it does not
appear to be the social issues that are promoting divisions within the
Democratic ranks.
To test our third hypothesis further, we have examined in more detail
the policy attitudes of three single issue groups operating within each
party—the anti-abortionists, advocates of women's rights, and environ-
mentalists.3 Our concern is to examine, first, how much the respective
groups have in common that transcends party lines and, second, the extent
to which delegates who are members of such groups indeed possess but a
single interest. That is, do these delegates hold a general set of issue
positions that places them within a well-defined segment of their respec-
tive political party or are these delegates in the party to realize their
group's goals alone?
In the case of the anti-abortionists and women's rights groups, our
survey included specific questions that capture the presumed central
concerns of the group. These questions concerned the possible passage of
the Equal Rights Amendment and an anti-abortion amendment to the
Constitution. The question of more rapid development of nuclear power is
not perhaps as central to environmentalists as the two issues described
above. Nonetheless, it is an issue of deep concern to many environmen-
talist organizations in the nation and clearly distinguishes the Democratic
activists with ecological concerns from other Democrats at the conven-
tions.
What observations can be made concerning single issue group politics
and political party delegates on the basis of Tables 6.9 and 6.10? For
certain issues central to the groups concerned, feminists and anti-abor-
tionists are clearly linked regardless of party. But this linkage in the case
of women's rights group activists is one of direction rather than one of
intensity. The score for Democratic feminists on support for the Equal
Rights Amendment is - 87.0; for Republican feminists it is — 24.6. The
scores for their respective parties are: Democrats, —40; Republicans,
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+ 38. Republican feminists are certainly outside their party on this issue
and are closer to Democratic delegates, but they are still quite distant from
Democratic women's rights group activists. On the broader range of
issues, it is apparent that Republican feminists are on the left of their party,
particularly on social policy issues, but their liberalism does not place
them in the same ideological camp as women's rights group activists in
the Democratic party. What the two groups of activists share is that they
are on the left of their respective parties, but the distance between the two
groups is far greater than the distance between each group and their fellow
party delegates.
Similarly, there is little congruity between Republican and Democratic
environmentalists. This incongruity is quite apparent in attitudes toward
the development of nuclear power. The support score for more rapid
development of nuclear power is +23.8 for the Republican activists in
environmentalist organizations. In contrast, the opposition among Demo-
cratic environmentalists is high for a score of -46 .0 . Thus Democratic
environmentalists are firmly on the left and are remarkably similar in their
issue positions to the supporters of women's rights. Both feminists and
environmentalists reveal a great deal of unity on social issues, particularly
on the issue of nuclear power. Both groups are far more likely to oppose
domestic budget cuts than are Democrats in general. The two groups are
much more supportive of SALT II and far more in opposition to the draft
than Democrats in general. The congruence in attitudes among members
of these groups is not surprising in light of their overlapping mem-
berships, as 49 percent of Democrats claiming to be active in ecology
groups are also active in women's rights groups (see Table 6.3).
Republican environmentalists are for the most part very similar in the
positions they hold to Republican delegates in general. It is only on the
issues of equal rights and abortion that the environmentalists are less
supportive of conservative positions. But on economic issues, there is
virtually no difference between environmentalist Republican delegates
and the rest of the party. Indeed, no particular sets of issue concerns
appear to differentiate Republican environmentalists from the mainstream
of Republican delegates.
It is with the anti-abortionists, the best known single interest group,
that we find sharp differences in issue orientation from others in the party.
Anti-abortionists are conservative, particularly on social issues, but also
on foreign policy concerns as well. They cluster on the right in both
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parties. But as for the other sets of social issues groups, there remain
substantial partisan differences between the two groups of anti-abor-
tionists. A good illustration is SALT II ratification, where Republican
anti-abortionists vigorously oppose Senate consent. Democratic anti-
abortionists lack such unity. On economic questions, the Democratic anti-
abortionists are very similar to Democrats in general in that no strong
pattern of issue positions is observable. Perhaps the most telling dif-
ference is on the Equal Rights Amendment: here the Republican anti-
abortionists are even more opposed to the ERA than they are in favor of an
anti-abortion amendment, albeit only slightly. The same pattern is not
duplicated for Democratic anti-abortionists who are too divided to have a
unified vigorous stance one way or the other on the issue.
In short, the Democratic anti-abortionists are conservative Democrats.
They are very distant from the ideological orientation held by Democratic
environmentalists and women's rights advocates, but they are removed
from the Republican party as well. If pressed they might find the Republi-
cans more sympathetic on social issues and some defense issues, but still
great gaps would remain that would ideologically separate them on many
issues from their fellow anti-abortionists in the Republican party.
We have also examined the issue positions of two economic groups,
business and labor, in the two parties. (See Tables 6.9 and 6.10.) There are
some clear parallels with the pattern we found for the social issue groups.
Both Republican and Democratic delegates who were active in business
groups were consistently more conservative on economic issues than
all the other groups described in this analysis as well as in comparison to
the over-all averages of delegates in their respective parties. But it is also
clear that Republican business delegates are consistently more conserva-
tive on economic issues than are Democratic delegates. The differences
between the two sets of business group delegates are far greater than the
differences between labor and business delegates within each of the two
parties.
What is apparent in comparing labor and business group delegates
within the Republican conventions is the remarkable unity on social
issues. The only social question that generates any difference between the
two Republican groups is the anti-abortion amendment where Republican
business group activists express slight opposition. There are clear-cut
differences between labor and business delegates on economic issues,
with Republican business activists more conservative, but the differences
are ones of magnitude.
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Differences between labor and business activists in the Democratic
Party are confined to economic issue areas. An illustration is that there is
more support among Democratic business activists than labor activists for
an anti-inflation policy that could cost jobs. On social issues a remarkable
similarity between labor and business activists exists on the ERA and
opposition to the anti-abortion amendment. There is some difference on
support for affirmative action programs with labor activists being much
more supportive. On foreign policy questions, Democratic labor activists
and especially business activists are somewhat more conservative than
Democratic delegates in general.
On the basis of our investigation, it is reasonable to conclude that in
spite of the activities of interest groups, the political parties are still
decidedly identifiable bodies possessing a high degree of loyalty and
varying degrees of ideological unity.
The Democrats are the more deeply divided party. There are divisions
between liberals and moderates and little unity is manifested on a range of
topical issues. Party support is lower than that found in the Republican
party. Democrats, confronted with a large number of diverse and active
interest groups, may simply be much less of a definable political entity
than Republicans. Where there is some semblance of commitment and
consensus in the Democratic party, however, it is in the area of social
issues. Here, deeply controversial issue positions have achieved a level of
delegate support not reflected in either economic or foreign policy issues.
In reference to the Democratic party the first hypothesis is partially
confirmed, as support for the party is stronger among the older established
economic groups. These economic groups are also more in the main-
stream of the party ideologically—more so than most of the single issue
groups who occupy a liberal position in the party.
In the Republican party the need to modify the hypothesis is more
evident. The position a group enjoys in the party clearly influences the
group's level of party support. Many of the newer social groups, as well as
labor, have not enjoyed much support among Republicans. In turn, such
groups are the least supportive of the party. In addition to sheer numbers,
it is likely that multiple group memberships enhance the group's oppor-
tunity to have its issue position disseminated throughout the party. The
greater the number of delegates who are members of business groups, the
greater the ease of generating probusiness sympathies. The greater the
extent of plural membership, the greater the likelihood of mutual appreci-
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ation of issue concerns and of coalitions built on such common concerns.
It is the anti-abortionist movement that presents the most obvious test
for hypotheses concerning the extent of party loyalty found in a single
issue group. Like nearly all other groups, the group has had a differential
impact on the two parties. It has much less representation among Demo-
cratic delegates than the other social issue groups. It is a movement that is
ideologically on the right of the Democratic party, but still anti-abortionist
delegates have more in common with other Democrats than they do with
Republican anti-abortionists. The Republican anti-abortionist movement
among Republican delegates is relatively large and ideologically consis-
tently to the right of any other group in the party. Like the other social
issue groups in the Republican party, it is less willing to support the party
than are delegates in general. The anti-abortionist movement is very much
still in the process of establishing itself and, if the examples of social
issues in the Democratic party give us guidance, we would predict that the
anti-abortionists would gain in influence in the Republican party and
diminish in strength among the Democrats. Social issues seem to follow a
zero-sum course of partisan distribution not unlike the issue itself. If one
party supports the issue, then the other party ultimately will not. In
contrast, economic groups with the exception of labor have a good deal
more flexibility in surviving in and accommodating to both parties. The
challenge to parties is not the rise of single issue groups, but sorting out
the process by which issue groups find their respective ideological homes.
NOTES
1. Discussion of single issue groups is not new to American politics. The
abolitionists and the suffragettes are examples of powerful nineteenth-century
movements. In the current debate more attention has focused on the effective
communication strategies of the New Right social issues groups.
2. A subjective measure of party support (question 5 in the appendix) has been
selected rather than objective measures such as attendance at party functions or
activities undertaken in behalf of party candidates. The subjective approach is
justified on the basis that the delegates surveyed form an elite within the party and
are capable of making such judgments.
3. These groups were chosen because they have arisen in the past ten to fifteen
years.
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Migration and Activist Politics
LAURENCE W. MORELAND,
ROBERT P. STEED, TOD A. BAKER
That population movements have important implications for the political
life of the nation has long been recognized by students of American
politics. Early work by Arthur Holcombe (1933) demonstrated that the
historic regional politics of the nineteenth century was giving way to
urban-rural conflicts. And later works by Lou Harris (1954), Samuel
Lubell (1952; 1956), Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960),
Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg (1970), and Kevin Phillips (1969)
have argued that population shifts in combination with social and eco-
nomic changes have resulted in profound modifications of the American
party system.
In their landmark study, Campbell et al. (1960, 232-233) identified
three kinds of political effects as potential consequences of population
movement. First, there is the impact on the political composition of the
areas from which movers leave and into which they move. Second, there is
the impact on the mover of the move itself, which may in turn reflect other
factors promoting political change (such as a dramatically improved
financial condition). And, third, there is the impact on the mover of the
new environment into which he moves. In 1960 when Campbell and
associates were writing, they identified one out of every seven persons as
residing in a region other than the one in which he grew up, and an even
larger proportion was found to have changed their places of residence in
terms of a move from an urban area to a suburban one or from a rural area
to an urban one. In the intervening twenty years, more recent census data
continue to demonstrate the high mobility of the United States population
(Bureau of the Census 1983, Table 1).
This chapter seeks to examine one aspect of the first potential con-
sequence of population movement, the impact on the political environ-
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ment of the area into which the migrant moves. A number of studies have
sought to assess the impact of in-migration on the aggregate political
environment, that is, on mass voting behavior. For example, it has been
shown that a substantial part of Republican voting in the South has been
due to the migration into the traditional Democratic South of persons who
strongly identified with the Republican party (Campbell 1977; Lyons and
Durant 1980; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976). Much less studied, how-
ever, has been the impact of population movement on political elites, that
is, the extent to which political elites may be composed of relatively
recent arrivals and the extent to which those recent arrivals may be
different from longer-term residents.'
In this chapter we seek to examine at least some of the ways in which
recent migrants may have affected local political environments. The focus
of the chapter is on state party elites—those party activists who so often
play an important role in choosing party candidates, who take issue
positions through the adoption of platforms or resolutions, who perform
much of the work of the party, and who in general help to shape the image
each party presents to the electorate. As Samuel Eldersveld (1964,
180-181) has written about party activists, "The party, in one sense, is
what it believes—its attitudes and perspectives, at all echelons. And what
the party leaders believe may certainly determine in large part the image it
communicates to the public, and the success with which it mobilizes
public support."
As a beginning toward understanding the impact of population move-
ments on state party elites, we will compare relatively recent residents
(that is, migrants or movers) with longer-term residents and natives. The
analysis will focus on the impact of migration on four areas: general
demographic background, selected aspects of past political activity, ide-
ological and issue positions, and attitudes toward 1980 presidential
candidates. Democratic and Republican delegates will be analyzed sepa-
rately.
With regard to length of residence, the respondents have been divided
into three groups. The first group consists of the migrants or movers who
are relatively recent residents of the states in which they are currently
politically active; these are persons who have resided in their states of
current residence ten years or less. They have been designated as short-
term residents (STRs). A second group has been designated as medium-
term residents (MTRs); these are persons who have lived in the state of
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Table 7.1. Length of residence: party activists and general population
(percent)
State
Arizona
Colorado
Iowa
Maine
Missouri
No. Dakota
Oklahoma
So. Carolina
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Democrats
STR
31.6
24.1
12.2
25.5
6.1
8.7
9.8
13.0
12.9
19.8
15.3
MTR
23.0
19.0
12.1
13.9
8.9
10.3
11.8
13.2
11.8
13.4
18.4
a
LTR
45.4
56.9
75.8
60.6
85.0
81.1
78.4
73.8
75.3
66.8
66.2
Republicans'1
STR
31.1
21.6
11.3
14.4
10.4
5.3
17.7
22.7
14.0
20.4
22.1
MTR
25.9
24.1
9.3
13.5
12.2
8.5
16.5
21.4
17.9
13.3
21.5
LTR
43.0
34.3
79.4
72.1
77.4
86.2
65.8
55.9
68.1
66.4
56.5
General
population11
Recent in-migrants
24.4
21.0
8.0
10.9
9.5
12.8
13.9
11.6
11.3
16.3
14.2
"Data for these columns, and all following tables, were derived from the eleven-
state survey of party activists. For Tables 7.1-7.7 and 7.9 the following key is used:
STR = short-term residents (resident in state for 10 years or less)
MTR = medium-term residents (residents in state for 10-20 years)
LTR = long-term residents (resident in state for more than 20 years)
•The figure in this column represents the percentage of the population in each state
resident in 1980 but not resident in 1975. The Bureau of the Census does not collect ten-
year statistics. Source: Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Population, Vol. I:
Characteristics of the Population (Washington, D C : Department of Commerce, 1983).
their current residence from ten to twenty years. The third group consists
of natives and long-term residents (LTRs); these are persons who have
resided in the state of their current political activity for twenty years or
more. In the data which follow, 17.3 percent of the total number of
respondents were STRs (of these, 47.0 percent were Democrats and 53.0
percent were Republicans), and 66.9 percent of the respondents were
LTRs (of these, 51.2 percent were Democrats and 48.8 percent were
Republicans).
Table 7.1 shows the percentages of political activists falling in each of
the three length-of-residence categories on a state-by-state basis as well as
the percentage of the general population who are recent migrants. Ari-
zona, perhaps the most notable state reflecting sunbelt growth, had the
highest percentages of relatively recent residents  for both Democratic
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(31.6 percent) and Republican (31.1 percent) activists. The states with the
smallest percentages of STRs among their political activists were
Missouri for the Democrats (6.1 percent) and North Dakota (5.3 percent)
for the Republicans.
DEMOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL BACKGROUNDS
Campbell et al. (1960, 233) found that interregional movers had higher
educations and incomes than the natives of the areas they left. That result
described, not political activists, but the general mass of citizenry who
chose to move their places of residence. The data from the eleven-state
survey of state political activists reveals similar findings, when migrants
are compared with other political activists of the states to which they have
moved.
For the Democrats, 69.5 percent of the STRs were college graduates
compared with 57.4 percent of the MTRs and 45.6 percent of the LTRs.
Similarly, among the Republicans, 62.0 percent of the STRs were college
graduates as compared with 55.3 percent of the MTRs and 51.8 percent of
the LTRs.
Despite their better educations, however, the STR political activists
earned no better incomes than their less well educated associates who
were longer-term residents (table 7.2). Indeed, for both parties medium-
term residents and long-term residents were both slightly more concen-
trated at the higher income levels than the short-term residents. We may
speculate that these shorter-term residents were more likely to be concen-
trated in high-education/medium-income occupations (such as ele-
mentary and secondary school teaching).
In addition, table 7.2 indicates that those political activists who were
relatively recent migrants (STRs) were considerably younger than longer-
term residents (both MTRs and LTRs) among both Democrats and
Republicans alike. Over half (54.3 percent) of the Democratic STRs were
between eighteen and thirty-four years of age (as compared with 29.6
percent of the LTRs) and about two-fifths (39.6 percent) of the Republi-
can STRs were between eighteen and thirty-four (as compared with 21.5
percent of the Republican LTRs). For both parties medium-term residents
tended to be older than short-term residents but younger than long-term
residents.
There were fewer differences with regard to the sex of the political
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Table 7.2. Characteristics of party activists
Age group
18-34
35-54
55 +
N
Sex
Female
Male
N
Race
White
Black
Hispanic
Other
N
Educational level
Some high school or
less
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
Post-college
N
Income level
$0-14,999
$15,000-24,999
$25,000-34,999
$35,000-44,999
$45,000-59,999
$60,000 +
N
Democrats 1
STR
54.3
37.2
8.5
100.0%
(1385)
50.0
50.0
100.0%
(1381)
91.9
4.4
2.5
1.2
100.0%
(1365)
1.6
5.7
23.3
24.5
45.0
100.1%
(1370)
21.0
30.3
23.4
12.8
6.5
6.0
100.0%
(1347)
MTR
41.4
49.4
9.2
100.0%
(1239)
52.0
48.0
100.0%
(1238)
91.7
5.6
1.7
1.0
100.0%
(1223)
2.0
12.2
28.3
18.4
39.0
99.9%
(1218)
15.7
27.0
26.0
15.4
8.7
7.3
100.1%
(1185)
h
LTR
29.6
42.7
27.8
100.1%
(5816)
49.3
50.7
100.0%
(5835)
88.3
8.5
2.0
1.2
100.0%
(5745)
5.6
17.6
28.1
19.1
29.5
99.9%
(5683)
20.1
31.9
23.1
12.3
6.4
6.2
100.0%
(5507)
Republicans
STR
39.6
41.9
18.5
100.0%
(1443)
38.5
61.5
100.0%
(1560)
98.0
0.8
0.5
0.8
100.1%
(1551)
1.0
6.5
30.5
27.7
34.3
100.0%
(1519)
13.3
25.7
24.8
16.1
10.6
9.5
100.0%
(1486)
MTR
28.3
51.4
20.2
99.9%
(1443)
41.3
58.7
100.0%
(1454)
98.1
0.6
0.6
0.7
100.0%
(1438)
2.4
10.7
31.5
24.3
31.0
99.9%
(1434)
11.6
22.2
24.6
15.1
12.5
14.1
100.1%
(1357)
%
LTR
21.5
45.8
32.7
100.0%
(5536)
39.8
60.2
100.0%
(5555)
98.2
0.8
0.2
0.7
99.9%
(5516)
3.3
12.6
32.3
26.0
25.8
100.0%
(5440)
13.5
25.4
24.2
14.6
9.6
12.7
100.0%
(5144)
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Table 7.3. Party activists as delegates to state or national conventions
Past experience
as a delegate
Yes
No
N
Democrats'
STR
31.3
68.7
100.0%
(1189)
MTR
40.3
59.7
• 100.0%
(1159)
%
LTR
51.8
48.2
100.0%
(5542)
Republicans
STR
35.7
64.3
100.0%
(1520)
MTR
50.2
49.8
100.0%
(1430)
%
LTR
56.2
43.8
100.0%
(5472)
activists. Among the Democrats, about half of all activists were female,
regardless of length of residence; of the Republicans, about 40 percent
were female, regardless of length of residence.
With regard to race, Republican STRs were overwhelmingly white
(98.0 percent), as were longer-term residents (98.1 percent for MTRs and
98.2 percent for LTRs). For the Democrats, short-term residents tended to
be slightly more white and less black than longer-term residents.
In short, then, although the subgroups were similar with regard to sex,
race, and income, there were some systematic background differences
among them with regard to age and education.
It is to be expected, although by no means certain, that those who have
only comparatively recently moved into a state would have less extensive
histories of party activism than longer-term residents. Research has sug-
gested that those who have recently moved into a community are less
likely to be integrated into community life than longer-term residents
(Milbrath and Goel 1977, 113). A sampling of the data at least partially
confirms this expectation. For example, only about a third of the STRs for
both Democrats and Republicans alike had previously served as delegates
to state or national party conventions, as compared (for both parties) with
more than half of the LTRs who had such experience (Table 7.3).
Similarly, these shorter-term residents had been somewhat less active
generally in political campaigns (Table 7.4). Fewer than one-half of the
STRs of either party had been active in all or most political campaigns.
These differing levels of political activity may be related to the age
differentials among the three subgroups since (as noted above) the short-
term residents tended to be significantly younger than longer-term resi-
dents. However, when we do control for age, correlations are not affected
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Table 7.4. Campaign activity of party activists
Active in—
All campaigns
Most campaigns
A few campaigns
None
N
Democrats '
STR
21.0
22.3
36.0
20.7
100.0%
(1411)
MTR
29.9
24.0
29.9
16.1
99.9%
(1256)
%
LTR
31.8
28.0
27.7
12.5
100.0%
(5906)
Republicans
STR
25.2
22.2
30.5
22.2
100.1%
(1570)
MTR
32.1
24.9
28.8
14.2
100.0%
(1460)
%
LTR
31.5
27.5
27.9
13.0
99.9%
(5610)
Table 7.5. Organizational activity of party activists
Democrats '
Politically active in STR MTR LTR
Republicans %
STR MTR LTR
Labor unions 14.4 13.7 18.5 3.8 3.1 2.5
Educational organizations 25.3 26.5 27.5 15.1 13.9 14.3
Other professional org. 26.5 21.6 20.3 25.0 22.3 23.1
Business organizations 13.8 10.4 15.1 23.8 23.3 27.6
Church groups 22.9 25.8 29.3 40.0 36.6 37.5
Women's rights groups 25.1 21.6 16.6 5.8 4.4 4.1
Civil rights groups 25.9 21.9 17.7 2.6 2.4 2.2
Ecology groups 22.3 17.0 12.7 7.2 7.4 7.6
Public interest groups 25.4 23.6 22.6 15.0 17.8 17.6
Anti-abortion groups 4.4 5.9 6.0 13.9 11.9 10.2
Farm organizations 6.7 6.1 15.1 5.9 7.1 15.3
Other issue groups 19.8 21.5 16.4 18.6 18.7 16.3
Column averages 19.4 18.0 18.2 14.7 14.1 14.9
for either party (Pearson product moment correlations decline only from
.43 to .37 for Democrats and from .38 to .33 for Republicans).
With regard to having switched parties, the data show that Democratic
short-term residents were more likely than longer-term residents to have
changed their party affiliation or identification. Almost a third (31.4
percent) of the Democratic STRs had switched parties, as compared with
somewhat smaller proportions of longer-term residents (26.7 percent for
MTRs and 20.6 percent for LTRs). For the Republicans, however, short-
Migration and Activism 133
term residents were no more likely to have switched parties than longer-
term residents (the range was only from 27.6 percent of MTRs to 28.8
percent of LTRs).
With regard to organizational membership, short-term residents were
as politically active as longer-term residents (table 7.5).
In some new issue groups (ecology groups, civil rights groups, and
women's rights groups), Democratic STRs were more active than longer-
term activists. Longer-term Democratic activists are more active in church
and farm groups. Republican STRs were slightly more active than longer-
term activists in anti-abortion groups, but trailed their longer-term col-
leagues in farm and business groups. The column averages in table 7.5
indicate that, in general, there are few differences between long and short
term residents in either party in level of interest group activity. On the
other hand, for all residence groups there is a modest difference between
the two parties, with Democrats showing higher levels of organizational
activity.
Thus, while the STRs may bring more education and youth to each of
the parties, they have been less active in their parties; however, in terms of
interest groups, the STRs were just as likely as MTRs and LTRs to be
politically active.
IDEOLOGY AND ISSUES
While the involvement of STRs affects the make-up of the parties with
regard to personal and political backgrounds, factors which may be
important in the skill and vigor of party activity, an equally critical
question concerns the philosophical and attitudinal component of their
party activity. Some of the most interesting perspectives with regard to
political activists who are short-term residents and those activists who are
longer-term residents appear in the areas of political philosophy and
issues of the 1980 campaign. Table 7.6 indicates that among Republicans
there was little difference on political philosophy regardless of length of
residence in the state. Both short-term residents and longer-term residents
were concentrated on the conservative end of the political spectrum with
86.9 percent of the STRs, 89.1 percent of the MTRs, and 87.1 percent of
the LTRs all describing themselves as conservative in some degree. This
consistency is yet another reflection of the ideological homogeneity that
tends to characterize the Republican party.
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Table 7.6. Political philosophy of party activists
Democrats % Republicans %
Philosophy
Very liberal
Somewhat liberal
Middle-of-the-road
Somewhat conservative
Very conservative
N
STR
28.7
44.3
16.6
8.9
1.4
99.9%
(1365)
MTR
22.6
44.0
19.0
13.4
1.0
100.0%
(1214)
LTR
15.5
38.8
23.8
18.6
3.3
100.0%
(5706)
STR
0.8
2.8
9.6
44.4
42.5
100.1%
(1557)
MTR
0.6
2.7
7.6
47.5
41.6
100.0%
(1446)
LTR
0.7
3.0
9.2
45.5
41.6
100.0%
(5547)
The data on the thirteen specific issue questions were highly consistent
with the activists' own self-placement on the political spectrum. The
differences between short-term Republican residents and longer-term Re-
publican residents were at most 1 or 2 percent.
Among Democrats, however, there were decided differences among
the activists both in terms of self-placement on the ideological continuum
and in responses to specific issues. A substantially larger proportion of the
short-term residents as contrasted with longer-term residents considered
themselves to be liberal in some degree. Almost three-fourths of the
Democratic STRs described themselves as liberal (73.0 percent), while
66.6 percent of the MTRs and only 54.3 percent of the LTRs did so. For
the eleven states in this study, the liberal (majority) wing of the Demo-
cratic party has been disproportionately represented by relatively new
resident activists. (These differences were reflected as well on the specific
issues. See Table 7.7.) The average difference between STR and LTRs is
11.1 percent, with newer residents being at least slightly more liberal on
all issues. Differences are particularly great on "new politics" issues
(average difference of 14.4 percent), but less on economic issues (average
difference of 5.9 percent). For Republicans, on the other hand, there were
no clear or consistent differences between more and less recent immi-
grants.
These differences among Democratic activists between short-term
residents and longer-term residents help to explain some of the greater
heterogeneity of the Democratic party as compared with the Republican
party. For the Democrats, then, but not for the Republicans, the short-term
residents brought to their political activism more strongly liberal lean-
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Table 7.7. Support index on issues
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Issue
New issues
ERA
Anti-abortion amendment
Nuclear power
Affirmative action
Economic issues
National health insurance
Deregulation oil/gas
Spending cuts to balance
budget
Anti-inflation measures
Wage-price controls
Defense issues
Increased spending
Salt II
Draft registration
U.S. Military in Middle
East
Minimum Ns
Maximum iVs
STR
84.0
21.0
30.0
76.4
71.0
46.5
34.1
39.7
52.9
32.5
69.6
48.2
44.2
1148
1410
Democrats •
MTR
81.3
28.0
38.8
74.7
68.0
47.4
38.2
41.9
54.8
40.1
67.1
53.9
50.7
1100
1250
7o
LTR
71.3
37.6
48.0
65.8
63.2
48.0
46.4
46.6
53.9
52.6
64.3
66.5
58.0
5136
5777
Republicans
STR
23.2
52.2
83.8
25.9
8.5
82.9
80.7
70.8
18.9
92.0
13.5
78.0
78.5
1507
1568
MTR
22.7
50.3
81.8
26.5
8.2
83.7
82.3
73.3
21.0
93.6
12.9
78.5
78.3
1403
1462
%
LTR
23.3
53.4
82.7
27.4
8.4
80.8
80.9
73.0
23.9
92.2
15.3
77.8
75.3
5444
5560
Note: The index combines the "strongly favor" and "mildly favor" categories, and
adds to that percentage half of the "not sure" category.
ings, and thus were in a position to affect in a measurable way the
ideological stance of the party.
As noted above in the passage on demographic backgrounds, the
Democratic STRs did not substantially differ from their longer-term party
counterparts except with regard to age and education. Thus it may well be
that the relative youth of the Democratic STRs together with their better
educations accounted for their greater liberality rather than their relatively
recent residence in the states of their political activity. To refine the data
further, in order to consider this possibility, partial correlations were
utilized to control for age and education among the Democratic activists
(controls were not utilized for the Republican activists inasmuch as the
homogeneity of the Republican data leaves almost no differences requir-
ing further explanation). As Table 7.8 shows, controls for both education
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Table 7.8. Partial correlations of residence length with ideological
positions
Questionnaire
item
Ideology
ERA
Anti-abortion
Nuclear power
Affirmative action
Health insurance
Deregulation oil/gas
Spending cuts
Anti-inflation
Wage-price controls
Defense spending
Salt II
Draft registration
Military in Middle
East
Zero-
order
correlations
.17*
.13
- . 1 4
- . 1 6
.11
.09
- . 0 3
- . 1 3
- . 0 8
.00
- . 1 8
.07
- . 1 5
- . 1 1
First-order
partials con-
trolling for
age
.14
.11
- . 1 2
- . 1 1
.09
.07
- . 0 1
- . 0 9
- . 0 3
.01
- . 1 4
.07
- . 1 2
- . 1 0
First-order
partials con-
trolling for
education
.15
.11
- . 1 1
- . 1 5
.09
.07
- . 0 2
- . 1 0
- . 0 6
.01
- . 1 6
.05
- . 1 4
- . 1 1
Second-order
partials con-
trolling for
age and ed.
.12
.09
- . 0 9
- . 1 0
.09
.08
- . 0 2
- . 0 8
- . 0 4
.03
- . 1 2
.05
- . 1 0
- . 0 9
Note: Correlations are reported for the Democratic delegates only; see the text for
explanation. For complete wording of questionnaire items see the appendix.
and age only reduce the correlation between length of residence and
ideology from . 17 to .12. For the thirteen issues, controlling for age and
for education eliminates some differences among the three groups with
regard to ideology and issue position, but it certainly does not eliminate
differences. (Partials run on a state-by-state basis indicated no significant
variations from this pattern.) Thus the data suggest that, while the Demo-
cratic STRs brought a liberalizing element to the Democratic party, that
impact may be both a direct and an indirect result of their migration status.
In other words, recent movers (STRs) tended to be younger and better
educated, characteristics which seemingly help to account for their
greater political liberality.
ATTITUDES TOWARD CANDIDATES
The choice of delegates to the party's national presidential nominating
convention is one of the most important tasks of a state party convention
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Table 7.9. Evaluation of candidates by length of residence.
Candidate
Carter
Kennedy
Brown
Reagan
Bush
Anderson
Minimum N
Maximum N
STR
2.86
2.78
3.48
4.61
3.70
2.73
1286
1398
Democrats
MTR
2.52
2.98
3.63
4.59
3.67
2.90
1117
1246
LTR
2.21
3.12
3.82
4.52
3.83
3.27
4709
5793
STR
4.67
4.88
4.64
1.47
2.43
3.87
1328
1565
Republicans
MTR
4.70
4.87
4.63
1.40
2.42
3.98
1235
1460
LTR
4.72
4.92
4.68
1.41
2.28
3.89
4649
5562
Note: Mean evaluation of candidate on a scale running from I (very favorable) to 5
(very unfavorable).
in caucus-convention states. These choices reflect the delegates' attitudes
toward the various presidential candidates (see Table 7.9). The attitudes
of the party activists in the eleven states under study here reflected very
closely their ideological self-placement on the political spectrum.
Republicans, regardless of the length of their residence in a given state,
were remarkably homogeneous in their attitudes toward presidential
candidates. The Republican delegates were uniformly unfavorable toward
Democratic candidates, but showed consistently favorable mean evalua-
tions of Ronald Reagan (1.47 for STRs, 1.40 for MTRs, and 1.41 for
LTRs); they were much cooler toward George Bush (ratings of 2.43 for
STRs, 2.42 for MTRs, 2.28 for LTRs), and cooler still toward John
Anderson (3.87 of STRs, 3.98 of MTRs, and 3.89 of LTRs). Consistent
with their conservatism, and regardless of length of residence, Republi-
cans overwhelmingly preferred the most conservative candidate.
Democrats, however, were much more diverse in their preferences,
and, in addition, there were clear differences between short-term residents
and longer-term residents. While Democrats were rather uniformly un-
favorable toward Reagan and Bush, STR Democratic activists were some-
what more favorable toward those candidates generally regarded as
liberal, such as Ted Kennedy (who had favorability ratings of 2.78, 2.98,
and 3.12 by STRs, MTRs, and LTRs, respectively), and Jerry Brown,
who, while not strongly favored by any of the subgroups, nevertheless
fared better among STRs (3.48 on the scale) than among MTRs (3.63)
and LTRs (3.82).
Similarly, John Anderson, the maverick of 1980 presidential politics,
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Table 7.10. Partial correlations of residence length with candidate
orientations
Candidate
Carter
Kennedy
Brown
Reagan
Bush
Anderson
Zero-
order
correlations
- . 1 7
.09
.11
- . 0 4
.05
.16
First-order
partials con-
trolling for
age
- . 1 3
.05
.07
- . 0 4
.04
.13
First-order
partials con-
trolling for
education
- . 1 6
.07
.10
- . 0 4
.02
.13
Second-order
partials con-
trolling for
age and ed.
- . 1 2
.05
.07
- . 0 3
.03
.11
Note: Partial correlations are reported for Democratic delegates only; see the text for an
explanation.
was more favorably regarded by STRs (2.73) than by MTRs (2.90) and
LTRs (3.27). Anderson's apparent liberalism in the context of the 1980
campaign made him more popular among Democratic STRs than any
other subgroup, Democratic or Republican.
Finally, consistent with their greater approval of Kennedy, Democratic
STRs were dramatically less supportive of Jimmy Carter than Democratic
MTRs or LTRs (2.86 for STRs, 2.52 for MTRs, 2.21 for LTRs). These
scale scores reflect sharp percentage differences: the percentage of STRs
very favorable toward Carter was little more than half of the percentage of
LTRs very favorable toward Carter, and the percentage of STRs very
unfavorable toward Carter (22.7 percent) was almost twice the percentage
of LTRs very unfavorable (13.0 percent).
As in the case of ideology and issues, the introduction of age and
education controls results in reductions in zero-order correlations be-
tween length of residence and candidate preference. (See Table 7.10.)
Once again, among Democratic STRs the impact of shorter-term residents
is at least partly an indirect one; the age and education of these activists
who move apparently had much to do with their patterns of candidate
support.
The data on attitudes of activists toward presidential candidates rather
closely mirror the data on the activists' ideological predispositions.
Republicans, regardless of length of residence, were impressively consis-
tent and homogeneous in their attitudes toward the presidential candi-
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dates. Democrats, on the other hand, were much more likely to be divided
in their preferences, and short-term residents were more favorable toward
candidates generally thought of as liberal or moderately liberal.
The mobility of the American electorate in the twentieth century
together with other important socioeconomic developments has had a
profound and far-reaching impact on the American party system; it has
eroded old loyalties without necessarily creating new ones (see, e.g., Ladd
with Hadley 1975). The fact of population mobility has not been limited to
the mass elecorate but has affected party elites as well, as a substantial
portion of party activists are new immigrants to the state party systems in
which they have become active.
The research reported in this chapter indicates that, for both parties,
party activists who were relatively short-term residents in the states of
their party activity tended to be younger and substantially better educated
than the longer-term residents they joined. Partly because of their youth,
these short-term resident activists brought less political experience to
their politics, although their current levels of organizational activity were
at least as high as those of longer-term residents.
Perhaps the most interesting finding of this research is that short-term
residents who were Democratic activists were likely to bring greater
liberalism to their politics than longer-term residents. In that respect,
these Democratic movers probably tended to strengthen the liberal wing
of the Democratic party in those states to which they chose to move. The
introduction of age and education controls does not necessarily diminish
the significance of these findings. Such controls do suggest that length of
residence, standing alone, is not a complete explanation of greater liber-
alism among Democratic STRs. But this merely means that the impact of
these short-term residents flows in part indirectly from their mover status.
In other words, among Democratic STRs, movers tended to be younger
and better educated, and these characteristics in turn correlate with greater
political liberalism. The fact that these activists moved relatively recently
into the states of their political activity did not, in itself, explain their
liberal political leanings, but the characteristics that frequently accom-
panied these moves (relative youth and better educations) do seem to
suggest an explanation for the differences in political philosophy and
issue position. Thus the relationship between length-of-residence and
political attitude exists.2
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Republican movers, on the other hand, varied little in ideology or in
their attitudes toward 1980 campaign issues as compared with longer-
term residents, and therefore their presence among party activists had
little or no effect on changing the ideological stance of the party. This is
not to say these short-term residents had no impact on Republican pol-
itics, because they clearly confirmed and strengthened the ideological
unity of the party.
Finally, these short-term residents held views of the 1980 presidential
candidates in ways consistent with their ideological and issue preferences.
Republican movers, in preferring Reagan and disdaining other candi-
dates, differed little from their associates who were longer-term residents.
Democratic movers, however, were more favorable toward candidates
such as Kennedy, Brown, and Anderson, all generally identified with
liberal or moderately liberal politics, but this again was apparently a
reflection of their age and education levels.
The data analyzed here suggest that attention to in-migrants helps to
clarify patterns of party activity. Population shifts may affect party organi-
zations and images as much as they affect aggregate voting patterns.
Further refinements in analyzing the impact of population redistribution
among party activists should serve to further an understanding of the
dynamics of political activism.
NOTES
1. What work has been done with regard to elites and population has only
peripherally considered this relationship. See e.g., Patterson (1963).
2. Unfortunately, the data collected for this study do not provide sufficient
basis to determine if the STRs migrated from more liberal party systems to less
liberal ones, and therefore that possibility cannot be ruled out.
In an effort to clarify this point, the state of childhood for the STRs was
examined to determine if those data would help to resolve the matter. These
childhood states were widely scattered with no apparent explanatory pattern.
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PART FOUR
Issues and Ideology

8
Elite Attitudinal Constraint
RONALD B. RAPOPORT
The issue of attitudinal constraint levels among mass publics has been a
major focus of substantive and methodological research in political
behavior over the past twenty years (for a sampling see Butler and Stokes
1971; Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfarber 1978; Converse 1964; 1975;
Field and Anderson 1969; and Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1978). Articles
concerned with the interpretation of averaged correlations among a set of
issues as well as the empirical questions of what factors are associated
with high or low levels of constraint are commonly found in a wide range
of political journals. A corresponding interest in the constraint levels of
elites has been much less explored (for a rare example, see Welch and
Peters 1981).
This paper will examine determinants of elite constraint in order to
address three questions:
What is the effect of education on attitudinal constraint among politi-
cally involved individuals?
What are the effects of type and degree of party activity and political
motivations on constraint levels?
To what degree do the zero order effects of education and political
activity and motivations disappear, once we control for other variables?
The most influential study of elite constraint is probably that of
Converse (1964). He compared constraint levels of 1958 Congressional
candidates with those of a national sample of eligible voters, and found
large differences between the two. Over a set of seven issue responses and
party, the average tau-c intercorrelations were .36 for elites, and .15 for
the mass sample. More recently Bishop and Frankovic (1981) replicated
the 1958 study for 1978 with similar results. They used nine issue
questions and party, and found average correlations (gammas) for elites of
.62, and for the mass sample of .16. In both cases, however, the inves-
tigators took the elite sample as a general comparison group, and therefore
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did not look at factors increasing or decreasing constraint within it. In fact,
Converse viewed the specific type of elite sample used as irrelevant for his
purposes. He argued that the contrasts with mass samples were to be
expected, "if the elite had been a set of newspaper editors, political
writers, or another group that takes an interest in politics" (1964, 229).
However, in one of the very few attempts to look at differences within an
elite, Welch and Peters (1981) did find subgroup differences in attitudinal
constraint among state legislators.
Congressional candidate and state legislative samples are theoretically
and substantively a particularly interesting group in that they help explain
"the character of the interaction between citizen and government" (Con-
verse 1975, 87). The large gap between mass and elites is instructive in
this regard and the stability of findings over a twenty year period is
particularly striking. In dealing with the question of what factors may
cause increased levels of constraint among masses as well as elites, elites
are also potentially a useful group to study. Elite samples provide us with
large numbers of highly involved, highly politicized respondents, and
allow us to study groups which may be present only at trace levels in mass
samples, and to test theoretically interesting and important hypotheses.
For example, in a 2000-person national sample the number of respondents
having run for even local office is too small to analyze, let alone to divide
into subgroups. Use of elite samples can allow us, however, to control for
high levels of involvement while examining independent effects of other
variables and vice versa. But "elite sample" is an imprecise term. Con-
gressmen differ from mass samples not only in level of involvement, but
also in terms of education, occupation, and income, and the presence of
all these at once. This means that it may be difficult to separate out which
of these differences or groups of differences is responsible for the higher
level of constraint among elites.
What is relevant about this data set, for our purposes, is that in all cases
the convention played an active role in nominations. This fact increases
the likelihood that there would be competition for state delegate slots, and
therefore that our respondents would be highly involved in politics.
Using state convention delegates rather than national convention dele-
gates or Congressional candidates provides a sample more varied in
length of involvement, types of involvement, age, and education, than we
might find for those more elite samples.
Substantively, state convention delegates are important political ac-
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tors. They are potential campaign activists, and a rather broad based
group; they have the ability to influence office holders and their selection.
They are, then, in their own right, an important, if academically neglected
group, and the ways that they structure issues and the factors influencing
the degree of this structuring are important. Finally, subgroup differences
in structuring, by activists, may have important implications for the
political system.'
The thirteen issues were analyzed using factor analysis with a varimax
rotation. Only items which loaded at least .40 on a factor were included as
part of that factor, and items were included only with the factor on which
they loaded highest. The three factors are: Strong America, Traditional
Domestic Issues, and New Issues. Strong America issues include: in-
creases in defense spending, institution of draft registration, U.S. military
presence in the Middle East, and commitment to nuclear power. Tradi-
tional Domestic issues include: affirmative action programs for minor-
ities, national health insurance, wage and price controls, and oil and gas
deregulation. New Issues include: ERA, a constitutional amendment to
prohibit abortions, and SALT II.2
Because we are interested in relative positions on issues, and because
support of (or opposition to) the issues involved demand varying levels of
liberalism or conservatism, and consequently have differing variances,
we will use average gammas as our measure of interattitude constraint.
The advantage of gamma over product moment correlation or variance
explained is that it is much less affected by variance differences in the
variables (Bruner 1976). Missing data are deleted pairwise rather than
listwise.
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
Since Converse's article, interest has focussed on at least two different
methodologies of looking at structuring of attitudes: first by using open-
ended questions to ascertain the degree to which common ideas, like
liberalism-conservatism, relate to a variety of more immediate political
concerns (e.g., candidates, issues, and parties); and secondly by using
issue intercorrelations to deduce psychological interrelatedness. The first
technique is one with which we can be confident that the respondent is
aware of how issues do relate to each other. This is true since the
respondent is given the opportunity to explicitly state the connection. In
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the intercorrelation technique no such conscious link can be uncovered. It
is rather inferred from empirical relationships.3
In looking at political ideology in both of these ways, the search for
correlates has focussed on two categories: those relating to general
cognitive skills, such as education and cognitive level, and those relating
to specifically political experiences, such as campaign involvement and
psychological involvement in politics. The reasoning for each set is clear.
Without the skills needed to integrate political information, political
exposure is futile. But without political information there is no substance
on which to bring skill to bear. The crucial questions are: what is the
minimum degree of each that is required for high levels of constraint, and
to what degree can each set of skills substitute for the other?
Given the large difference in the two approaches used, it is therefore
not surprising that the two measures do not show the same relationship
with certain independent variables. However, since both techniques were
designed to tell us something about the degree to which an individual's
attitudes on one issue affect or constrain other issue positions, it would
give us more confidence in both measures if such anomalies could be
reconciled. Although both measures are correlated with political involve-
ment, the same cannot be said for education. "Levels of conceptualiza-
tion", has consistently been found to relate strongly to education. This
holds for studies done in the U.S. (Klingeman and Wright 1974; Con-
verse 1964) and in Europe (Klingeman 1979; Butler and Stokes 1971).
The U.S. data covers almost two decades and holds up well even when
political involvement is controlled.4 This relationship is not surprising.
Education presumably increases the abilities to think abstractly and
deductively, and these are very important in developing high levels of
conceptualization. Neither is it surprising that political involvement plays
an important independent role in developing high levels of conceptualiza-
tion, since one must be motivated in order to use skills which one
possesses.
More perplexing are the correlates, and lack of correlates, of attitude
intercorrelation among mass samples. Although involvement has consis-
tently been found to be related to constraint (Bowles and Richardson
1969; Converse 1964; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1978; Pierce and Hagner
1980), education has not (Bennett, Oldendick, Tuchfarber, and Bishop
1979; Converse 1975; Nie et al. 1978). Nie et al. (1978), comparing those
with at least some college with those having less than a high school
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diploma, found consistent but weak education effects for every presiden-
tial year between 1956 and 1972 (the only Congressional election at
which they looked, 1958, showed the same results).
However the existence of even a small relationship is challenged by
Bennett et al. Using more precise education categories for presidential
election years from 1956 to 1976, they found that, "only in 1956 does a
linear trend emerge . . .  [and] . . . in only 2 years . . .  [are] the college
educated . . . substantially more consistent than the least educated"
(1979, 59). The reason for this "nonfinding" is rather clear. People can
develop constraint either by deduction and linking, or by taking over the
consistent attitudes of a friend, acquaintance, or political figure (see
Campbell et al. 1960, and Converse 1975 on "ideology by proxy").
The first process is enhanced by both education and by political
involvement. The role of education is clear, but as Abelson argues (1959,
344), "pressure toward consistency only operates when the issue is
salient; that is, when thought about." Political involvement brings with it
salience. However, insofar as constraint is caused by taking over the
attitudes of a politically more involved person, it is only involvement that
comes into play. It is the involved, and not necessarily the educated,
respondent who will elicit and pay attention to cues and therefore be able
to act on them. The result of these concurrent processes of constraint
formation is that, among mass samples, not only is involvement more
strongly related to constraint than is education, but education is only
weakly related.
This might lead us to attribute differences between mass and elite
constraint levels to differences in involvement. However, it is also possi-
ble that education is effective in raising constraint only after one has
reached a fairly high level of involvement so that the two factors are
hierarchically arranged. With a mass sample such hypothesis would be
difficult if not impossible to test given the problem of declining cell size.
Among elites, however, this should be much less true. While involvement
should continue to have a strong impact, the fact that all respondents have
a substantially higher proportion of members in the "high involvement
category" will restrict the sample variance on involvement, and diminish
its effect, while allowing education's effect among the highly involved to
be fully explored. That is, since everyone in an elite sample is politically
involved, those individuals whom we find in a mass public with high
education, but low involvement (who would diminish the effect of educa-
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Table 8.1. Constraint in three issue Areas, by education
Education
HS graduate or less
Some college
College graduate
Strong America
issues
.41
(2479)
.48
(4721)
.54
(8734)
Traditional
domestic
.34
(2292)
.45
(4615)
.52
(8316)
New
issues
.28
(2448)
.40
(4687)
.50
(8716)
All
issues
.25
(2403)
.35
(4635)
.43
(8584)
Note: In this and succeeding tables, constraint measures are average gamma correla-
tions among pairs of issues in each issue domain; unweighted Ns are in parentheses.
tion on constraint), will not be present, with the result of an increased
effect of education.
The only attempt to measure constraint among elites for different
educational groups is that of Welch and Peters (1981). They found a
substantial effect of education on social issues (using issues similar to our
New Issues), but no difference on economic-welfare issues (roughly
equivalent to our Traditional Domestic Issues). However, their analysis is
hampered by small Ns (they report data on only eighty-two respondents
with fourteen years of education or less), which made controls for involve-
ment or other variables impossible.
EDUCATION AND POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT
Our first cut at the data provides support for our hypotheses.5 In all three
attitude spheres, as Table 8.1 shows, we find differences between re-
spondents with a high school diploma or less, and those with a college
degree of between .13 and .22 (i.e., differences between average gam-
mas), and of .18 across all thirteen issues. Given the high level of
involvement of all respondents in our sample, our findings seem to
establish, at the very least, the effect of education among the most
involved sector of the electorate, and it certainly lays to rest any idea that
involvement can, by itself, totally substitute for generalized intellectual
skills in the development of consistent ideologies.6
In looking at elites, the concept of involvement is much less easily
operationalized. Clearly anyone attending a local caucus, let alone a state
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convention, would be considered very high in involvement relative to the
electorate. Certainly some important differences do exist among these
delegates—in terms of length of previous involvement and in terms of
type of previous involvement. In addition, delegates differ as well in terms
of motivation for involvement. But how should we expect these to relate to
constraint differences?
To the degree that constraint is psychological and sociological, rather
than strictly logical, it is at least partly a function of learning which
attitudes should go with which attitudes. Will foreign policy hawks also
be domestic liberals, or will they be domestic conservatives? There is no
logical connection between these issues unless certain premises are
accpeted such as: "interventionism in the economy and foreign interven-
tionism are both attempts of government to ameliorate the conditions of
the downtrodden." Or "the more money spent on arms the less money
spent on domestic programs." The first of these premises may have been
more commonly accepted in the early 1960s, and the latter in the 1970s.
(See Erikson, Luttbeg, and Tedin 1980, 71, for a similar example based
on Vietnam war attitudes.) But neither is true of logical necessity. Prem-
ises are learned through interaction with the politics of the time. This
explains the relationship between involvement and constraint among
mass samples. Once the premises are learned, the ability to derive
consistent issue positions from them is dependent on general cognitive
skills. Clearly the more one is involved in politics, the greater the
opportunity one has to learn. This might lead us to expect that length and
extent of participation should be related to level of constraint. But it is also
possible that the learning of general political premises requires suffi-
ciently low levels of involvement such as would be possessed by even
those of our delegates only briefly involved in politics.
We have three measures of extent of involvement: number of years
active, number of campaigns in which one has been involved, and type of
campaign activity engaged in. When we examine constraint levels by the
number of campaigns involved in, we find only a weak trend in the
expected direction for Traditional Domestic Issues and inconsistent re-
sults for the other two issue areas (Table 8.2). Since Traditional Domestic
Issues are the longest standing of the three issue areas, the finding of
greatest effect of involvement is not surprising. However, when we look at
the relation between length of involvement and constraint, the results are
surprising. Rather than finding modest support for our hypothesis, as we
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Table 8.2. Constraint in three issue areas, by experience
Active in campaigns
All
Most
Some
None
Years active
0-5
5-10
10-20
20 +
Types of activities
Important
Unimportant
Strong America
issues
.49 (4900)
.52 (4270)
.50 (4762)
.49 (2423)
.52 (6606)
.54 (3635)
.49 (3483)
.43 (2856)
.51 (4122)
.50 (12494)
Traditional
domestic
.49 (4707)
.49 (4107)
.45 (4484)
.41 (2245)
.47 (6116)
.48 (3484)
.49 (3333)
.43 (2723)
.49 (3966)
.46 (11817)
New
issues
.42 (4866)
.46 (4251)
.44 (4755)
.45 (2417)
.47 (6487)
.51 (3623)
.44 (3467)
.31 (2830)
.44 (4104)
.43 (12437)
All
issues
.37 (4820)
.40 (4204)
.36 (4663)
.35 (2360)
.38 (6368)
.42 (3580)
.38 (3423)
.30 (2795)
.39 (12241)
.40 (4057)
did with number of campaigns, we find the opposite relationship. Those
active over the longest period of time were the least constrained, and those
involved over the shortest period of time were the most constrained.
Such an unexpected finding suggests a possible spurious relationship.
Both involvement variables are related to motivational variables such as
reason for attending the convention and pragmatism, as well as to educa-
tion. In all three cases the relationship is rather mild (gamma (.20), and
approximately the same for each. The strongest relationship is with age.
Clearly the younger respondents have had less opportunity to get involved
in a large number of campaigns (gamma = .23) and, to an even greater
extent, are unlikely to have been active for as long a time as older
respondents (gamma = .51). So there is a possibility of age acting as a
spurious variable in the case of length of involvement, and as a suppressor
variable in the case of number of campaigns involved. When we do
control for age, the negative relationship between time involved and
constraint is eliminated, but no relationship between constraint and either
years or campaigns involved in shows up (data not shown).
It is possible of course that it is neither length of time nor number of
campaigns involved in, but type of involvement in the campaigns. To this
end, we asked respondents which sorts of jobs they had held in cam-
paigns. We counted respondents who had managed a campaign, written
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speeches, or planned strategy as having had important campaign jobs and
respondents who had had no positions or who had done clerical work,
canvassing, coffees, or fundraising as having fulfilled unimportant jobs.
By this criterion, approximately one in four respondents (27 percent) had
held important positions. Unlike the other involvement variables, this one
was unrelated to age (gamma = .006). However, the difference in con-
straint between those who had held important campaign positions and
those who had not was consistently small (see Table 8.2). What seems to
be clear is that involvement is important in developing high levels of
constraint, but only up to a point. Therefore, in mass samples, where very
few respondents go beyond that point, we find strong involvement effects.
In elite samples, where all respondents are quite involved, we find only
very small effects.
MOTIVATIONAL EFFECTS ON CONSTRAINT
Besides general cognitive skills (education) and extent of contact with
politics (amount or type of involvement), we should also expect to find
that motivations to attend conventions that derive from specific interest in
ideological purity and ideological content of politics would produce
higher levels of constraint. This derives from the role of thinking about the
topic has on decreasing dissonance (Abelson 1959).
Although we do not have a direct measure of general ideological
orientation to politics, respondents were asked to indicate how important
a variety of influences were in their decision to become involved in
politics in 1980. These influences included issues, candidates, party,
meeting people, furthering career, civic duty, excitement of campaign,
and public visibility of delegate. A factor analysis of these influences
revealed two factors, the first consisting of issues and candidate influ-
ences, and the second consisting of all other influences except for party
and civic duty which did not load strongly on either factor. The items
loading strongly on each factor were combined in a simple additive scale.
Respondents were then divided into high and low on each scale. The first
scale we labelled Ideology and the second Personalism.7 Respondents
were also asked if their participation was motivated by a particular issue.
Finally we asked a battery of questions designed to measure purism
versus pragmatism. Purists focus more strongly on ideology in politics,
while pragmatists focus more strongly on electability (Soule and Clark,
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Table 8.3. Constraint in three issue areas, by motivation
Pragmatism
High
2
3
Low
Ideology
High
Low
Personalism
High
Low
Single issue
Yes
No
Strong America
issues
.43 (2187)
.47 (4246)
.53 (5623)
.57 (2960)
.51 (10223)
.50 (5221)
.49 (2538)
.51 (11566)
.54 (8088)
.47 (7654)
Traditional
domestic
.41 (2122)
.43 (4049)
.48 (5351)
.57 (2804)
.50 (9736)
.42 (4942)
.35 (2419)
.50 (11009)
.49 (7708)
.46 (7252)
New
issues
.38 (2181)
.36 (4237)
.47 (5603)
.58 (2952)
.45 (10153)
.41 (5223)
.38 (2527)
.48 (11537)
.49 (8048)
.39 (7641)
All
issues
.33 (2902)
.32 (5526)
.40 (4178)
.48 (2166)
.39 (10029)
.35 (5128)
.30 (2495)
.40 (11368)
.41 (7941)
.37 (7511)
1970). The pragmatism/purism questions were combined to form an
additive scale. The scale was divided to produce smaller ("purer") groups
at each extreme (19 percent and 17 percent of the sample respectively)
with the remainder in the two middle categories.
Although it is likely that ideological constraint for delegates did not
develop over the course of the 1980 campaign alone, one would expect, in
general, that a person's reasons for involvement in 1980 would not be
atypical of his general motivations for political participation. Therefore,
respondents high on the Ideology scale, those low on the Personalism
scale, and those motivated by single issues would be expected to have the
most ideological orientations and therefore show the highest levels of
constraint. The Pragmatism scale measures a general orientation to pol-
itics, and we should expect, therefore, that the most purist, i.e., those who
want to further ideology even at the expense of electoral success, would
be more constrained than the less purist, more pragmatic respondents.
As Table 8.3 shows, we find general support for our hypotheses using
all four measures of ideological salience. Although the Ideology Index
shows the weakest discrimination, this is attributable to the fact that fully
two-thirds of our respondents indicated that both issues and candidates
were "very important," putting them into our "High Ideology" category.
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Ideological salience measures have almost exactly the same effect on all
three issue areas. This is not surprising since the reasons for increased
constraint here, i.e., salience, should apply equally to all three areas.
The greatest and most consistent effect of motivational variables is for
pragmatism. In fact the effects of pragmatism on all three issue areas are
almost as strong as those of education. Although it is reasonable that those
individuals who emphasize ideology in choosing a candidate would be
more likely to be concerned with ideological consistency and constraint,
it is a particularly interesting finding in light of Stone and Abramowitz's
conclusion, in chapter 5, that both purists and pragmatists relied much
more heavily on electability than on ideological proximity. This may
suggest that even though pragmatism questions seem to address the
degree to which one wants a candidate to embody issue concerns, it may
be behaviorally more relevant to issue choice than to candidate choice. In
other words, if we had asked respondents about their voting on platform
planks, we might have found that the purist would be more likely to follow
his ideological predilections, while the pragmatist might be more willing
to compromise. This is of course only speculation, but it is plausible
considering the stress that standard pragmatism questions put on the issue
component of candidate choice.
We find, then, that at the zero order level, education has the greatest
effect on constraint in all three issue areas. Motivation variables show
consistent, and in the case of pragmatism, strong effects as well. Only
involvement shows no zero order effect.
THE INDEPENDENT EFFECT OF EDUCATION
Our most interesting findings relate to education. The fact that, among an
involved elite sample, education has such a strong effect on constraint
implies that cognitive variables do have an important role to play among
those for whom politics is salient. This also explains the failure to find
education effects among mass samples. However in looking at the zero
order relationship only, we are not able to determine the degree to which
education's effects are due to the spurious effects of involvement and
motivation.
Looking, however, at the effect of education within categories of our
control variables does allow us to control for the spuriousness possibility.
When we do so, by looking at education's effect on constraint, across the
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Table 8.4.
Pragmatism
High
2
3
Low
Ideology
High
Low
Personalism
High
Low
Single issue
Yes
No
Domestic constraint by
HS graduate
or less
.36 (249)
.29 (613)
.34 (696)
.47 (366)
.37 (1566)
.28 (450)
.27 (384)
.36 (1354)
.41 (1043)
.28 (1066)
education and
Some
college
.37 (487)
.40 (1159)
.47 (1568)
.56 (875)
.47 (2995)
.42 (1210)
.36 (776)
.49 (3039)
.46 (2271)
.45 (2001)
Issues and Ideology
motivation
College
graduate
.48 (1298)
.46 (2112)
.53 (2883)
.52 (1451)
.56 (4770)
.45 (3092)
.39 (1149)
.54 (6193)
.53 (4059)
.51 (3902)
20 categories of our 7 control variables (the motivational and experience
variables), we find that the average differences in constraint between
college graduates and respondents with a high school degree or less,
within categories, is almost exactly the same as for the sample as a whole
(see Tables 8.4 and 8.5). For Traditional Domestic, Strong America and
New Issues, the zero order effects of education on constraint (differences
between high and low education groups) were .18, .13 and .22 respec-
tively. Across categories of our control variables, they average .17, .12,
and .22 respectively. In addition, across the 20 categories, for the three
issue areas (60 comparisons) there is but a single case in which the highest
education group does not show the highest level of constraint (and this by
only .01). Similarly, there is only one case in which high school educated
respondents show higher constraint levels than respondents with some
college (by .02). Clearly, the effect of education is undiminished by
controls. This stable effect of education across subgroups implies that
higher levels of education can make up for motivational effects, and also
raises the question of whether motivational effects can overcome educa-
tional deficiencies, so that for instance, highly motivated delegates, with
only a high school degree, will show greater constraint than less motivated
college graduataes. (Our analysis here will focus on Traditional Domestic
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Table 8.5. Domestic constraint by education and experience
Active in campaigns
All
Most
Some
None
Years active
0-5
5-10
10-20
20 +
Types of activities
Important
Unimportant
HS graduate
or less
.33 (651)
.39 (568)
.34 (628)
.32 (396)
.37(751)
.39 (418)
.32 (471)
.27 (621)
.33 (370)
.35 (1922)
Some
college
.46 (1364)
.48 (1150)
.47 (1284)
.42 (636)
.48 (1825)
.46 (926)
.45 (908)
.39 (815)
.45 (1017)
.46 (3498)
College
graduate
.52 (2476)
.52 (2271)
.54 (2384)
.49 (1159)
.55 (3335)
.53 (2009)
.49 (1804)
.48 (1125)
.54 (2382)
.52 (5932)
Issues, although the results for Strong America, New Issues, and all
issues combined are similar in all cases.)
In The American Voter, Campbell et al. (1960) examined the potential
of involvement to overcome education differences in levels of con-
ceptualization. They found only small compensatory effects. Here, how-
ever, we find that both education and motivation can make up, at least
partly for deficiencies in the other, and neither totally dominates the other.
Respondents low in constraint motivation (i.e., high on Personalism and
pragmatism, low on Ideology, and nonsingle issue delegates) were able to
overcome this disadvantage if they were high in education. For example,
nonsingle issue college graduates, showed levels of constraint higher than
single issue respondents with some college. Education's effect was equal-
ly strong in raising college graduates with the highest level of pragmatism
to levels of constraint above those of the least pragmatic delegates with
some college.
Motivation variables also play an important role in partially overcom-
ing educational deficiencies. For example, low education delegates,
lowest in pragmatism equal or surpass college graduates from each of the
two highest pragmatism levels. Respondents high on our Ideology scale,
with only some college, show higher constraint than college graduates
low on Ideology. Viewed from another perspective, what this clearly
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implies is that both educational and motivational effects remain, after
controlling for the other, and that, for the most part, the two effects are
independent of one another.
The role of involvement is much less clear. Given our earlier finding
that length of campaign involvement, extent of involvement, and types of
involvement had only very limited effects on constraint, it is not unex-
pected that we find only a small ability of experience to make up for
education. With a single exception, no low education group, regardless of
years of involvement or type of campaign involvement, shows greater
constraint than any middle education group, and no middle education
group shows greater constraint than any high education group.
We do, however, continue to find strong effects of education as an
important compensatory variable. For example, college graduates with no
important campaign responsibilities, were more constrained than re-
spondents with important campaign responsibility, but with only some
college education. Similarly, college educated respondents at any level of
years of activity, were more constrained than noncollege graduates at any
level of activity. The same basic relationship holds for number of cam-
paigns in which respondent has been involved.
To summarize, then, for both motivational and involvement variables,
we find that concurrent controls for education and other variables dimin-
ished the zero order effect of each variable only slightly. Education effects
remain strong and consistent throughout.
The findings here are important in showing that education does have an
important role to play in explaining interattitudinal constraint. Previous
negative findings about the role of education on constraint were foreor-
dained by the use of mass samples. Our findings here show that education
does increase constraint substantially, but apparently only among re-
spondents with at least a reasonably high level of political involvement.
Since a mass sample has few such individuals, failure to find effects is
unsurprising. Among a sample of activists, such as used here, however,
education accounts for large increases in constraint, increases greater than
those caused by length or type of involvement, or by type of motivation.
Even controls for motivation and involvement leave education's impact
almost entirely intact.
On a more general level, our findings indicate a consistently high level
of attitudinal constraint among political elites, in spite of substantial
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variation in constraint levels. Even in times of substantial instability in
partisanship, and voting behavior, there remains a clear and consistent
structuring of political attitudes. Although this structuring is particularly
strong once we divide attitudes into different issue areas, there is still a
high level of constraint across issues areas. To the degree that elites set
agendas, and serve as cue givers to masses, there is no reason to expect
declines in the levels of constraint at the mass level.
NOTES
1. Both Democrats and Republicans were weighted to a total N of 10,000,
giving us a resulting N of 20,000. Using convention representation weights both
state population and party strength within states. Alternatives of weighting by
population alone, or equally weighting each state party group are less promising
since the theoretical universe is either less clear or less interesting. (Although
analyses weighting each state party equally produced almost identical results.)
2. Rao's canonical factor analysis with varimax rotation yielded three factors
for the thirteen issue questions. Eleven of the thirteen issues loaded at least .40 on
one of the three factors, and were included as part of that issue group. Spending
cuts to balance the budget and stronger action to reduce inflation, even if it meant
increased unemployment, did not load on any of the three factors. They were
included, however, in the "All Issues" computations throughout the paper. The
factor loadings were as follows (eigenvalues for the three factors were 12.56,2.37,
and 2.04 respectively):
ERA
Amendment prohibiting abortion
Increase in defense spending
National health insurance
Nuclear power
Spending cuts to balance budget
Affirmative action
Deregulation of oil and gas
Wage and price controls
Strong action to reduce inflation
Reinstitution of draft registration
SALT II Treaty
Increase American presence in Middle East
3. The uses of constraint measures to assess ideology have come under attack
from a variety of scholars (Balch 1981; Bennett 1975; Brown 1970; Coveyou and
Piereson 1977; Lane, 1973; Luttbeg 1968; Marcus, Tabb, and Sullivan 1974).
Factor 1
.385
.002
-.395
.710
-.347
-.388
.505
-.534
.662
-.349
-.136
.461
-.097
Factor 2
-.209
.148
.624
-.253
.536
.342
-.223
.312
-.075
.381
.612
-.250
.609
Factor 3
.700
-.504
-.429
.328
-.274
-.297
.405
-.062
.061
-.111
-.116
.496
-.190
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Correlational measures have been criticized on three different grounds: first, that
they assume that all individuals have attitudes on the relevant issues and the issue
positions are unidimensionally related for everyone; second, that correlations
across a group of individuals may imply little or nothing about structuring of
attitudes by individuals; and third, that items sampled are not important to the
individual and to the political system. The first and third of these are much less
applicable for our sample. The issues about which we asked were widely dis-
cussed in 1980, and anyone active in party politics during that year would be
conversant with these issues and have a common understanding of them. Em-
pirical support is provided by the fact that a single factor did account for 80 percent
of the common variance across the thirteen issues, and the average correlation
between the self-placement liberal conservative five point scale and the individual
issue items was .52 (gamma) with a range between .34 and .71. Furthermore, we
do look at factors separately. Concerning the problem of inferring individual
structuring from group correlations, this is much less a problem when the
individuals in question share a common perspective on politics. This too is to be
expected among a group who have been exposed to common political experiences
and events, as these 1980 delegates have. Also, statistical artifacts (e.g., a few
outliers, extreme consensus on certain issues) that might artificially inflate or
decrease correlations (Balch 1981) are not present in our data.
4. In the 1956 (Campbell etal. 1960) and 1973 (Klingeman and Wright 1974)
surveys in the U. S., low interest college educated respondents were higher in
levels of conceptualization than high interest high school educated respondents.
5. Our education categories are a bit different from those employed by Nie et
al. (1978) (who used less than high school degree and college educated as their
two categories) and from Bennett et al. (1979), who used O-8 years, 9-11 years,
high school grad, some college, and college graduate. Given our elite sample we
use high school graduate or less, some college, and college graduate as our break
points.
6. It is of course possible that it is party and not education which is having the
observed effect on constraint. Republicans are less likely to have only a high
school education, and if they showed higher levels of constraint, their prepon-
derance in the higher education groups, even though small, could be responsible
for the effect we find. However, equiweighting Democrats and Republicans within
each education category did not alter the results at all (only two of the nine average
gammas changed by as much as .01).
7. Rao's canonical factor analysis with varimax rotation yielded two factors for
the sample, when we analyzed all eight motives (with eigenvalues of 8.3 and 2.2
respectively):
Factor 1 Factor 2
Support party .230 .267
Help political career .522 - .066
750
652
007
104
671
218
.015
.217
.567
.597
.048
.254
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Excitement of campaign
Meet other people
Support a candidate
Work for issues
Visibility
Civic responsibility
Our scale for Ideological motivation divided our sample into those who said
that both candidate and issue considerations were "very important" reasons for
their participation in 1980 (about two-thirds of our sample) and those for whom at
least one of these motivations was not "very important." The Personalism scale
was constructed from the four personal motivation items. If a motivation was cited
as "very important", respondents were assigned a score of 1, if "somewhat
important", a score of 2, "not very important," a score of 3, and "not important at
all," a score of 4. Respondents with a combined score of 8 were placed in the high
Personalism category (i.e., those for whom, on average, personal motivations
were at least "somewhat important"), and the rest were placed in the low Person-
alism category.
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Issue Constellations in 1980
JEFFREY L. BRUDNEY,
JEAN G. MCDONALD
According to Malcolm Jewell and David Olson, state party organizations
exhibit many patterns of factionalism. Jewell and Olson (1982,52) define
factions as "any sign of disagreement within a political party . . . any
divergence of opinion." Based on the varying issue stances of groupings
or factions present in the parties at the 1980 state presidential nominating
conventions, this chapter examines such "divergence of opinion" within,
rather than between, state parties.
"Ideology is not supposed to have much importance in American
political life," Dwaine Marvick (1980, 72) once wrote in describing
contemporary politics. Yet, as Marvick was aware, research on party
activists from the precinct to the presidential level has demonstrated
consistently that they possess rather sophisticated ideological belief sys-
tems. Opinions on "issues of the day" are well-developed within the ranks
of the party leadership; attitudes and beliefs demonstrate constraint and fit
into more general schemata or ideologies (Conover and Feldman 1980).
This level of ideology contrasts with that found among rank and file party
identifiers, who tend to have less well-defined belief systems (for exam-
ple, Marvick 1980;Montjoyetal. 1980; Dunn 1975; Flinn and Wirt 1971;
McCloskey et al. 1960). Not only is ideology salient to party elites, but
also, historically, the two parties have professed very different ideological
orientations, with the Republicans decidedly more conservative than the
Democrats.
While prior research has established these findings, important ques-
tions remain. For instance, are activists in each party monolithic in
attitudes, as is usually presumed, or is diversity in opinion tolerated? If
attitudinal heterogeneity is prevalent, what varieties of political opinion
are countenanced among party activists? Are these differences related to
party roles, candidate preferences, and/or ideological self-identification?
Do the viewpoints of party activists demonstrate a unidimensional struc-
ture (especially along a liberal-conservative continuum), or do they
conform to a more complex multi-dimensional pattern?
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Samuel Eldersveld (1964) addressed the issue of attitudinal diversity
within the parties in his classic study of local party organization in Wayne
County, Michigan. In this fluid, pragmatic party system, Eldersveld found
differing ideological orientations among party leaders. He related these
differences to several factors, including position in the party hierarchy.
Eldersveld concluded that ideological differences were accepted among
the party leaders, although they became socialized to the basic orientation
of their party: "Contrasting viewpoints could be tolerated within the
parties because of their loose knit structures; slack was common in the
local party organizations. . . . The party gladly embraces, and freely
associates with, a most ideologically conglomerate set of political sup-
porters and activists" (Eldersveld 1964, 218).
Like Eldersveld, Edmond Costantini (1971) identified position in the
party hierarchy as an important source of differing perspectives and
ideological viewpoints within the parties. Costantini argued that top party
leadership would have a more moderate policy orientation than lower-
level party elites. He reasoned that those at the top would be most
concerned with gaining electoral victory and appealing to a broad base of
popular support; party activists at lower levels would participate primarily
because of ideological predispositions, and thus could be expected to
deviate from the superstructure of the party by holding more extreme
views. Although Costantini's study was limited by the exclusion of
Republicans, it did substantiate his basic hypothesis that the party sub-
structure was more extreme in attitudes than top leadership. He concluded
that "the leadership-follower dichotomy adopted by McCloskey [1960]
may conceal significant aspects of the complex pattern of clash and
counterpoint within a political party" (Costantini 1971, 289). Although
Eldersveld (1964) did not find that lower-level party leaders were neces-
sarily more extreme in their views than top leadership, both studies
reported ideological diversity among activists according to their position
in the party hierarchy.
A second grouping within the party which may be related to the issue
orientation of its leadership, especially in a presidential election year, is
candidate preference. According to Jeane Kirkpatrick (1976), candidate
factions differed considerably in their political attitudes at the 1972
presidential nominating conventions. On the one hand, two of the Demo-
cratic candidate factions—those supporting McGovern and Wallace—
were highly ideological. In contrast, the Humphrey and Muskie factions
were ideologically diverse, as could be observed in their disparate stands
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on the issues; the personality of the candidate and the loyalty he evoked
were the coalescing factors in these factions. Kirkpatrick (1976,264-268)
contended that the Democratic party did not conform to the stereotype of a
group of "like-minded men," but neither did it appear to be an association
exclusively for the electorally-minded; the party was both. On the other
hand, the Republican party displayed much less factionalism than the
Democrats. Kirkpatrick argued that consensus was much higher among
Republicans (although they were not monolithic), hence differences in
political attitudes were less sharp.
Other researchers have also found the Republican party to be less
diverse and more united in opinion than the Democrats. As a result of the
internal and external constituencies facing the party, the Republicans have
been able to survive (although only barely at times) with a more limited
popular appeal but a more unified issue orientation. Barton and Parsons
(1977), for example, characterized Republicans as having the most struc-
tured belief system of any of several groupings of party elites; they
constituted a relatively homogeneous group with a high degree of con-
sensus on the issues. A diverse lot, Democrats evidenced both less
structured belief systems and much less consensus than the Republicans.
Marvick's (1980) research on party activists points to a third source of
attitudinal diversity within the parties: ideological predisposition. In his
studies of Los Angeles party committee members over time, Marvick
found that ideological diversity was tolerated within the parties. Year after
year, for example, moderate Republicans held distinctly different opin-
ions on the issues than conservative members of their party. Similarly,
moderate Democrats diverged from their liberal counterparts. These
groupings were accepted within the party structure and apparently were
not disciplined or ousted for their deviance. In sum, the parties may
include varying ideological factions which may affect political attitudes
and policy outlooks.
Recent research has addressed the related issue of the dimensionality
of belief systems. Increasingly, the literature has recognized that political
attitudes are dynamic and multidimensional, if not always consistent (for
example, Herzon 1980; Conover and Feldman 1981, 1980; Stimson
1975). Herzon's (1980) work, in particular, suggests the multidimen-
sionality of belief systems among elite groups. In his sample of Phila-
delphia lawyers, Herzon found a lack of consensus on ideological
viewpoints. He was able to identify the "themes underlying the respond-
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ents' positions on the issues and . . .  reveal the ideological dimensions
that structure their political thinking" (Herzon 1980, 247). While attor-
neys with different backgrounds may demonstrate less agreement than
activists in a common political party organization, nevertheless one would
expect structured, viable ideologies to characterize both groups. The
multidimensional belief system found among the attorneys suggests that a
similarly complex structure may be prevalent among party leaders.
Based on this research, groupings or factions within the parties result-
ing from position in the party hierarchy, candidate preference, and ide-
ological predisposition may lead to differing issue positions and political
beliefs, thus belying the conception of monolithic party systems. The
literature also suggests that these differences will be more pronounced
among Democrats than Republicans. Finally, the belief systems underly-
ing the views of party leadership are more likely to display a multidimen-
tional than a unidimensional structure. The following hypotheses
summarize these findings for purposes of empirical test:
• Republican party leaders will exhibit less diversity in opinion than
will Democratic party leaders.
• Upper levels of party leadership will differ in issue orientation from
those at lower levels; not only may upper-level leaders be concerned with a
different set of issues, but also they may be less extreme in their views
than the party substructure.
• Factions based on candidate preference will exhibit different issue
stances within the same party.
• Issue positions within the parties will differ according to ideology
(liberal-conservative), but moderates across the two parties will also
differ.
• Intraparty factions or groupings can be expected to demonstrate
multidimensional issue structures underlying their political attitudes.
These hypotheses are examined empirically based on a very large
sample of over 17,000 political activists who served as delegates to the
1980 conventions of the Democratic or Republican party in their state.
Although only a subset of the United States is represented in this sample,
the collection of states seems sufficiently diverse (politically, geograph-
ically, economically, etc.) to approximate a broad cross-section of state
party activists.
Among the questions put to the state convention delegates were
thirteen items soliciting their opinions on important issues of public
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Table 9.1. Issue positions by party
Issues and Ideology
Issue
Equal Rights Amendment
Amendment banning abortion
Increase defense spending
National health insurance
Nuclear power
Spending cuts/balance budget
Affirmative action programs
Deregulation of oil and gas
Wage and price controls
Reduce inflation
Draft registration
Ratification of SALT II
U.S. military in Middle East
Democrats
Mean
2.06
3.56
3.09
2.54
3.27
3.22
2.45
3.10
2.90
3.13
2.73
2.57
2.88
Std.
dev.
.37
.55
.41
.34
.37
.31
.20
.31
.33
.21
.46
.20
.24
N
8489
8414
8398
7428
8364
8286
8296
8183
8228
8191
8294
8100
8281
Republicans
Mean
3.96
2.85
1.56 (
4.50 (
2.02
2.00
3.71
1.99
3.96
2.35
2.16
4.26
2.25
Std.
dev.
.34
.60
).87
).88
.05
.25
.11
.09
.23
.11
.21
.05
.05
N
8641
8606
8637
8217
8591
8581
8486
8482
8506
8345
8524
8431
8490
Diff.
std. dev.*
.03
- . 0 5
.54
.46
.32
.06
.09
.22
.10
.10
.25
.15
.19
*Standard deviation for Democrats minus standard deviation for Republicans.
policy: the Equal Rights Amendment, a constitutional amendment pro-
hibiting abortions unless the life of the mother is endangered, increases in
defense spending at the expense of domestic programs, national health
insurance, nuclear power, cuts in nondefense spending to balance the
federal budget, affirmative action programs, deregulation of oil and gas
prices, wage and price controls, action to reduce inflation even if unem-
ployment results, reinstitution of draft registration, ratification of the
SALT II Treaty, and increasing America's military presence in the Middle
East. The full text of the items may be found in the appendix (Question
19). For each item, delegates were asked to place themselves on a five-
point scale, ranging from "strongly favor" (1) to "strongly oppose" (5).
ISSUE POSITIONS
The first hypothesis proposed that Republican party activists will display
greater homogeneity in opinion than will their counterparts in the Demo-
cratic party. Table 9.1 presents data to evaluate this hypothesis. The table
includes the mean and standard deviation of responses on the thirteen
issues for both Democrats and Republicans, as well as the difference
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between the standard deviations for each item (standard deviation for
Democrats—standard deviation for Republicans).
Table 9.1 supports the hypothesis. With the exception of the abortion
issue, Republican delegates consistently display less variation in opinion
than do Democratic delegates, as assessed by the respective standard
deviations. Even with respect to abortion, the differences in standard
deviations is not large. For two of the issues, defense spending and na-
tional health insurance, the Republicans are markedly more unified in
opinion than the Democrats (differences in standard deviation are .54 and
.46, respectively), and for four others, nuclear power (difference = .32),
draft registration (.25), deregulation of oil and gas (.22), and a U.S.
military presence in the Middle East (.19), they are considerably more
monolithic. Although the remaining six issues reveal somewhat smaller
differences in the variability of issue positions between Democrats and
Republicans (.15 or less), Republicans are consistently more similar in
opinion. The latter are also consistently conservative, while the Demo-
crats are moderate to liberal.
According to the second hypothesis, upper levels of party leadership
can be expected to differ in issue orientation from those in the lower
echelon, i.e., the party substructure. Because of the difficulty of ranking
party offices hierarchically, especially across states, in this research a
basic distinction is made between delegates who hold public office (upper
level leaders) and those who do not (lower level leaders). Table 9.2 reports
the results of analyses of variance comparing mean scores on the issues
across these two groups for each party.
Certainly among Republican delegates, the hypothesis does not re-
ceive empirical support: The largest difference in mean scores observed
between public officeholders and nonofficeholders is only . 15 (nuclear
power), and for only one other issue (action to reduce inflation at the
expense of unemployment) is the difference greater than .10. Apparently,
Costantini's (1971) findings documenting issue differences between the
leadership and the substructure of the Democratic party may not be
generalizable to the Republican party. Whether holders of public office or
not, Republicans were consistently conservative on the issues and ex-
hibited remarkable consensus of opinion.
Not so for the Democratic party. Democratic officeholders differed by
as much as .51 (nuclear power) from the party substructure. Comparable
differences are observed on the issues of defense spending (.43), draft
Table 9.2. Issue positions among public officeholders and
nonofficeholders
Issue
Equal Rights Amendment
Amendment banning
abortion
Increase defense spending
National health insurance
Nuclear power
Spending cuts/balance
budget
Affirmative action
programs
Deregulation of oil and gas
Wage and price controls
Reduce inflation
Draft registration
Ratification of SALT II
U.S. military in Middle
East
Equal Rights Amendment
Amendment banning
abortion
Increase defense spending
National Health Insurance
Nuclear power
Spending cuts/balance
budget
Affirmative action
programs
Deregulation of oil and gas
Wage and price controls
Reduce inflation
Draft registration
Ratification of SALT II
U.S. military in Middle
East
Officeholders
Mean
2.40
3.36
2.71
2.67
2.82
3.02
2.55
2.95
2.79
2.98
2.37
2.63
2.57
3.98
2.79
Std.
dev.
.49
.54
.41
.38
.30
.35
.25
.34
.38
.24
.31
.18
.18
.28
.55
1.54 0.82
4.52 0.83
1.88 0.97
1.97
3.75
2.03
3.96
2.24
2.10
4.24
2.22
.26
.09
.10
.24
.11
.19
.05
.04
N
976
967
973
925
955
957
951
938
949
943
946
931
952
Nonofficeholders
Mean
Std.
dev. N
Democratic delegates
2.02
3.59
3.14
2.52
3.33
3.24
2.43
3.12
2.91
3.16
2.77
2.56
2.92
1.34
1.55
1.40
1.33
1.36
1.30
1.19
1.30
1.32
1.20
1.47
1.20
1.24
Republican delegate
993
981
989
958
991
984
974
973
978
954
982
970
974
3.96
2.86
1.57
4.50
2.03
2.00
3.70
1.98
3.96
2.37
2.17
4.26
2.25
1.35
1.61
0.87
0.88
1.06
1.25
1.11
1.09
1.23
1.11
1.22
1.05
1.05
7513
7447
7425
6503
7409
7329
7345
7245
7279
7248
7348
7169
7329
7648
7625
7648
7259
7600
7597
7512
7509
7528
7391
7542
7461
7516
Diff.
means
.38
- . 2 3
- . 4 3
.15
- . 5 1
- . 2 2
.12
- . 1 7
- . 1 2
- . 1 8
- . 4 0
.07
- . 3 5
.02
- . 0 7
- . 0 3
.02
- . 1 5
- . 0 3
.05
.05
.00
- . 1 3
- . 0 7
- . 0 2
- . 0 3
Eta/Eta2
.09/.008**
.05/.002**
.10/.009**
.04/.001**
.12/.014**
.06/.003**
.03/.001*
.04/.002**
.03/.001*
.05/.002"
.09/.008**
.02/.000
.09/.008**
.01/.000
.01/.000
.01/.000
.00/.000
.05/.002**
.01/.000
.01/.000
.02/.000
.00/.000
.04/.001**
.02/.000
.00/.000
.01/.000
*Difference in means statistically significant at the .01 level.
"Difference in means statistically significant at the .001 level.
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registration (.40), the Equal Rights Amendment (.38), and a U.S. mili-
tary presence in the Middle East (.35). However, the remaining eight
issues show less than a one-quarter point difference between of-
ficeholders and nonofficeholders. Although for all but one issue (ratifica-
tion of the SALT II Treaty) the differences between the mean issue
positions of the two groups achieves statistical significance (largely due to
sample size), the eta2 statistics assessing explained variation are quite
small, only once surpassing even 1 percent (nuclear power). Thus, while
the hypothesis is substantiated for hierarchical groupings within the
Democratic party, the evidence is not overwhelming.
Analysis of the Democratic delegates also shows that with the excep-
tion of a single issue (mandatory wage and price controls), officeholders
maintained a more conservative orientation than did the party substruc-
ture. Thus, as Costantini (1971) found, within the Democratic party the
substructure appears more extreme than top leadership.
As suggested by the third hypothesis, issue differences across candi-
date factions are more substantial for both parties. Democratic delegates
pledged to incumbent Jimmy Carter saw the issues in a far different light
than did those pledged to challenger Edward Kennedy. As could be
expected, Kennedy delegates were far more liberal than Carter supporters.
As a group, Kennedy delegates were more opposed to reinstituting draft
registration (by 1.27 points on a 5-point scale), more supportive of a
national health insurance program (by 1.17), more opposed to increased
defense spending (by .97), and more supportive of mandatory wage and
price controls (by .92). Carter delegates were more supportive of the
development of nuclear power (by .83), deregulation of oil and gas prices
(by .76), a U.S. military presence in the Middle East (by .74), cuts in
nondefense spending to balance the budget (by .72), and action to reduce
inflation (by .69). On eleven of the thirteen issues, the mean scores for
Carter and Kennedy supporters differ by more than half a point. Were it
not for the fact that some of the liberal Democratic delegates had endorsed
Carter as a candidate because he seemed more likely to win—despite their
preference for Kennedy's views—the differences on the issues between
these candidate factions would have been even greater (see chapter 5).
As was the case with respect to the comparison of officeholders and
nonofficeholders (see Table 9.2), candidate factions in the Republican
party display greater similarity in issue positions than do the candidate
followings in the Democratic party (Table 9.3). As a group, state conven-
Table 9.3. Issue positions among candidate factions
Issue
Equal Rights Amendment
Amendment banning
abortion
Increase defense spending
National health insurance
Nuclear power
Spending cuts/balance
budget
Affirmative action
programs
Deregulation of oil and gas
Wage and price controls
Reduce inflation
Draft registration
Ratification of SALT II
U.S. military in Middle
East
Issue
Equal Rights Amendment
Amendment banning
abortion
Increase defense spending
National health insurance
Nuclear power
Spending cuts/balance
budget
Affirmative action
programs
Deregulation of oil and gas
Wage and price controls
Reduce inflation
Draft registration
Ratification of SALT II
U.S. military in Middle
East
Carter delegates
Mean
2.17
3.57
2.79
2.85
3.03
3.01
2.56
2.87
3.15
2.94
2.30
2.58
2.61
Std.
dev.
1.40
1.52
1.35
1.34
1.32
1.28
1.21
1.25
1.30
1.15
1.26
1.18
1.15
N
4484
\/[\\
4436
4015
4411
4383
4403
4336
4352
4338
4391
4296
4390
Reagan delegates
Mean
4.21
2.67
1.38
4.51
1.90
1.90
3.83
1.93
3.93
2.28
1.97
4.42
2.08
Std.
dev.
1.15
1.57
0.74
0.90
1.03
1.28
1.10
1.13
1.29
1.13
1.14
0.96
1.04
N
3160
3131
3159
3092
3132
3127
3097
3102
3108
3050
3116
3079
3107
Democratic delegates
Kennedy delegates
Mean
1.60
3.80
3.76
1.68
3.86
3.73
2.05
3.63
2.23
3.63
3.57
2.40
3.35
Std.
dev.
1.06
1.51
1.32
0.92
1.26
1.24
1.10
1.32
1.19
1.21
1.47
1.20
1.28
N
1686
1678
1679
1363
1676
1660
1667
1653
1665
1656
1647
1634
1663
Republican delegates
Non-Reagan
delegates
Mean
3.38
3.31
1.80
4.47
2.17
2.17
3.54
1.92
3.90
2.38
2.19
4.00
2.38
Std.
dev.
1.50
1.54
1.03
0.87
1.10
1.28
1.12
1.06
1.22
1.07
1.19
1.15
1.05
N
1236
1230
1235
1139
1232
1228
1217
1222
1226
1194
1226
1213
1220
Diff.
means
.57
- . 2 3
- . 9 7
1.17
- . 8 3
- . 7 2
.51
- . 7 6
.92
- . 6 9
-1 .27
.18
- . 7 4
Diff.
means
.83
- . 6 4
- . 4 2
.04
- . 2 7
- . 2 7
.29
.01
.03
- . 1 0
- . 2 2
.42
- . 3 0
Eta/Eta2
.19/.04**
.07/.01**
.31/.09**
.38/. 14**
.27/.07**
.25/.06**
.19/.04**
.26/.07**
.31/.09**
.26/.07**
.40/. 16**
.07/.01**
27/.Q7**
Eta/Eta2
29/.08**
.18/.03**
.22/.05**
.02/.00
.11/.01**
.09/.01**
.12/.01**
.01/.00
.01/.00
.04/.00*
.09/.01**
.18/.03**
.13/.02**
*Difference in means statistically significant at the .01 level.
••Difference in means statistically significant at the .001 level.
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tion delegates committed to Ronald Reagan have nearly identical posi-
tions in support of deregulation of oil and gas prices and action to reduce
inflation even if unemployment should increase, and in opposition to
wage and price controls and national health insurance as those not
pledged to Reagan (the only other sizable candidate faction). These
groups do differ substantially on a number of issues, however. For
example, Reagan delegates were more opposed to the Equal Rights
Amendment (by .83) and to the SALT II Treaty (by .42) and more in favor
of an amendment prohibiting abortions except when the mother's life is
endangered (by .64) and increases in defense spending (by .42). On the
remaining issues, the differences between Reagan delegates and support-
ers of other candidates range between .22 and .30. While the issue
positions taken by candidate factions among Republicans are closer than
those found in the Democratic party, on most issues a clear (albeit
smaller) difference is discernible.
Tables 9.4 and 9.5 allow examination of the fourth hypothesis con-
cerning the issue positions of ideological factions with the parties. Dele-
gates classified themselves on an ideological dimension ranging from
very liberal to very conservative. Table 9.4 contrasts the views on the
thirteen issues of "very" and "somewhat" liberal Democratic delegates
with those of party moderates; the table also presents a comparison of the
opinions of "very" and "somewhat" conservative delegates with moder-
ates in the Republican party.
As anticipated, large differences on the issues separate the ideological
factions within the same party. Democratic moderates are far more conser-
vative than party liberals, and Republican moderates are far more liberal
than party conservatives. The differences are especially marked among
the Democrats: On nine of the thirteen issues, the means for liberals and
moderates differ by more than one-half point, the largest disagreements
occurring on defense spending (1.00), draft registration (.95), the Equal
Rights Amendment (.87), and national health insurance (.84). Had very
liberal Democratic delegates alone been compared with the combined
group of those who considered themselves somewhat liberal or moderate,
the differences in issue positions would have been even greater than those
displayed in Table 9.4.
Republican conservatives and moderates also demonstrate sizable
differences on the issues, but they are generally smaller than those found
between Democratic ideological factions. On six issues (compared with
Table 9.4. Issue positions among party ideological factions
Issue
Equal Rights Amendment
Amendment banning
abortion
Increase defense spending
National health insurance
Nuclear power
Spending cuts/balance
budget
Affirmative action
programs
Deregulation of oil and gas
Wage and price controls
Reduce registration
Draft registration
Ratification of SALT II
U.S. military in Middle
East
Issue
Equal Rights Amendment
Amendment banning
abortion
Increase defense spending
National health insurance
Nuclear power
Spending cuts/balance
budget
Affirmative action
programs
Deregulation of oil and gas
Wage and price controls
Reduce inflation
Draft registration
Ratification of SALT II
U.S. military in Middle
East
Very/somewhat
Mean
1.60
3.90
3.59
2.12
3.63
3.56
2.11
3.27
2.76
3.35
3.14
2.32
3.16
Liberal
Std.
dev.
1.05
1.43
1.30
1.15
1.30
1.22
1.06
1.30
1.29
1.18
1.48
1.12
1.23
N
4842
4792
4790
4264
4788
4747
4776
4673
4701
4689
4739
4657
4737
Very/somewhat
conservative
Mean
4.14
2.73
1.47
4.57
1.95
1.92
3.79
1.93
4.03
2.31
2.12
4.37
2.20
Std.
dev.
1.21
1.59
0.76
0.82
1.01
1.23
1.07
1.07
1.21
1.11
1.20
0.97
1.03
N
7399
7360
7397
7104
7349
7355
7263
7253
7276
7130
7287
7220
7267
Democratic delegates
Moderate
Mean
2.47
3.26
2.59
2.96
2.86
2.89
2.80
2.95
3.10
2.89
2.19
2.79
2.53
Std.
dev.
.40
.53
.24
.30
.25
.22
.15
.25
.32
.15
.20
.14
.07
N
1778
1773
1768
1560
1754
1740
1738
1736
1733
1724
1734
1702
1731
Republican delegates
Moderate
Mean
2.81
3.64
2.08
4.13
2.39
2.43
3.29
2.33
3.58
2.56
2.28
3.66
2.46
Std.
dev.
.49
.43
.09
.06
.11
.23
.12
.13
.27
.09
.22
.14
.08
N
759
759
755
676
760
751
753
749
750
749
755
740
746
Diff.
means
- . 8 7
.64
1.00
- . 8 4
.77
.67
- . 6 9
.32
.34
.46
.95
- . 4 7
.63
Diff.
means
1.33
- . 9 1
- . 6 1
.44
- . 4 4
- . 5 1
.50
- . 4 0
.45
- . 2 5
- . 1 6
.71
- . 2 6
Eta/Eta2
.32/. 10
.19/.04
.33/. 11
.30/.09
.26/.07
.24/.06
.211.07
.11/.01
.12/.01
.17/.03
.28/.08
.18/.O3
.23/.05
Eta/Eta2
.30/.09
.16/.03
.22/.05
.14/.02
.13/.02
.12/.01
.14/.02
.11/.0I
.11/.01
.07/.01
.04/.00
.20/.04
.07/.01
Note: All differences in means statistically significant at the .001 level.
Issue Constellations in 1980
Table 9.5. Issue positions among moderates in each party
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Issue
Equal Rights Amendments
Amendment banning
abortion
Increase defense spending
National health insurance
Nuclear power
Spending cuts/balance
budget
Affirmative action
programs
Deregulation of oil and gas
Wage and price controls
Reduce inflation
Draft registration
Ratification of SALT II
U.S. military in Middle
East
Democrats
Mean
2.47
3.26
2.59
2.96
2.86
2.89
2.80
2.95
3.10
2.89
2.19
2.79
2.53
Std.
dev.
.40
.53
.24
.30
.25
.22
.15
.25
.32
.15
.20
.14
.07
N
1778
1773
1768
1560
1754
1740
1738
1736
1733
1724
1734
1702
1731
Republicans
Mean
2.81
3.64
2.08
4.13
2.39
2.43
3.29
2.33
3.58
2.56
2.28
3.66
2.46
Std.
dev.
1.49
1.43
1.09
1.06
1.11
1.23
1.12
1.13
1.27
1.09
1.22
1.14
1.08
N
759
759
755
676
760
751
753
749
750
749
755
740
746
Diff.
means
.33
- . 3 8
.51
-1 .17
.47
.46
- . 4 9
.62
- . 4 8
.33
- . 0 9
- . 8 7
.07
Eta/Eta2
.11/.01*
.11/.01*
.19/.04*
.40/. 16*
.18/.O3*
.17/.O3*
.19/.04*
.23/.05*
.17/.03*
.13/.02*
.03/.00
.33/.11*
.03/.00
*Difference in means statistically significant at the .001 level.
nine for the Democrats), for example, the means for Republican conserva-
tives and moderates diverge by one-half point or better; differences on ten
issues surpass a criterion of .40 (compared to eleven for the Democrats).
In addition, the largest difference in issue positions in Table 9.4 is
observed for the Republican factions with respect to the ERA (1.33), and
opinions on the amendment banning abortion reveal the fourth largest
difference (.91).
Table 9.5 compares the issue positions of Democratic moderates with
those of moderates in the Republican party. The differences in means
observed are not as pronounced as those based on the analysis of intrapar-
ty ideological factions (Table 9.4). Only four of the issues—national
health insurance (1.17), ratification of the SALT II Treaty (.87), deregula-
tion of oil and gas prices (.62), and increases in defense spending (.51)—
show a difference in means greater than one-half point, and just seven
issues exhibit mean differences larger than .40. As expected, the Demo-
crats are consistently more liberal than the Republicans, but the abortion
amendment presents an anomaly: Moderate Democrats are more suppor-
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Table 9.6. Factor analysis of all delegates (N = 13,595)
Issue
Equal Rights Amendments
Amendment banning abortion
Increase defense spending
National health insurance
Nuclear power
Spending cuts/balance budget
Affirmative action programs
Deregulation of oil and gas
Wage and price controls
Reduce inflation
Draft registration
Ratification of SALT II
U.S. military in Middle East
Percent total variance
Percent common variance
Eigenvalue
Government
interference
.36
- . 0 3
- . 3 6
.70
- . 3 2
- . 3 8
.47
- . 5 4
.65
- . 3 4
- . 1 1
.46
- . 1 0
41.0
80.1
5.33
Defense/
security
- . 2 1
.13
.64
- . 2 3
.53
.34
- . 2 4
.28
- . 0 6
.38
.61
- . 2 6
.62
9.5
11.6
1.24
Moral/
ethical
.74
- . 5 0
- . 4 4
.35
- . 3 0
- . 3 0
.38
- . 0 8
.09
- . 0 9
- . 1 0
.50
- . 1 8
8.4
8.4
1.10
Commun-
ality (h2)
.73
.27
.74
.66
.47
.35
.42
.38
.43
.26
.39
.53
.43
59.0
100.0
tive (by .38) of an amendment banning abortion unless the life of the
mother is endangered than are moderate Republicans. (Democrats are
also slightly more in favor of draft registration, but the difference in means
is only .09). In sum, the evidence regarding the similarity of moderate
factions across the parties is mixed. Although clear differences in ide-
ology demarcate their views, with respect to (absolute) proximity of issue
positions, moderates in the two parties may sometimes have more in
common with each other than with the dominant ideological faction in
their respective parties.
ATTITUDE DIFFERENCES
In order to test the final hypothesis and examine the dimensional structure
underlying the policy attitudes of the state party activists, factor analyses
were performed on the thirteen issues for the entire sample as well as each
of the subgroups identified above. Table 9.6 presents the results of the
factor analysis for all delegates.
Three coherent dimensions emerge in this factor analysis. The first is
defined by high loadings of national health insurance (.70), wage and
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price controls (.65), deregulation of oil and gas prices ( — .54), affir-
mative action programs (.47), ratification of the SALT II Treaty (.46) and
the relatively more modest loadings of the Equal Rights Amendment
(.36), increases in defense spending ( - .36), cuts in nondefense spending
to balance the federal budget ( — .38), and action to reduce inflation
(— .34). These items evince a common concern among delegates with
"government interference" in several critical spheres—social (the ERA,
affirmative action, national health insurance, defense spending at the
expense of domestic programs), economic (spending cuts to balance the
budget, deregulation of oil and gas, wage and price controls, steps to
combat inflation), and international (SALT II). The direction (i.e., signs)
of the loadings suggest that the dimension captures the notion of federal
intervention in the affairs of the nation: Opposition to the Equal Rights
Amendment, affirmative action programs, national health insurance,
wage and price controls, and the SALT II Treaty is accompanied by
support for deregulation of oil and gas, as well as increases in defense
spending, cuts in non-defense spending, and reducing inflation at the
expense of social programs and unemployment. The dimension can be
interpreted as placing delegates along a continuum of support or opposi-
tion to "government interference" in important issue areas. This dimen-
sion might also be characterized as an emerging concept of liberalism-
conservatism.
The second dimension is labelled "defense/security," and with good
reason: Increases in defense spending (.64), a U.S. military presence in
the Middle East (.62), and reinstitution of draft registration (.61) all load
heavily on this dimension. The development of nuclear power (.53) is also
associated strongly with this dimension. Apparently, delegates envisage
nuclear power as an alternative to U.S. resource dependence on the
volatile Middle East and thus an aspect of the security of the nation. It is
interesting to note that ratification of the SALT II Treaty loads in the
opposite direction from the other items, but with only small magnitude
( - .26). Delegates do not seem to conceive of the treaty as part of defense
strategy or as a viable alternative to a strong military.
The third dimension defines a "moral/ethical" orientation. Its major
tenets—the Equal Rights Amendment (.75), SALT II (.50), a constitu-
tional amendment prohibiting abortions (—.50), increases in defense
spending at the cost of social programs (— .44), affirmative action pro-
grams (.38), and national health insurance (.35)—require delegates to
Table 9.7. Factor analysis of Democratic and Republican delegates
Democratic delegates (N
Issue
Equal Right Amendment
Amendment banning abortion
Increase defense spending
National health insurance
Nuclear power
Spending cuts/balance budget
Affirmative action programs
Deregulation of oil and gas
Wage and price controls
Reduce inflation
Draft registration
Ratification of SALT II
U.S. military in Middle East
Percent total variance
Percent common variance
Eigenvalue
Defense/
security
- . 1 8
.19
.68
- . 1 9
.55
.40
- . 1 5
.35
- . 0 5
.41
.63
- . 1 8
.63
31.7
72.6
4.12
Republicans delegates (N
Issue
Equal Rights Amendment
Amendment banning abortion
Increase defense spending
National health insurance
Nuclear power
Spending cuts/balance budget
Affirmative action programs
Deregulation of oil and gas
Wage and price controls
Reduce inflation
Draft registration
Ratification of SALT II
U.S. military in Middle East
Percent total variance
Percent common variance
Eigenvalue
Government
interference
.22
.04
- . 1 9
.50
- . 1 9
- . 2 0
.30
- . 4 8
.68
- . 1 7
.04
.36
- . 0 2
23.0
61.2
2.99
= 6,392)
Moral/
ethical
.69
- . 3 9
- . 4 4
.34
- . 2 9
- . 2 9
.47
.08
.01
- . 0 7
- . 2 5
.43
- . 2 2
10.6
15.3
1.38
= 7,203)
Defense/
security
- . 1 1
- . 0 2
.58
- . 0 4
.43
.19
- . 1 5
.19
.01
.31
.49
- . 2 2
.52
11.4
21.0
1.49
Government
interference
.10
.13
- . 1 1
.63
- . 0 8
- . 2 1
.34
- . 3 3
.54
- . 2 3
- . 1 2
.12
.01
9.5
12.0
1.23
Moral/
ethical
.70
- . 5 2
- . 3 2
.19
- . 1 4
- . 1 5
.22
.02
.03
.04
.04
.42
- . 0 9
10.2
17.8
1.33
Commun-
ality (h2)
.52
.21
.68
.55
.40
.28
.36
.24
.29
.23
.48
.23
.44
51.7
100.0
Commun-
ality (h2)
.56
.27
.48
.29
.24
.10
.16
.27
.47
.12
.25
.35
.27
44.6
100.0
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make difficult moral choices on pressing matters of national and interna-
tional policy. Opposition to the ERA, affirmative action, national health
insurance, and SALT II lie at one end of the scale, and support for
increases in defense spending and an amendment banning abortion fall at
the other.
With few exceptions, these general dimensions are found in the factor
analyses performed for each major subgroup. However, the analyses
reveal important differences across subgroups both in the scope of the
dimensions (i.e., constituent items) and in the emphasis placed upon
them.
Republican delegates demonstrate a dimensional structure comparable
to that shown in table 9.6 (Republicans constitute 53 percent of the
sample, Democrats the remaining 47 percent). Table 9.7 reveals that
government interference is again the first dimension, identified by high
loadings of wage and price controls (.68), national health insurance (.50),
deregulation of oil and gas (— .48), and to a lesser extent, ratification of
SALT II (.36) and affirmative action programs (.30). The defense/
security dimension shows high loadings only for defense spending (.58),
U.S. military presence in the Middle East (.52), draft registration (.49),
and nuclear power (.43). The moral/ethical choice dimension is charac-
terized by the loadings of the Equal Rights Amendment (.70), the
abortion amendment ( - .52), the SALT II Treaty (.42), and to a lesser
degree, defense spending (— .32).
For Democratic delegates, defense/security emerges as the first di-
mension, followed by the moral/ethical choice dimension, with govern-
ment interference last (see Table 9.7). The government interference
dimension is much less prominent in the dimensional structure of Demo-
crats than Republicans, accounting for just 9.5 percent of total space
variation compared with 23.0 percent for Republicans. Surprisingly, a
greater number of issues seem to take on moral overtones for Democrats
than Republicans. In addition to the items which load high on this
dimension for Republican delegates, significant loadings are found for
the Democratic delegates on the ethical dimension for national health
insurance (.34), nuclear power ( — .29), cuts in nondefense spending
( — .29), and U.S. military presence in the Middle East (— .22).
Because an overwhelming number (88 percent) of Republican dele-
gates who indicated that they were pledged to a candidate were supporters
of Ronald Reagan, the factor analysis based on these Reagan delegates
Table 9.8. Factor analysis of Carter and Kennedy delegates
Issue
Defense/
security
Carter delegates (N
Equal Rights Amendment
Amendment banning abortion
Increase defense spending
National health insurance
Nuclear power
Spending cuts/balance budget
Affirmative action programs
Deregulation of oil and gas
Wage and price controls
Reduce inflation
Draft registration
Ratification of SALT II
U.S. military in Middle East
Percent total variance
Percent common variance
Eigenvalue
- . 2 2
.17
.69
- . 1 2
.53
.36
- . 1 6
.28
.03
.34
.58
- . 1 6
.60
27.2
68.2
3.54
Kennedy delegates (A
Issue
Equal Rights Amendment
Amendment banning abortion
Increase defense spending
National health insurance
Nuclear power
Spending cuts/balance budget
Affirmative action programs
Deregulation of oil and gas
Wage and price controls
Reduce inflation
Draft registration
Ratification of SALT II
U.S. military in Middle East
Percent total variance
Percent common variance
Eigenvalue
Liberal-
Conservative/
Ideology
- . 4 5
.46
.73
- . 1 7
.59
.39
- . 3 2
.06
.05
.19
.62
- . 4 3
.59
29.3
72.6
3.81
Moral/
ethical
= 3,462)
.66
- . 2 8
- . 4 2
.43
- . 2 0
- . 3 0
.53
.07
.04
- . 1 0
- . 1 8
.42
- . 1 6
11.3
18.9
1.47
I = 1,222)
Economic/
budget
.14
- . 0 4
.29
- . 1 9
.22
.30
.01
.53
- . 1 1
.48
.26
- . 0 3
.25
10.1
14.5
1.31
Government
interference
- . 0 8
.23
- . 0 1
.51
- . 0 2
- . 1 2
.25
- . 3 2
.54
- . 1 9
- . 0 3
.04
.09
9.6
12.9
1.25
Government
interference
.34
- . 0 9
- . 0 9
.60
- . 0 7
- . 1 2
.45
- . 0 9
.34
- . 1 2
- . 1 0
.26
.03
9.9
12.9
1.28
Commun-
ality (h2)
.49
.16
.65
.45
.33
.23
.37
.19
.29
.16
.37
.20
.40
48.1
100.0
Commun-
ality (h2)
.34
.22
.63
.43
.41
.26
.30
.29
.13
.28
.46
.26
.41
49.3
100.0
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resembles very closely that for all Republican delegates (see Table 9.7).
For the same reason, the dimensional structure for Democratic delegates
pledged to Jimmy Carter is very close to that for all Democrats (72 percent
of those delegates indicating a candidate pledge were committed to
Carter). However, interesting differences distinguish Carter delegates
from those pledged to Edward Kennedy. The factor analyses performed
for these subgroups are presented in Table 9.8.
The most arresting aspect of Table 9.8 is the first dimension found for
the Kennedy delegates. In contrast to the results for Carter delegates and
all Democrats, this dimension reveals a pervasive ideological orientation
which links social and military issues in a coherent framework—for the
Equal Rights Amendment (— .45), affirmative action programs (— .32),
and SALT II (— .43), and against the amendment prohibiting abortions
(.46), cuts in nondefense spending (.39), as well as nuclear power (.59),
the draft (.62), U.S. military presence in the Middle East (.59), and
increases in defense spending (.73). As opposed to the Carter supporters,
these delegates apparently do not conceive of defense/military as a
separate issue or dimension but as part of an integrated liberal-conserva-
tive ideology. The Kennedy delegates also identify an explicitly econom-
ic/budget dimension, characterized by high loadings of deregulation of
oil and gas prices (.53), action against inflation (.48), cuts in nondefense
spending (.30), and increases in defense spending (.29). The single point
of overlap between Carter and Kennedy delegates is the government
interference dimension which appears for both groups, but even here
differences are evident: Although national health insurance and wage and
price controls are found in this dimension in the two subgroups, the factor
analysis for Kennedy delegates also places the ERA (.34), affirmative
action (.45), and the SALT II Treaty (.26) in this dimension, while the
analysis based on Carter supporters adds deregulation of oil and gas prices
(— .32). There was good reason, then, for the bitterness and controversy
which surrounded the primary contest between Carter and Kennedy:
Supporters of the two candidates saw the major issues from disparate
perspectives.
The parties demonstrate intriguing differences between those holding
public office and the rank and file. Nonofficeholders in each party
visualize the issues in terms of the three dimensions found in Table 9.6:
government interference, defense/security, and moral/ethical choice.
However, Democrats again conceive the ethical dimension more com-
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prehensively (i.e., with more constituent issues), and the defense/security
dimension is the first factor for them, accounting for the most variance;
government interference emerges first for the Republicans.
The dimensional structures underlying the policy attitudes of of-
ficeholders in each party are more complex. Factor analyses demonstrated
that for both Democratic and Republican officeholders who served as
convention delegates, the thirteen issues must be understood in more than
three dimensions—four for the Democrats and five for the Republicans.
The Democrats have as their first two dimensions the now familiar
defense/security and moral/ethical factors found for most of the sub-
groups examined. However, like the Kennedy delegates (see Table 9.8),
they also identify an economic/budget dimension characterized by the
high loadings of deregulation of oil and gas prices (.64), cuts in non-
defense spending to balance the federal budget (.43), action to reduce
inflation (.38), and increases in defense spending (.25). Moreover, the
final dimension is a pale reflection of the government interference con-
tinuum exhibited by all delegates as well as by Democratic delegates: For
example, national health insurance, the keystone to this dimension for
other subgroups, has a loading of just .24. Wage and price controls
demonstrates the highest loading on the dimension, .53.
For Republican officeholders, the moral/ethical dimension is the first
and most important, and defense/security is the second. The third dimen-
sion, government interference, is muted, with appreciable loadings for
only wage and price controls (.57), deregulation of oil and gas (— .57),
and national health insurance (.43). The abortion item, which loads
heavily on no other factor, constitutes the fourth dimension with a loading
of (.68); the Equal Rights Amendment (— .32) displays the next largest
loading, implying a more broadly conceived women's rights dimension.
The final dimension is concerned with economic/budget issues. Like the
economic dimension found for Democratic officeholders, it is distin-
guished by the loadings of deregulation of oil and gas prices (.43), action
to reduce inflation (.42), spending cuts to balance the budget (.32), and
increases in defense spending (.27). In sum, although their policy at-
titudes diverge dramatically, the complexity of the attitudinal structures
displayed by officeholders of both parties and the similarities found
between structures suggest that these two groups may be closer to one
another in their conception of major issues (but not in issue positions)
than to the rank and file of their respective parties.
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In contrast, members of the same party claiming different ideological
predispositions (i.e., liberalism-conservatism) demonstrate more similar
attitudinal frameworks. Factor analyses based on Democratic delegates
who classify themselves as "liberal" as opposed to those who identify as
"moderate" or "conservative" both show defense/security as the first
dimension, with comparable, high loadings for defense spending, draft
registration, U.S. military presence in the Middle East, and development
of nuclear power. The moral/ethical dimension constitutes the second
factor for the two groups, identified by significant loadings for the Equal
Rights Amendment, increases in defense spending, and ratification of the
SALT II Treaty. Yet, moderate/conservative Democrats also consider
affirmative action programs (.51) and national health insurance (.45) part
of this dimension, and the constitutional amendment prohibiting abor-
tions falls in the dimension for liberal Democrats. Although a few discre-
pancies arise, the loadings for a core of critical variables identify the last
two dimensions for both factions as economic/budget and government
interference.
Liberal/moderate Republican delegates and conservative Republicans
also conceive of the issues in comparable dimensions. For each group,
defense/security (defense spending, draft registration, U.S. military pres-
ence in the Middle East, and nuclear power) constitutes the first dimen-
sion. The two factions also envisage a strong abortion/women's rights
dimension, defined by high loadings for a constitutional amendment
banning abortions and the Equal Rights Amendment. Liberal/moderate
Republicans and their conservative counterparts identify a common gov-
ernment interference dimension, consisting of the ERA (loadings of
.30/.43, respectively), defense spending ( - . 24 / - . 21 ) , national health
insurance (.29/.49), affirmative action (.49/.41), and ratification of
SALT II (.41/.47). Finally, for both groups an economic/budget dimen-
sion emerges with deregulation of oil and gas prices, wage and price
controls, and national health insurance the key components. With respect
to dimensional structure, these analyses suggest that moderates have more
in common in the conception of issues with the more partisan faction of
their own party than with moderates in the other party.
In this chapter we have examined the content and structure of issue
orientations of delegates to the 1980 state party conventions, with par-
ticular emphasis on issue constellations, or groupings, within the parties.
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Issue constellations exist but are more evident and divisive within the
Democratic than within the Republican party. They appear to be tolerated
within the parties, perhaps even encouraged by them. Although these data
cannot establish whether sanctions are brought to bear against party
factions, the study does reveal substantial diversity of opinion among
party leadership.
As hypothesized, Republican delegates were more homogeneous in
opinion than Democrats. For Democrats, a wider range of issue positions
may reflect a variety of delegate perspectives, including the attraction of a
candidate, position in the party hierarchy, or ideological standing. For
Republicans, ideology showed the strongest association with issue orien-
tations.
Data analysis provided little evidence for the hypothesis that public
officeholders within the Republican party adhere to different beliefs than
nonofficeholders. Within the Democratic party, however, hierarchial dif-
ferences were more marked and in the expected direction—i.e., public
officeholders were more moderate or conservative in opinion than the
more liberal substructure.
Candidate factions in both parties differed in opinion from fellow
activists. Although the data available cannot answer the question of causal
precedence governing candidate support and issue position, candidate
factions displayed prominent intraparty differences in the content of belief
systems. Again, these differences were more pronounced within the
Democratic party. Kennedy delegates held quite different opinions than
did Carter delegates; the latter were more moderate or divided in opinion
than were the highly cohesive, ideological Kennedy supporters. Among
Republicans, delegates who favored Reagan and those who did not were
distinguished by less sharp differences on the issues.
Ideological groupings within the parties also demonstrated differences
in the content of their beliefs. As anticipated, moderate Republicans held
different opinions than conservative Republicans; moderate Democrats
expressed more moderate views on the issues than did their more liberal
counterparts. Nevertheless, moderates across parties did not always close-
ly resemble one another. While in some instances the moderate factions
were closer to each other than to the more extreme wing of their respective
party, when ideological viewpoint and attitude structure are considered,
overall, the groups resembled other delegates in their party more than
moderates in the other party.
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Factor analyses performed on the thirteen issues substantiated the
hypothesis of a multidimensional structure underlying the attitudes of the
party leadership. Three coherent dimensions emerged which charac-
terized the entire sample of delegates as well as each of the party sub-
groups examined: These consisted of government interference, defense/
security, and moral/ethical choice. An economic/budget dimension also
characterized some of the subgroups (for example, officeholders in each
party), and an abortion/women's rights dimension appeared less fre-
quently, only among Republican delegates.
The factor analyses suggest that Democratic and Republican delegates
conceived the issues in comparable dimensions, but that the dimensions
differed in salience or priority across the two parties. Similarly, while
ideological and candidate groupings within the parties viewed the issues
from similar dimensional frameworks, important differences again arose.
For example, Democratic delegates pledged to Edward Kennedy demon-
strated the most comprehensive ideological dimension of any subgroup
examined. The structure and content of their attitudes varied dramatically
from that of delegates pledged to Jimmy Carter. These findings help to
explain why the struggle between these two candidates and their followers
was so intense: They saw the issues differently.
Officeholders in each party displayed complex attitudinal structures
with four dimensions in common: defense/security, moral/ethical choice,
economic/budget, and government interference. Delegates not holding
office in the two parties also revealed a similar dimensional structure,
consisting of government interference, defense/security, and moral/eth-
ical choice. Thus, in both parties public officeholders may view the
political landscape in a different and more complex fashion than the party
substructure. The demands of holding office and appealing to a broad
constituency may result in a more complicated political world for public
officials.
This research shows that delegates to the 1980 Democratic and Repub-
lican party conventions in the caucus states differed in issue positions and
attitude structures. These cleavages were reinforcing in the sense that
groupings which differed in issue positions varied as well in the structure
of their beliefs. Generally, the differences were related to position in the
party hierarchy, candidate preference, and ideological perspective. In
sum, the parties appear more a collection of similar views than a mono-
lithic front.
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NOTES
1. The factor analysis used was a principal factor with interaction (PA2), with a
varimax rotation. Because of the difference in method of factor analysis, and a
difference in weighting, the results differ slightly from those reported in chapter 8.
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The Permeability of Parties
ROBERT W. KWEIT, MARY GRISEZ KWEIT
American political parties have traditionally been major links between the
electorate and political officials. The primary way in which parties have
performed that linkage function has been by making the electoral process
more understandable to the voting public. While the public now may be
less receptive to party cues than in the past, parties continue to try to
simplify and guide the electoral choice of voters by reducing the number
of alternatives, defining those alternatives, and providing stable symbols.
As a byproduct of performing such electoral functions, parties as-
sumed various social roles which augment the electoral linkage. As
Clinton Rossiter (1960) argued, "the parties serve a useful social purpose
in acting as buffers and adjusters between individuals and society, es-
pecially as the latter intrudes into the lives of ordinary persons in the
shape of impersonal political authority."
Because of the crucial role parties play in linking citizens to political
authorities, the legitimacy of our representative government depends to a
large extent on the degree to which the party system is open to infiltration
and manipulation by new social forces. While it is clear, given the
candidacies of George Wallace in 1968 and John Anderson in 1980, that a
two-party system is not inevitable, it is also clear that at the present time
no third party structure provides any meaningful competition to the
dominance of the Democratic and Republican parties. This means that the
openness of the party system is in essence equivalent to the openness of
the two major parties.' It is the purpose of this study to examine one
aspect of the openness of parties: the extent to which state party conven-
tions are permeable to involvement by those representing social groups or
issue positions which differ from those of the traditional coalition bases of
the party.
In their quest for electoral majority, parties have traditionally attempt-
ed to have an inclusive rather than an exclusive membership. From the
time that party workers literally met the boats full of immigrants at the
The Permeability of Parties 189
docks, parties have devoted considerable efforts to ensure that the party-
in-the-electorate achieves maximum size. Yet, while the party leaders
sought inclusiveness in the party-in-the-electorate, they were never as
eager to seek the same goal for the party leadership itself, or so it often
seemed. An indicator of the extent to which the permeability of parry
leadership is considered important is the degree to which that leadership
has been the focus of efforts by reformers to open its functions to more
widespread involvement by the mass membership.
We have, in the last decade and a half, experienced the most recent of
efforts to reform the parties. The reforms focused primarily on ensuring
representativeness in the process of choosing delegates to the national
conventions. Most agree that the primary impetus for this period of reform
was the turbulent Democratic National Convention of 1968. Prior to that
convention, an ad hoc committee of the Democratic party investigated
complaints concerning the convention and concluded that "state systems
for selecting delegates to the National Convention display considerably
less fidelity to basic Democratic principles than a nation which claims to
govern itself can safely tolerate." (Congressional Record 1968, E.9172).
The charge made was basically that closed and unrepresentative groups of
party regulars in the states were choosing convention delegates, thus
limiting in significant ways which presidential candidates could be nomi-
nated. In the aftermath of this, a party commission chaired by George
McGovern and Donald Fraser was created to right the wrongs which had
become painfully clear in 1968. Austin Ranney (1974, 44), one of the
members of that commission, identified the goals of that commission as
follows:
The prime objective . . . was not to make the party more combat-
ready for November, but rather to ensure a more representative . . .
national convention. More representative of whom? Not necessari-
ly of all elements of the New Deal coalition, but rather of certain
demographic groups—women, youth, minority groups—the com-
missions believed had been discriminated against by the traditional
overstocking of conventions with middle-aged white males. Cer-
tainly not the representation of party notables or regulars or contrib-
utors, but rather of people who in 1972 were active on behalf of
particular presidential aspirants. In Polsby's and Wildavsky's cate-
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gories, the reforms were intended to maximize the representation of
"purists," not of "professionals."
In this statement Ranney initially identifies the goal as one of assuring
that the nomination process would be open to all demographic groups,
and the force of the reforms which were adopted was aimed at providing
what Pitkin (1967) refers to as "descriptive representation." The means by
which this was to be achieved was a requirement that state parties insure
that blacks, women, and young people be represented in the national
convention delegations in proportion to their number in the population.
Yet, as the last part of Ranney's statement implies, there was also concern
about ensuring that varying viewpoints be guaranteed representation—
"substantive representation" in Pitkin's terms.
Thus the major focus of these reforms was to increase the permeability
of national conventions. The reforms have since been revised by the
Mikulski and Winograd Commissions, yet the goals remained. As Keefe
(1980,4) concludes, the subsequent reform commissions "further refined
party rules to increase intraparty democracy. The broad thrust of the
1969-1978 reforms was to increase popular participation in the presiden-
tial nominating process while at the same time diluting the power of party
professionals." These reforms were intended as Democratic reforms, but
the Republicans have in many cases also been affected because Democrat
controlled state houses often made the reforms state law.
There seems to be widespread agreement that the reforms had a
definite effect on the national conventions, although not entirely what was
intended. As Jeane Kirkpatrick (1976) has thoroughly documented, a
"new presidential elite" has come to dominate the national conventions.
This elite included more minorities, women, and young people than had
been present before and fewer of the traditional white, Anglo-Saxon, male
party regulars. Thus the conventions became permeable by new groups,
but it should be noted that they were not necessarily any more represen-
tative of the mass of party identifiers than were prereform delegates. She
found the new delegates tended to have a much higher socioeconomic
status and, especially among the Democrats, to hold issue positions that
differed greatly from those of the party mass.
The effect of these reforms on the states is less well documented.
Cousins v. Wigoda made it clear that the national parties had the legal
right to determine the processes states use to choose delegates to the
The Permeability of Parties 191
national conventions. It is also clear that since 1968, the number of
presidential primaries has increased precipitately. The primaries have
been the major focus of research on the effect of the reforms at the state
level. Some have argued the increase was directly due to the reform
(Wayne 1980, 86). Others contest this (Bode and Casey 1980, 16-18).
More relevant to the topic of this paper has been research to determine the
extent to which the voters in these primaries are representative of the
general electorate. While the primary electorate has generally been seen
as a small and atypical subset of the general electorate, Rubin (1980) has
argued that the size of the primary electorate jumped in the postreform
period. In addition, his analysis and that by Kritzer (1980) indicated that
the primary electorate differs from the general electorate only in terms of
level of partisanship and interest in politics, not in terms of demographics
or issue concerns. This would seem to indicate primary states are highly
permeable to new forces.
The evidence seems to indicate that the reforms have in fact altered the
participation in national conventions and may have broadened the par-
ticipation in state primaries. What has received less attention from re-
searchers has been what has been going on in those states which did not
jump on the primary bandwagon and which are still using the caucus-
convention method for choosing delegates to the national conventions.
This research will use the data on state party convention delegates in such
states to assess the extent to which the conventions in those states are open
to involvement by new groups in the party which differ in significant ways
from those delegates who may be seen as more traditional party activists.2
In this chapter we investigate continuity and change among these
convention delegates by a cohort analysis. Three types of new party ac-
tivists were identified: (1) those who have recently become active in party
politics; (2) those who have recently switched parties; and (3) those who
are young and are thus of necessity new activists. Because of the potential
important effect of the reforms of the last decade on the composition of the
convention delegates, the years 1971 -1980 were used to delineate the first
cohort in each of these three groupings.
The years 1961-1970 delineated the second cohort in each grouping.
This cohort was chosen for two reasons. In the first place it permits a clear
comparison of pre- and postreform periods. This will provide evidence on
the effect of the reforms on the permeability of these state conventions.
Secondly, this period was one of extraordinary turbulence, when many
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new social forces were demanding increased access to the political
process. Those delegates who became politically active, or who switched
parties, or who came of political age during that time may well bear some
imprint of that period that makes them distinct. If so, their presence in the
state convention in 1980 would indicate both the permeability of the party
and some continuing impact of that period on current politics. In addition,
if such differences are found among those who became active during that
period, this may be evidence that even before the reforms, parties were
open to the activity of those who differed from traditional activists. Of
course, no definitive judgment can be made on this point since it is
impossible to know if they also differed at the time they became active.
The years before 1961 delineated the third cohort in each grouping.
When examining the party switchers, those who have never switched
parties constituted a fourth comparison group. Those active for more than
twenty years, or those over forty years of age, or those who have never
switched parties are considered to represent the mainstream of the party
and the new activists were compared with these groups to determine if the
conventions are permeable by activists who differ in significant ways
from the mainstream.
There is one caveat to be made about this analysis. Like any cohort
analysis, the cohorts are examined at one point in time, yet longitudinal
inferences are often made which the data cannot directly support. For
example, if the 1960s cohorts are found to differ from the other delegates,
the data do not directly indicate the differences arose from the experiences
in the 1960s. This is, however, not a major problem for the analysis. The
question addressed here is not what is the origin of differences which are
found, but rather whether the conventions in caucus-convention states are
permeable by groups which differ from the traditional party activists.
Specifically, we will examine the extent of differences among the
cohorts in each of the three groups of new party activists in both parties.
Since the movement of new activists into the party is a primary form of
party rejuvenation, it is to be expected that the attitudes of newer activists
will differ from those of older activists.
There are three types of differences which will be examined here:
demographic characteristics, organizational memberships, and issue
positions. Demographic characteristics and organizational memberships
determine the coalitional bases of the parties. Changes in this coalitional
base are important because parties aim their appeals primarily at those
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who are believed to be their traditional supporters; this means that the
involvement of new party activists with different demographic or organi-
zational characteristics will potentially have long-range effects on the
party platform and therefore on what the party attempts to achieve in
government (Pomper and Lederman 1980, 146-47). This is the reason
permeability of the parties is important. The linkage between party
positions and the involvement of new activists who differ significantly in
their issue positions is even more direct.
Initial investigations of the cohorts on the basis of these three types of
differences indicated amazing similarity between the age cohorts and the
length of activity cohorts. Suspecting that the similarity may be due to a
large overlap between these cohorts, correlations between the cohorts
were computed. Among the Democrats, the correlation was .72 and
among the Republicans it was .70, confirming the overlap. Thus to avoid
repetition, information on only the length of activity cohorts will be given.
It was felt that those just becoming active would be more likely to be
sources of new forces in the party than those just coming of political age.
This was felt to be so because of the extent to which socialization tends to
produce youth who do not differ significantly from the political charac-
teristics of their parents. Correlations between the switching cohorts and
the activity cohorts also indicated overlap.3 Yet since the switchers were
few in number compared with the activity cohorts and were expected to be
an important source of new influence in the party, both the switchers and
the activity cohorts were examined.
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
Research on party activists has consistently demonstrated that they tend to
be recruited from the ranks of higher socioeconomic status (Verba and
Nie 1972). The research by Kirkpatrick (1976) on national party conven-
tions indicated that far from reducing this tendency, the reforms in the
Democratic party seem to have produced delegates who differ even more
significantly in terms of socioeconomic status.
The data on state convention delegates also contain no convincing
evidence of increased involvement by lower socioeconomic groups
among the newer cohorts. Tables 10.1 and 10.2 indicate that the recent
switchers and those who have recently become active do tend to have a
larger percentage of people in the lower income ranks than do those more
Table 10.1 Demographic bases of party support by length of party activity
Race
% Black
% Hispanic
Religion
% Catholic
% Jewish
Education
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
Post college
Income
$ 0 - 14,999
15 - 24,999
25 - 34,999
35 - 44,999
45 - 59,999
$60 +
Less than
10 yrs.
%(A0
6.9 (354)
2.3 (120)
23.6(1,166)
2.6 (129)
2.1 (153)
12.4 (632)
27.2(1,390)
22.9(1,169)
34.6(1,771)
23.1 (1,064)
32.6(1,625)
23.4(1,165)
12.0 (596)
5.6 (278)
5.1 (256)
Democrats
10-20
years
% (N)
8.3 (138)
1.9(31)
23.2 (377)
2.2 (35)
3.5 (58)
15.8 (259)
25.7 (420)
16.1 (264)
38.8 (634)
15.0 (243)
30.5 (493)
24.9 (403)
14.4 (233)
7.8 (127)
7.4 (120)
More than
20 yrs.
%(N)
8.9 (142)
1.2 (19)
21.6 (341)
1.0 (16)
10.8 (170)
22.3 (351)
29.4 (463)
13.8 (218)
23.7 (373)
19.2 (283)
25.9 (382)
22.9 (338)
13.9 (206)
9.3 (137)
8.9 (131)
Less than
10 yrs.
% (N)
0.7 (38)
0.4 (22)
10.9 (561)
0.7 (36)
2.1 (107)
10.3 (536)
32.0(1,666)
26.9(1,379)
28.7(1,491)
14.3 (712)
26.2(1,308)
24.8 (1,239)
14.3 (716)
9.9 (493)
10.5 (522)
Republicans
10-20
years
% (N)
0.7 (14)
0.2 (4)
9.3 (172)
0.6 (11)
3.1 (57)
10.6 (197)
30.6 (567)
26.2 (485)
29.5 (546)
10.0 (176)
22.8 (400)
25.6 (449)
16.7 (293)
10.4 (182)
14.4 (253)
More than
20 yrs.
% (JV)
1.1 (15)
0.1 (1)
7.2 (100)
0.2 (3)
5.4 (76)
15.0 (210)
32.7 (457)
22.1 (309)
24.6 (344)
13.3 (171)
22.2 (286)
21.0 (271)
15.1 (194)
11.6 (150)
16.8 (216)
Table 10.2. Demographic bases of party support by switchers
Race
% Black
% Hispanic
Religion
% Catholic
% Jewish
Education
Less than high school
High school
Some college
College Graduate
Post college
Income
$ 0 - 14,999
15 - 24,999
25 - 34,999
35 - 44,999
45 - 59,999
$60 +
Recent
switchers
% (AO
2.5 (8)
1.3(4)
12.8 (38)
1.7(5)
1.5(5)
6.6 (21)
25.0 (79)
19.0 (60)
47.8 (151)
20.2 (63)
29.8 (93)
22.8 (71)
14.1 (44)
5.8(18)
7.4 (23)
Democrats
Sixties
switchers
%(/V)
1.2(3)
0.8 (2)
8.9 (20)
1.2(3)
0.4 (1)
5.2(12)
19.0 (44)
15.1 (35)
60.3 (140)
10.8 (25)
29.7 (69)
29.3 (68)
16.8 (39)
7.8(18)
5.6(13)
Pre-sixties
switchers
%(A0
3.9 (21)
1.1 (6)
17.9 (94)
1.1 (6)
4.8 (26)
13.1 (71)
26.9 (145)
18.7 (101)
36.5 (197)
19.0 (100)
27.5 (145)
24.3 (128)
13.9 (73)
8.7 (46)
6.6 (35)
Non-
switchers
% (AO
8.5 (584)
2.2 (150)
24.4 (1631)
2.3 (155)
4.7 (321)
15.5 (1056)
28.0 (1906)
20.2 (1378)
31.6 (2150)
19.7 (1304)
31.3 (2073)
23.4 (1548)
12.8 (844)
6.6 (438)
6.2 (412)
Recent
switchers
% (AO
1.9(11)
0.2(1)
16.9 (99)
0.9 (5)
1.3(8)
8.3 (48)
32.0(184)
25.4 (146)
32.9 (189)
17.2 (100)
27.9 (162)
21.4 (124)
13.8 (80)
8.8 (51)
10.9 (63)
Republicans
Sixties
switchers
%(/V)
1.7(8)
1.1 (5)
14.4 (68)
1.3(6)
1.7(8)
10.0 (47)
30.8 (144)
25.6 (120)
31.8 (149)
8.8 (40)
19.7 (90)
23.9 (109)
18.4 (84)
12.1 (55)
17.! (78)
Pre-sixties
switchers
% (AO
1.1 (10)
0.2 (2)
10.8 (99)
1.0(9)
2.0 (19)
11.0 (102)
31.4 (292)
25.4 (236)
30.1 (280)
8.2 (72)
20.3 (178)
24.9 (218)
17.5 (153)
13.0 (114)
16.1 (141)
Non-
switchers
% (AO
0.6 (37)
0.3 (17)
8.7 (528)
0.5 (29)
3.0 (132)
11.4 (700)
32.1 (1971)
26.3 (1614)
27.2 (1669)
13.6 (793)
25.7 (1500)
24.4 (1423)
14.6 (852)
10.0 (581)
11.6 (678)
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traditional cohorts. Yet is is more plausible to argue this is due to the age
of these groups rather than the greater involvement of lower socioeconom-
ic status groups.
The overlap between age and length of activity has already been
pointed out. The recent switcher cohorts in both parties had a larger
percentage of people under thirty than did either of the other switching
cohorts or the nonswitchers in the parties (29.9 percent among recent
Democratic switchers and 26.5 percent among recent Republican switch-
ers). The argument that their low income level may be only due to their
stage of life is buttressed by the fact that newest cohorts also have the
highest levels of education of any of the comparison groups, with a single
exception. The exception is that group which switched to the Democratic
party in the 1960s. Given the high correlation between education and
income, it can be expected that the newest cohorts will attain higher
income levels as they become more established in their careers.
Racial and religious groups have been important components of party
coalitions. Axelrod (1972) identified nonwhites and Catholics as part of
the New Deal Democratic coalition and whites and Protestants as Repub-
licans. It has also been the case that Jews have traditionally been Demo-
cratic. Examination of these data indicate no major change in these
patterns. An investigation of the activity cohorts indicates that by far the
largest number of black delegates are Democrats, but the percentage of
blacks appears to be declining slightly in both parties. This may be
evidence that blacks are becoming politically disaffected and are with-
drawing from traditional party politics, but it must be emphasized that the
changes are small.
Other racial groups have been increasing in political activity, but there
are relatively few of their representatives among these convention dele-
gates. Hispanics are the only other minority group with a sizable represen-
tation at these conventions. By far the largest percentage of Hispanics are
Democrats. If these increasing numbers among recent Democratic activ-
ists is an indication of a longitudinal trend, this may presage the creation
of a new political force within the Democratic party. But again the
numbers are small. The numbers of Hispanics among the switching
cohorts in both parties are too tiny to warrant any generalizations.
Catholics and Jews are still predominantly Democrats. In both parties
the percentage of Jews and Catholics among those who have recently
become active is greater than among those active more than ten years. This
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increasing political presence may be related to the increasing importance
of issues relevant to these groups—the viability of Israel for Jews and the
banning of abortion for Catholics—although the direction of the relation-
ship cannot be ascertained. Alternatively, since these groups include a
high percentage of second and third generations of immigrant families, it
may simply be the case that the increasing percentage of Catholics and
Jews among recent activists may be due to increasing acculturation.
Regardless of the reason for the increase, their increasing numbers may
indicate their increasing importance in both parties, as well as an open-
ness to these groups. Examination of the switching cohorts indicates there
is a clear pattern of an increasing percentage of Catholics among recent
switchers to the Republican party. This is very likely due to the fact that
the Republican party has seemed to be more supportive of a constitutional
amendment to ban abortion.
The evidence concerning the permeability of the parties by those with
demographic characteristics which differ from those of traditional party
activists is mixed. There is little reason to believe that these convention
delegates are becoming any more representative of the population in
terms of socioeconomic status. While these data in no way indicate the
parties are not permeable by lower socioeconomic groups by design, they
do indicate few representatives of the poor were present at these conven-
tions. There was some evidence that fewer blacks were becoming active,
but at the same time there were larger percentages of Hispanics, Jews, and
Catholics among the new cohorts. The vast bulk of these groups were
present in the Democratic party. Both Jews and Catholics were part of the
traditional New Deal Democratic coalition and thus they do not indicate a
major change in the coalitional base of that party. Two changes which may
be important are the relatively large percentage of Catholics among recent
switchers to the Republican party and the increasing percentage of His-
panics among recent Democratic activists. While the raw numbers in both
cases are small, both groups are new additions to their present political
homes, indicating some permeability.
No major changes are evident when the pre- and postreform activity
cohorts were examined. However, those who switched to the Democratic
party in the 1960s do differ in several ways from the other switching
cohorts in that party. There are smaller percentages of blacks, Hispanics,
Catholics, and Jews among the 1960s Democratic switchers. In addition,
they have the highest level of education of any of the cohorts examined.
Table 10.3. Organizational membership by length of party activity
Democrats
Active less than 10 yrs.
(N)
Active 10-20 years
(N)
Active more than 20 yrs.
(N)
Republican
Active less than 10 yrs.
(N)
Active 10-20 years
(N)
Active more than 20 yrs.
(N)
Union
14.7
(786)
18.8
(330)
19.6
(335)
2.9
(158)
3.0
(57)
2.0
(30)
Ed. org.
25.8
(1,373)
29.5
(516)
23.4
(400)
13.2
(715)
15.1
(292)
15.5
(229)
Prof.
org.
19.6
(1,045)
24.8
(434)
20.3
(346)
21.1
(1,145)
25.0
(483)
25.4
(377)
Business
org.
11.3
(605)
15.2
(267)
19.4
(332)
22.0
(1,194)
28.7
(555)
34.0
(504)
Church
group
24.3
(1,295)
29.2
(512)
32.2
(549)
36.4
(1,977)
37.4
(721)
37.8
(560)
Women's
rts.
18.8
(1,004)
20.3
(356)
13.3
(227)
4.1
(225)
5.2
(101)
4.0
(59)
Civil
rts.
18.3
(974)
24.0
(421)
16.1
(275)
2.1
(114)
2.6
(50)
2.5
(37)
Ecology
14.7
(785)
17.1
(300)
10.5
(179)
6.2
(337)
8.4
(162)
9.7
(144)
Pub. int.
20.0
(1,068)
26.2
(459)
25.9
(442)
13.8
(748)
20.5
(395)
22.9
(340)
Anti-
abor.
5.1
(274)
5.9
(103)
6.3
(108)
11.6
(629)
9.8
(189)
9.5
(141)
Farm
org.
8.5
(455)
13.1
(229)
21.8
(372)
8.6
(468)
13.3
(256)
22.7
(336)
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This evidence seems to indicate that one legacy of the 1960s is a group of
people who switched to the Democratic party although differing from the
demographic characteristics of the party. This finding parallels Kirk-
patrick's (1976) discovery of the new professionals who became active in
the national conventions in the 1970s. Further evidence for the uniqueness
of this group can be found in the next section which examines the
organizational membership of both the activity and the switching cohorts
in each party.
ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP
A second way of identifying changes in the party coalitions is to examine
the organizational memberships of party activists. While activists may not
always use their party strictly to further goals of their groups, it seems safe
to assume that such memberships reflect the interests of the members and
may provide a clue concerning what issues may be of concern to the party.
Increasing involvement by members of organizations not previously
represented in the party is an indicator of the openness of the party
conventions.
Tables 10.3 and 10.4 provide information on the organizational mem-
berships of the switching and length of activity cohorts of both parties.
The pattern among the Democrats is virtually the same both among the
activity cohorts and the switching cohorts. In both sets of cohorts the
percentage of members of unions, farm, and church organizations is less
among the newer cohorts. Also evident in both sets of cohorts is the
uniqueness of those who switched to the Democratic party in the 1960s or
who became active during that period. Those groups had high percen-
tages of members in educational, professional, women's rights, civil
rights, ecology, and public interest groups. The high percentage of educa-
tional and professional memberships is probably due to their high level of
education noted earlier. The high percentages in the other groups, how-
ever, may well be a legacy of 1960s, for the issues which those groups
represent were prominent during that period. The pre-1960s switchers
also have high percentages of members of professional and public interest
groups, but what seems to be most notable about them is the high
percentage of church and farm memberships. This may simply be a
reflection of the effects of the socialization process experienced by those
who are old enough to have switched parties more than twenty years ago.
Table 10.4. Organization membership by switching cohorts
Democrats
Recent switchers
(N)
Sixties switchers
<N)
Pre-Sixties switchers
(N)
Non-switchers
(N)
Republicans
Recent switchers
(N)
Sixties switchers
(N)
Pre-Sixties switchers
(N)
Non-switchers
(N)
Union
11.3
(37)
18.0
(44)
14.6
(82)
16.8
(1211)
6.4
(39)
3.1
(15)
2.7
(26)
2.3
(149)
Ed. org.
28.4
(93)
40.0
(98)
27.4
(154)
25.5
(1837)
15.6
(96)
14.8
(72)
13.9
(135)
13.8
(882)
Prof.
org.
20.4
(67)
24.9
(61)
19.2
(108)
20.7
(1491)
22.5
(138)
27.6
(130)
26.6
(258)
22.0
(1412)
Business
org.
13.7
(45)
13.9
(34)
15.1
(85)
13.6
(979)
22.6
(139)
29.2
(142)
27.1
(263)
25.4
(1626)
Church
group
20.4
(67)
24.5
(60)
31.1
(176)
26.9
(1939)
42.2
(259)
34.7
(169)
34.5
(335)
37.0
(2373)
Women's
rts.
22.0
(72)
24.9
(61)
18.1
(102)
17.7
(1273)
4.9
(30)
3.9
(19)
3.8
(37)
4.4
(280)
Civil
rts.
16.5
(54)
25.3
(62)
15.3
(86)
19.4
(1393)
5.4
(33)
3.3
(16)
2.0
(19)
1.9
(124)
Ecology
15.2
(50)
27.3
(67)
16.0
(90)
13.6
(981)
6.5
(40)
8.0
(39)
7.7
(75)
7.1
(454)
Pub. int.
22.6
(74)
25.7
(63)
21.9
(123)
22.6
(1624)
13.0
(80)
18.7
(91)
20.0
(194)
16.6
(1063)
Anti-
abor.
4.0
(13)
4.1
(10)
6.2
(35)
5.5
(396)
19.5
(120)
12.9
(63)
9.3
(90)
10.1
(648)
Farm
org.
9.5
(31)
8.2
(20)
15.3
(86)
12.2
(875)
7.8
(48)
10.1
(49)
10.3
(100)
12.9
(825)
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Among Republicans, when both the activity and the switching cohorts
are examined, the only major changes seem to be decreases in the
percentage of business, public interest, and farm organizations. No other
changes are evident among the activity cohorts, but an examination of the
switching cohorts shows some increases in the percentage of members of
unions, church groups, and anti-abortion groups among recent switchers.
While the percentages are small, the increase in the union memberships
confirms the impression that union members are no longer solidly locked
into the Democratic party. The increase in percentages of church and anti-
abortion group memberships also confirms the fact that the Republican
party has greater appeal to those who favor a constitutional amendment to
ban abortion. This finding is probably related to the fact that larger per-
centages of Catholics are switching to the Republican party now than in
the past.
Because these data are based solely on closed-ended questions, there
is no way to tell if members of other groups have joined either of these
parties. Yet, looking only at these organizations there is some evidence of
the permeability of the parties. Whether one looks at switchers or those
who became active in the 1960s, it is clear that the Democratic party was
the recipient in the 1960s of new identifiers who differed in the percentage
of members in organizations associated with issues prominent at that
time. Conversely it would appear that currently it is the Republican party
which is the recipient of those concerned about the moral issues which are
prominent in political debate. Thus it would appear that both parties are
permeable by delegates representing certain organizations in larger num-
bers than had previously been the case.
The evidence concerning the effect of the reforms on this permeability
is not clear. Among the Republicans the increases in members of certain
groups occurred among recent switchers, which may be some slight
evidence that the reforms made the party more permeable. But it must be
remembered that the Republican party was not affected by the reforms to
the same degree as was the Democratic party. In addition, it might be
expected that given its current leadership and position, the Republican
party would be a more logical political home to church and anti-abortion
groups than would the Democratic party. Thus the involvement of these
group members may well have occurred regardless of the reforms.
Among the Democrats, the cohorts which stand out are those who
became active in the 1960s and the 1960s switchers. There is no way of
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Table 10.5. Mean index scores by switchers
Traditional
New issues domestic Strong America
Category
Recent switchers
Sixties switchers
Pre-sixties switchers
Non-switchers
Repub-
licans
11.50
11.99
11.72
11.26
Demo-
crats
7.23
5.94
7.28
7.26
Repub-
licans
16.37
16.70
16.68
16.35
Demo-
crats
12.16
10.64
10.18
10.80
Repub-
licans
4.13
3.27
2.94
4.00
Demo-
crats
7.73
9.40
7.61
7.77
Note: The smaller the number the greater the support. All comparisons are significant
at the .05 level.
knowing if those who became active in the 1960s also differed at that
time. If the differences did exist at that time, it would indicate the party
was permeable before the reforms. However, it is also intriguing to note
that of the 1960s switchers, 64.1 percent have been active for less than ten
years—after the time of the switch. This compares with 56.9 percent of
the Republicans who switched in the 1960s and have been active for less
than ten years. Again, it is impossible to prove that those who switched in
the 1960s differed in terms of organizational memberships at the time of
the switch. However the large numbers who became active after the
reforms may indicate some greater openness of these party conventions to
delegates with organizational memberships which differ from those of
more traditional activists.
It must also be pointed out that the major differences occur between
rather than within the parties. A higher percentage of Democrats than
Republicans are active in unions, educational organizations, women's
rights and civil rights organizations, ecology, and public interest groups.
ISSUE POSITIONS
The information presented so far contains only circumstantial evidence
concerning how these cohorts differ in terms of issue positions. While
socioeconomic status and organizational membership are related to polit-
ical beliefs, the relationship is not perfect. The involvement of those with
different demographic or organizational characteristics may not indicate
much about the openness of the party if the new activists do not differ
significantly on positions they take on issues which are politically rele-
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Table 10.6. Mean index scores by length of activity
Traditional
New issues domestic Strong America
Repub- Demo- Repub- Demo- Repub- Demo-
Length of activity licans* crats licans* crats licans* crats
Less than 10 years
10-20 years
More than 20 years
11
11
11
.31
.25
.25
7
7
8
.07
.13
.01
16.34
16.38
16.33
10
10
11
.87
.91
.04
4
3
3
.04
.94
.78
8
7
6
.42
.22
.04
Note: The smaller the number the greater the support.
*ANOVA not significant at the .05 level.
vant. This section will examine directly how the cohorts differ on posi-
tions they take on issues.
Questions concerning thirteen issues were included in these data. The
responses were factor analyzed. Eleven of the thirteen questions loaded on
one of three factors (see chapter 5 note 2 for results of factor analysis). The
resulting factors were named Traditional Domestic (affirmative action,
national health insurance, wage and price controls, and oil and gas
deregulation), New Issues (ERA, abortion, and SALT II), and Strong
America (nuclear power, defense spending, the draft, and Middle East).
Additive scales were constructed for each factor, running from 4 to 20 for
Traditional Domestic and Strong America and from 3 to 15 for New
Issues; low scores indicate support for Traditional Domestic and Strong
America positions and liberalism on New Issues (see appendix, question
19). Mean scores on these scales were then computed for each cohort and
analysis of variance was used to determine if there were significant
differences among the cohorts. The results appear in tables 10.5 and 10.6
Among the switching cohorts, all of the differences are significant,
although in most cases the differences are not large. Among the Demo-
crats, the 1960s switchers again stand out on two of the scales: New
Issues and Strong America. That cohort was the most supportive of the
New Issues index and the least supportive of Strong America. Again there
is no way to know if those in this cohort had these positions at the time of
their switch, yet their presence now among the delegates to these state
party conventions indicates the liberal and pacifist concerns prominent in
the 1960s are still being represented today. Among the Republicans, the
1960s switchers also stand out on the New Issues scale, on which they are
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the least supportive. This means that on that scale the 1960s switchers in
the two parties are exact opposites of each other. On the Strong America
scale, the pre-1960s switchers are the most supportive and on the Tradi-
tional Domestic issues all groups are extremely close.
Once again the major differences appear when comparing the parties.
The largest difference (1.98) between the highest and lowest means of the
four switching cohorts within a party occurs among Democrats, in-
triguingly on the Traditional Domestic issues. Among the Republicans,
only on the Strong America scale is the difference between the highest
and lowest mean greater than one point (1.19). In fact, the average
difference between highest and lowest mean within the Democratic party
cohorts is 1.70 and within the Republican party it is 0.67, indicating the
Republicans are more consensual than the Democrats. Yet when the
means between the parties are compared, for only two cohorts are the
differences less than four points. When comparisons between the parties
are made, the average difference between the means of comparable
cohorts is 4.94.
These same between-party differences are also evident when the
activity cohorts are examined. Yet there are even smaller differences
within the parties among these cohorts. In fact, on the Traditional Domes-
tic index there were no significant differences among the activity cohorts
in either party. These issues represent the traditional divisions between the
parties. Those just becoming active in the parties have apparently been
socialized to accept this basic cleavage. In addition, there were no signifi-
cant differences among these cohorts in the Republican party on the New
Issues index. Of the cohort comparisons that produced significant dif-
ferences, the pattern is linear. The newer Democratic activists were more
supportive of the New Issues and in both parties the newer activists were
more opposed to Strong America, although the Democrats were consis-
tently more opposed than were the Republicans. The opposition of the
newest activists to the Strong America index may well be due to the large
numbers of people under thirty in that cohort.
In these data it would appear that of the two sources of new party
activists who may differ in issue concerns from the mainstream of the
party, those who switch to the party differ more than those who have
recently become active in the party. The party switcher cohorts consis-
tently produced significant differences on these indices. In the Republican
party only on the Strong America index were there significant differences
among the activity cohorts and in the Democratic party there were
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significant differences on both the New Issues and Strong America in-
dices. In neither party were there significant differences on the Traditional
Domestic index, which is composed of those issues which have tradi-
tionally divided the parties.
Among the Democrats it was clear that those who switched to the party
in the 1960s are now espousing issue positions which are more liberal and
more pacifist than those of any other cohort. This would seem to be an
indicator of the permeability of that party. Again, the fact that 64.1 percent
of these 1960s switchers did not become active until the seventies may
indicate that the reforms did increase the openness of the party to new
activists who differ from the mainstream. This conclusion must be
tempered, however, by the fact that 60.3 percent of all Democrats had also
been active for less than ten years. It thus may simply be the fact that few
people stay active in party politics for more than ten years and the numbers
may reflect this rather than the effect of reforms ten years ago to make the
party more open. It may also be the case that those who switched parties
simply needed a period of acculturation in their new party before becom-
ing active.
For the Republicans, while the differences among the switching co-
horts are significant, they are also small. The 1960s and pre-1960s
switchers seem to be similar to each other and seem to be more conserva-
tive and hawkish than the recent switchers or the nonswitchers.
There was concern that the indices might have masked the differences
among some cohorts. The factor analysis on which the indices were based
was run using the entire data set. It may well be that the separate cohorts
view the interrelationship among the issues differently. In fact when factor
analyses are run for the cohorts, different factors are produced. Therefore
separate analyses of variance were calculated for each of the issues within
the cohorts.4 The results appear in tables 10.7 and 10.8.
Among the Democratic switching cohorts, all differences were signifi-
cant. Once again the uniqueness of the 1960s switchers is obvious. Of the
thirteen issues, the 1960s switchers stand out on ten. They are the most
supportive of ERA, affirmative action, and SALT II; and they are the most
opposed to an anti-abortion amendment, increased defense spending,
development of nuclear power, spending cuts, anti-inflation measures
which may increase unemployment, draft registration, and the U.S.
military presence in the Middle East—all positions that one might expect
of a 1960s liberal.
Among the Republicans, three of the thirteen issues produced no
Table 10.7. Mean issue scores by switchers
Republicans
Recent switchers
(AO
Sixties switchers
(AO
Pre-sixties switchers
(AO
Non-switchers
(AO
Democrats
Recent switchers
(AO
Sixties switchers
(AO
Pre-sixties switchers
(AO
Non-switchers
(AO
ERA
3.95
(603)
4.18
(480)
4.00
(954)
3.95
(6288)
2.00
(325)
1.72
(242)
2.26
(544)
2.05
(6967)
Anti-
abortion
3.31
(600)
3.18
(474)
3.06
(945)
3.15
(6266)
2.21
(322)
1.81
(240)
2.40
(538)
2.47
(6907)
Defense
spending
4.38
(603)
4.66
(477)
4.48
(949)
4.43
(6289)
2.93
(323)
2.47
(241)
3.03
(544)
2.92
(6880)
National
health
insur-
ance
4.44
(604)
4.50
(479)
4.45
(950)
4.52
(5952)
2.99
(321)
2.47
(243)
2.81
(542)
2.49
(6120)
Nuclear
power
3.85
(597)
4.11
(479)
4.14
(945)
3.98
(6256)
2.70
(319)
2.46
(241)
2.87
(541)
2.74
(6852)
Spend-
ing
cuts
4.00*
(599)
4.12
(476)
3.97
(945)
4.00
(6252)
2.88
(321)
2.49
(241)
2.76
(534)
2.79
(6784)
Affirm-
ative
action
3.76
(598)
3.91
(471)
3.72
(933)
3.69
(6173)
2.60
(320)
2.38
(239)
2.67
(531)
2.42
(6806)
Dereg.
oil
4.03*
(590)
4.02
(473)
4.07
(934)
4.02
(6171)
3.10
(319)
2.86
(239)
2.87
(533)
2.89
(6696)
Wage-
price
4.04*
(594)
4.05
(471)
3.97
(937)
3.96
(6188)
3.21
(323)
3.10
(240)
3.09
(533)
2.86
(6734)
Anti-
inflation
3.50
(586)
3.72
(466)
3.66
(910)
3.66
(6076)
3.05
(318)
2.64
(237)
2.93
(534)
2.85
(6707)
Draft
3.83
(593)
4.08
(472)
3.96
(936)
3.81
(6204)
3.26
(321)
2.94
(234)
3.35
(531)
3.28
(6796)
SALT
11
4.24
(591)
4.43
(474)
4.28
(921)
4.26
(6133)
2.67
(318)
2.27
(240)
2.70
(527)
2.56
(6627)
Military
in
Mideast
3.74
(591)
3.89
(475)
3.82
(938)
3.74
(6170)
3.11
(322)
2.90
(241)
3.09
(532)
3.14
(6784)
*ANOVA not significant at the .05 level.
Table 10.8. Mean issue scores by length of activity
National
health Spend- Affirm- Military
Anti- Defense insur- Nuclear ing ative Dereg. Wage- Anti- SALT in
ERA abortion spending ance power cuts action oil price inflation Draft II Mideast
Republicans
Active less than 10 years 3.98* 3.17 4.41 4.50* 3.92 3.98* 3.72* 3.98 3.97* 3.59 3.84* 4.28 3.76*
(AO (5232) (5218) (5255) (4987) (5211) (5208) (5161) (5145) (5155) (5073) (5167) (5118) (5160)
Active 10-20 years 3.93 3.05 4.44 4.54 4.04 4.04 3.72 4.06 3.97 3.68 3.83 4.27 3.71
(AO (1899) (1884) (1893) (1823) (1882) (1882) (1858) (1855) (1875) (1831) (1873) (1846) (1859)
Active more than 20 years 3.94 3.19 4.49 4.51 4.13 4.01 3.66 4.06 3.93 3.79 3.86 4.20 3.76
(AO (1428) (1421) (1436) (1331) (1421) (1412) (1394) (1400) (1398) (1361) (1401) (1388) (1392)
Democrats
Active less than 10 years 1.94 2.30 2.76 2.55* 2.53 2.70 3.39 2.88 2.95 2.80 3.11 2.60 3.01
(AO (5140) (5117) (5114) (4399) (5100) (5072) (5071) (5000) (5023) (5009) (5048) (4971) (5047)
Active 10-20 years 2.03 2.45 2.88 2.53 2.78 2.75 2.44 2.87 2.89 2.84 3.31 2.46 3.16
(AO (1697) (1683) (1676) (1520) (1675) (1656) (1655) (1631) (1632) (1628) (1658) (1610) (1645)
Active more than 20 years 2.46 2.83 3.41 2.52 3.34 3.08 2.64 2.99 2.76 3.10 3.75 2.56 3.42
(AO (1582) (1549) (1542) (1449) (1527) (1498) (1505) (1491) (1511) (1495) (1529) (1462) (1524)
*ANOVA not significant at the .05 level.
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significant differences. Of the ten remaining issues, the 1960s and the
pre-1960s switchers stand out as the most conservative on ERA, affir-
mative action, SALT II, increased defense spending, draft registration,
and the U.S. military presence in the Middle East. Thus, when the
separate issues are examined, the 1960s switchers to both parties appear
as polar opposites. Again, the differences between the parties are greater
than those within the parties.
When the Democratic activity cohorts are examined, only on the issue
of national health insurance were there no significant differences. Of the
remaining twelve issues, nine produced a linear pattern with the newer
cohorts more liberal on ERA, affirmative action, an anti-abortion amend-
ment, increased defense spending, development of nuclear power, spend-
ing cuts, anti-inflation measures, and the U.S. military presence in the
Middle East. There is thus much similarity in the issue positions of the
1960s switchers and of those who recently became active.
Among the Republicans, on seven of the thirteen issues there were no
significant differences among the activity cohorts. On three of the remain-
ing six issues, there is a linear pattern parallel to that in the Democratic
party, with the recent activists more liberal on increased defense spending,
nuclear development, and anti-inflation measures. But all of the Republi-
can cohorts are more conservative on these issues than any Democratic
cohort.
This examination of the activity cohorts indicates the Democrats are
experiencing an influx of new activists who are more liberal than the
mainstream activists. The pattern is linear, with no major changes appar-
ent following the reforms. The new activists in the Republican party,
however, do not differ significantly from those active for longer periods
on seven of the thirteen issues examined.
Our purpose in this chapter was to examine the permeability of state
party conventions in eleven states which still choose national convention
delegates by the caucus-convention method. The permeability of these
conventions by new social forces is of major importance both because it
may affect the composition of the national conventions and because it
determines the degree to which the parties can legitimately claim to act as
linkage mechanisms between the population as a whole and governing
officials. It must be reiterated that failure to find changing representation
among the new activists does not necessarily indicate the parties are
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deliberately denying entrance to new groups. Rather it may simply be that
such groups are remaining out of politics or using other means besides the
parties to participate.
Before the results of the cohort analysis are reviewed, it is important to
point out that 61 percent of the convention delegates in the Republican
party and 60.3 percent in the Democratic party have been active for less
than ten years. In addition, 23.4 percent of the Republican delegates and
12.9 percent of the Democratic delegates had once considered themselves
members of the opposite party. In fact 8.3 percent of the Republicans and
5.6 percent of the Democrats had switched in the last ten years. The fact
that those new activists could be chosen as delegates to the state party
conventions is itself an indicator that the conventions are not composed
solely of a closed elite. Yet such numbers mean little in terms of represen-
tation if the new activists are similar or identical to those active in the
party for longer periods of time.
Examination of the demographic characteristics of the new activists
did not indicate any major change. Research has indicated that national
convention delegates tend to have higher socioeconomic status than the
population as a whole. This paper provides evidence that state party
convention delegates also have higher income and education levels than
the population. While the new activists have slightly lower incomes, than
mainstream activists, they also have higher education levels. This would
seem to indicate the lower incomes are due to life cycle rather than being
an indicator of increasing representation of lower socioeconomic groups.
No large influx of new religious or racial groups was evident in either
party. In fact the percentage of blacks is less among recent cohorts than
among the mainstream cohorts. There is, however, some evidence that
Catholics are switching to the Republican party. In general there appears
to be no evidence of major change in the demographic characteristics of
new activists compared with the mainstream cohorts.
In many ways those who switched to the Democratic party in the 1960s
stand out, but they were even less representative of the population as a
whole. There were fewer blacks, Hispanics, Jews, and Catholics among
that cohort and they had an extremely high level of education. This is
similar to what Kirkpatrick (1976) found in her examination of national
convention delegates in the 1970s. Among these delegates, that did not
seem to foretell a continuing pattern since recent switchers and recent
activists don't share the characteristics of the 1960s switchers. Examina-
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tion of the organizational membership of the new cohorts also indicated
few major changes. For the most part, the pattern seemed to be that of
declining percentages of members in the organizations examined rather
than increasing percentages. The exception to this pattern occurred
among the Republicans where slightly larger percentages of members of
unions, church groups, and anti-abortion groups appeared among recent
switchers. Once again the switchers to the Democratic party in the 1960s
stand out. Larger percentages of that cohort than any other cohort were
members of groups representing concerns which were dominant at the
time that they switched parties. Since the information on organizational
membership was gathered by closed-ended questions, there was no way to
know if members of other groups are becoming more active in these party
conventions. Yet there is evidence here that both parties have been
permeable to larger percentages of members of some groups. The evi-
dence on the effect of the reforms is not clear since the data are not
longitudinal. It may, however, be important that 64.1 percent of the
Democratic switchers who do differ in organizational memberships did
become active within the last ten years, perhaps indicating the reforms
increased the permeability of the party.
While there is evidence that the parties are permeable to delegates with
differing organizational affiliations, it must also be kept in mind that there
is much more difference between the parties than within them. Therefore,
while permeable, the parties have apparently not been the object of
invasion by groups which would change in a major way the basic charac-
teristics of the parties.
This same conclusion can be drawn from an analysis of the issue
positions of the cohorts. Greater differences occur between rather than
within parties. This is especially true in the case of the length of activity
cohorts within the Republican party. On two of the three indices and seven
of the thirteen issues there were no significant differences among these
cohorts. There are significant differences among the switching cohorts in
both parties on the indices and for most of the separate issues. In the
Democratic party the 1960s switchers stand out as the most liberal and in
the Republican party the 1960s and pre-1960s switchers are the most
conservative. The fact that these switchers are delegates at the state
conventions although having once been a member of the opposite party
and differing in issue positions is itself evidence of the permeability of the
parties.
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These differences may well point to something else besides the per-
meability of the parties. Many have argued for the creation of responsible
parties which would take clear positions on issues and which would
therefore provide the voter with clear alternatives. During the 1960s a
movement toward such parties apparently began. There was during that
time an incipient realignment with liberals moving out of the Republican
party and into the Democratic party and conservatives making the reverse
move. These liberals are more liberal than the mainstream of the Demo-
cratic party and the conservatives are more conservative than the main-
stream of the Republican party.
Of these liberals, 64 percent did not become active until after the
reforms. Yet one must be cautious in concluding the reforms made the
party much more permeable to them. Looking at the opposite side of the
coin, 36 percent became active at approximately the same time that they
switched parties—before the reforms. It may be that the reforms made it
easier for this group to get involved, yet the party was certainly not closed
to them before. As argued before, the switchers may simply have needed
time to become acculturated to their new party before becoming active.
Or, it may be that this group previously used other means than party
politics to express their views and are only now moving into traditional
party politics.
It is only possible to speculate about what effects these switchers have
had or may have on the parties. Presumably their goal would be to pull the
parties away from the traditional centrist politics. Predictably, the Repub-
lican switchers were strongly supportive of Ronald Reagan, who is seen as
a spokesman for conservative positions. Yet what is not as predictable is
the fact that a majority of the Democrats who switched in the 1960s were
supportive of Jimmy Carter, despite the fact that they perceived them-
selves as more liberal than Carter. Their support may be due to the fact that
a large majority believed Carter had a good chance to win in 1980.
Presumably, the traditional goal of party politics—winning—was more
important than ideology. This shows that they were then willing to play the
party game, which may minimize the effect they would have on changing
the party. In addition, they represent only a small percentage (3.4 percent)
of the delegates at these conventions, which also minimizes their influ-
ence.
On the other hand, these 1960s switchers had high levels of party
activity. Indices were created from questions dealing with other forms of
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Table 10.9. Activity levels among switchers/non-switchers
Category
Recent switchers
Sixties switchers
Pre-sixties switchers
Non-switchers
Republicans
Party
activity
1.32
2.36
2.18
2.10
Campaign
activity
2.43
3.18
3.01
2.87
N
(674)
(487)
(970)
(6413)
Party
activity
1.62
2.21
1.73
1.89
Democrats
Campaign
activity
3.00
3.93
2.95
3.15
N
(328)
(245)
(562)
(7195)
Note: All comparisons significant at the .05 level.
party and campaign activities in which these delegates had taken part.5 As
Table 10.9 shows the 1960s switchers in both parties had the highest
scores of any of the switching cohorts on the campaign index and second
highest on the party index. Thus, while small in numbers they have the
potential of influence because of their activity levels.
If these switchers were to have an effect on the parties, the change
would be felt more by the Democrats. The Republican switchers stand
out, but not to the same extent as do the Democrats. The Democratic
delegates in general are less consensual than the Republican delegates,
which means that change is thus more likely among the Democrats. This
is especially the case because the delegates in the Democratic party who
had been active for less than ten years were similar to the 1960s switchers
in terms of issue positions. It may be that the high activity levels of the
1960s switchers in the Democratic party has created an image of the party
which makes it attractive to new activists who share the views of the
switchers.
Regardless of the impact of the 1960s switchers, their presence at these
state party conventions is an indicator of the permeability of the conven-
tions by those who differ from the traditional activist cohorts. Yet for the
most part, the differences found are not large. The parties have not been
invaded by activists who differ dramatically from the traditional activists,
but rather by those who take basically the same, but slightly more extreme
stands on the issues. Differences between the parties are consistently
larger than differences within the parties on both issue positions and
organizational affiliation. Only on socioeconomic status do the two
parties look similar. Both Republican and Democratic conventions had
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delegations with higher income and education levels than the population
as a whole, indicating these conventions are not as representative of the
general electorate as Rubin (1980) and Kritzer (1980) found the primaries
to be.
The fact that more than 60 percent of each party has been active less
than ten years would seem to indicate that access is open to new partici-
pants. Since the 1960s switchers to the Democratic party are ideologically
distinct from other groups and since about two-thirds have been active less
than ten years one can speculate that reform has made the party more
permeable. On the other hand the conventions appear to have been open
prior to reform. Perhaps, the reforms simply made it easier for new
activists. In general it appears that while large percentages of these
delegates are new activists and while parties are permeable by those who
do differ, the differences are more a difference in degree than a difference
in kind. Winning is still important regardless of ideological orientation.
As the French would say, "Le plus 5a change, le plus c'est la meme
chose."
NOTES
1. For a contrary argument on the need to close parties and encourage opening
the electoral system to new parties, see Ceaser (1980).
2. In this paper, the term activist is used to refer to these convention delegates.
It is recognized that attendance at a state convention is not necessarily an indicator
of participation in other forms of party activity. Information on the level of party
and campaign activity of these delegates is presented later in the paper.
3. Among the Democrats, of the 5,438 who had been active less than ten
years, only 491 (9 percent) had switched parties in the last ten years. Among the
Republicans, the comparable numbers are 730 of 5,332 (14 percent).
4. While analysis of variance assumes a normal distribution, it has been shown
that the accuracy of the F statistic is not seriously threatened by relaxing this
assumption (Lindquist 1953, 86).
5. For the party activity index, the number of positions respondent had held in
the party (question 6 in the appendix) were counted. For the campaign activity
scale, the number of different campaign activities respondent had done were
summed (question 10 in the appendix).
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Extremist Delegates:
Myth and Reality
CHARLES S. HAUSS, L. SANDY MAISEL
Both major parties were "opened up" considerably after the tumultuous
1968 Democratic convention. State laws and party rules were changed
to make primaries the dominant way we select delegates to state and
national conventions. Even where primaries are not used, the caucus
procedures were changed to give grassroots party members more influ-
ence.
But the open party has also been the subject of much criticism, at least
since the nomination and overwhelming defeat of Senator McGovern in
1972. Each party has enacted a wave of counter-reforms designed to cure
the modern "mischief of faction" often attributed to the new, more open
procedure (Ranney 1975). Most recently the Democrats have adopted the
Hunt Commission reforms, which went into effect for the 1984 conven-
tion. Those reforms are typical of the changes taking place in both parties.
Among other things, the reforms shorten the delegate selection "season,"
presumably to limit some of the alleged irrationalities produced by the
primary system (Kirkpatrick et al. 1980; Lengle 1981). The commission
has also tried to blunt the impact of the post-1968 reforms by increasing
the role party leaders played at the 1984 convention and afterward.
These counter-reforms are all in some way inspired by criticisms of the
open party levelled by the so-called neoconservatives (Kirkpatrick 1976;
Ranney 1975). In their eyes, the open party has brought the "wrong" kinds
of people into the parties—ideologues who would make disastrous
choices such as nominating McGovern.
The neoconservatives are by no means the first group of observers to
make this kind of criticism. In the 1950s and 1960s such activists were
described as amateurs who did not share the winning-is-all-that-counts
focus of the so-called professionals.
The neoconservatives are following a similar line of reasoning when
they argue that rules changes have given ideological extremists an oppor-
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tunity to take over one or both of the major parties. They continue by
claiming that these individuals are more likely to have an amateur role
orientation and to be more concerned with the adoption of their own
political views as a basis for party platforms rather than seeking one which
serves the good of the party, most frequently defined as nominating a
candidate and adopting a platform which will most likely lead to victory
in November (Wildavsky 1965; Soule and Clarke 1970; Sullivan et al.
1974; 1977; Kirkpatrick 1976; Nakamura and Sullivan 1981).
In short, the neoconservatives are worried that ideologues are encour-
aged to enter the delegate selection process because of the openness of
that process and that they will place principle above pragmatism, adopt
platforms which hurt the parties' efforts to form majority coalitions, and
will nominate "pure" candidates who will lose the November election.
They feel that takeover of the parties by activists who can be characterized
by ideological extremism, tactical amateurism, and devotion to purist,
issue-oriented candidates will have serious negative consequences for the
parties and for politics in general, consequences that go beyond the
nomination of a losing candidate like McGovern to the evolution of a
system in which public policy directions swing vastly from administra-
tion to administration in a way which would be detrimental to American
policy at a time when consistency and stability, not chaos, is required (for
a British version of this argument, see Rose 1980).
The party leaders responsible for the Hunt Commission and other
reforms clearly accept at least the broad outlines of the neoconservative
analysis, since they have tried to increase the influence of party regulars in
the nomination process. Yet, oddly, that analysis has never been subjected
to the kind of empirical analysis it warrants. Serious research on the new,
open party and its strengths and weaknesses is just beginning nearly a
decade after the McGovern debacle and the beginnings of the neoconser-
vative movement.
Austin Ranney organized a panel at the 1981 annual meetings of the
American Political Science Association to begin dealing with the neocon-
servative critique of the nominating process in a systematic fashion.
Robert Nakamura and Denis Sullivan (1981) presented a cogently argued
critique of the most frequent criticisms of that process. In this chapter, we
continue that investigation and reinforce this skeptical reaction to the
criticisms of the new party and its activists.
Delegates to state conventions which selected delegates to the national
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conventions without presidential preference primaries provide us with
another view of the impact of the post-1968 reforms. Despite the fact that
these delegates were not chosen in primaries, they were selected in a
manner which was open, which was marked by proportional representa-
tion of presidential preferences (at least for the Democrats), and which
was certainly susceptible to take-over by nonregulars. (Nakamura and
Sullivan 1981, 5ff.). Those observing caucuses which selected state
convention delegates in these states were often struck by the fact that the
first-level caucuses looked more like primaries in which the polls were
only open for a short period of time than the closed door caucuses of an
earlier era (see Maisel, chapter 2). Hence, while we cannot use the data
from the state party delegate study to test the entire neoconservative
argument, we can use them to continue exploring one of its most impor-
tant empirical elements—the role of activists—and see if there are many
of those the neoconservatives fear. And we can determine what their
influence on party life is and get some idea as to how likely they are to take
over either of the major parties in the near future.
IDEOLOGUES IN THE PARTIES
The first task in evaluating the neoconservative theory is to identify those
delegates who qualify as the type of ideologues the neoconservatives
fear.' Neither our questionnaire nor the professional literature provides
the convenient indicators of the main aspects of the neoconservatives'
critiques—ideological identification, attitudes on issues, and attitude on
the role of party. We have constructed indices which identify those
delegates with whom we are concerned.
First, we identified ideologues on issues. For each delegate we totaled
the number of issues on which s/he responded with an extreme position—
on the left for the Democrats and on the right for Republicans (see
appendix, question 19).2 Second, we developed a similar index which
taps an individual's attitude about proper party strategy (question 14). We
gave a score of 1 for each ideological answer to the questions regarding
whether or not a candidate should compromise his/her values in order to
win, whether the party platform should avoid controversial issues, and so
on. (It would have been useful to examine the effects of these variables on
candidate choice as well. However the anti-organizational extremist can-
didates that were present in 1964, 1972, and 1976, were absent in 1980,
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Table 11.1. Number of extreme answers on issues and party tactics
None
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
N
Issues
(Percent)
Democrats Republicans
19.5
18.6
17.3
12.4
9.5
6.6
5.1
3.6
2.8
2.0
1.3
1.0
0.3
6429
4.5
7.5
8.2
10.2
10.5
11.0
10.6
9.8
9.2
7.8
6.0
3.5
1.3
7246
Party tactics
(Percent)
Democrats Republicans
14.9
19.8
20.8
19.4
13.8
11.3
7656
16.3
18.6
18.0
17.7
15.9
13.5
7884
with the possible exception of the short-lived Crane campaign.)
Table 11.1 presents the distributions on these indicators. Even a most
cursory analysis shows that there is a major flaw in the neo-conservatives'
analysis. Ideologues do not dominate either party. Only 4.6 percent of the
Democrats and 18.6 percent of Republicans gave extreme answers on
nine or more of the twelve issues. While one could claim that these are not
insignificant numbers, none of the questions posed permitted us to
identify true radicals or reactionaries. If one scored a twelve on our scale,
one could still fall within the mainstream of our political system, a liberal
or a conservative to be sure, but not necessarily a radical or a reactionary.
Yet only 1.3 percent of Republicans and 0.3 percent of Democrats did so.
Similarly 25.1 percent of the Democrats and 29.4 percent of Republi-
cans qualified as ideologues on the question of party tactics, by taking the
nonprofessional extreme on at least four of the five questions posed.
Again, though these numbers are far from meaningless, one could easily
take the extreme position on all of these questions, achieve the perfect
score of five on the tactical scale, and still not be someone only interested
in ideology and issues and not in winning. Again, only slightly more than
one in ten respondents fell into the most extreme category.
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Table 11.2. Interrelationships among ideological indicators
Party tactics
Political philosophy8
Issues
Democrats Republicans
.14
(5951)
- . 4 5
(6242)
.22
(6707)
.40
(7114)
Party
Democrats
- . 0 5
(7432)
tactics
Republicans
.20
(7771)
Note: Entries are Kendall's tau-fcs.
aResponse to the question "How would you describe your own political
philosophy?" Answers run from very liberal to very conservative.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EXTREMISTS
To this point we have defined ideologues as those who qualify on either
one of the dimensions indicated. The neoconservatives argue, however,
that these factors, ideological extremism, and an amateur definition of the
role of party, are part and parcel of a common approach to party politics. If
this is so, then these dimensions should be highly correlated and related as
well to an individual's self-perception of his/her placement on a liberal/
conservative spectrum.
Not surprisingly, the individuals who call themselves "very liberal"
Democrats or "very conservative" Republicans are likely to score high on
our indices. The conclusion from table 11.2 is that the delegates' ide-
ological self-perceptions relate mainly to their views on the issues of the
day. But significantly, self-described liberals in the Democratic party and
conservatives in the Republican party are not of one mind on questions
relating to the role of party.
Perhaps asking the ideologues we have identified to fit neatly into one
view of politics is demanding too much of the neoconservatives. At the
heart of their criticism is not just that these individuals are ideologues, but
that they are not loyal party members. Massachusetts Congressman Bar-
ney Frank has described participants of this type as "tumbleweeds,"
because they blow in and out of the major parties, touching down as active
participants only when the candidates and issues turn them on.
We compiled an index to measure respondents' past involvement in
party life in order to test the "tumbleweed" hypothesis. We looked at
whether or not the respondent had been a delegate before, whether s/he
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Table 11.3. Ideologues and party loyalty
Activism in Ever switch 1976
the past party identification vote"
Issue
Party role
Demo-
crats
- . 0 4
(6353)
.06
(7566)
Repub-
licans
- . 0 7
(7149)
.06
(7775)
Demo-
crats
.01
(6269)
.01
(7354)
Repub-
licans
- . 0 3
(7060)
- . 0 4
(7668)
Demo-
crats
- . 0 5
(6242)
.05
(7366)
Repub-
licans
.04
(7077)
- . 0 5
(7670)
Note: Entries are Kendall's tau-b correlations between issues and party role ideologue
scales and loyalty measures.
"Vote is coded as 1 Carter, 2 did not vote, 3 Ford.
had been involved in earlier campaigns or held party office, how long the
delegate had been active in party life, whether s/he had voted in the 1976
presidential election. If the ideologues had "tumbleweed" tendencies,
they should have shown up at some point—a disloyal vote, limited past
involvement in party life, prior affiliation with the other party.
Table 11.3 reveals that ideological thinking in the ways we have
measured it has nothing to do with a history of loyalty or commitment to
the party. Tactical and ideological extremists have been as active as anyone
else and among Republicans were even slightly less likely than main-
stream delegates to have ever identified with the other party. In addition
among the Republicans, tactical ideologues were slightly more loyal to
President Ford in 1976 than were mainstream delegates. For these individ-
uals, commitment to extreme views and desiring a more ideological party
have not been impediments to long standing party involvement, an in-
volvement very much in the mainstream of party life.
From our analysis to this point we conclude that it will result in a more
accurate description if we view the ideologue in a light very different from
that posited by the neoconservatives. They feared that the two major
parties were susceptible to takeover by large groups of delegates who
thought alike on the two types of issues we have examined here. They saw
the conventions populated by two sharply divergent groups, namely the
party regulars and the ideologues. We have found no such major division.
At the state conventions in 1980, the large majority of delegates in both
parties eschewed the extreme views which the neoconservatives feared.
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Table 11.4. Ideologues and social characteristics
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Age
Sex
Race
Fundamentalist
How religious
Education
Income
Issues
Democrats
- . 1 0
(6294)
- . 0 9
(6302)
.13
(6211)
.13
(4500)
.17
(6194)
.10
(6148)
- . 0 7
(6086)
Republicans
.06
(7094)
.09
(7131)
- . 0 2
(7073)
- . 1 4
(4000)
- . 1 3
(7042)
- . 0 1
(6967)
.01
(6724)
Party
Democrats
.05
(6565)
- . 0 8
(7461)
.05
(7375)
- . 0 4
(5475)
- . 0 7
(7332)
- . 0 9
(7306)
- . 0 9
(7180)
role
Republicans
.05
(7327)
- . 0 3
(7731)
.01
(7679)
- . 1 6
(4448)
- . 1 9
(7635)
- . 0 7
(7570)
- . 0 9
(7278)
Note: Entries are Kendall's tau-b correlations between issues and party role ideologue
scales and social characteristics.
Even those delegates who tended toward extremism in one respect were
not notably different from the mainstream delegates in others.
The analysis to this point leaves us somewhat puzzled about the
neoconservatives' fears. Perhaps, we reasoned, the real fear was that the
party was susceptible to takeover by people "not like them." Certainly
stereotypes of ideologues in both parties are clear in the minds of many
active politicians. In the Republican party, we expect advocates of the New
Right to be newly wealthy, bright, young, predominantly male born-again
Christians or fundamentalists. Democratic ideologues should come from
urban (or perhaps rural, but not suburban) areas, they should be highly
educated though not necessarily wealthy, and they should have rejected
conventional political and moral standards. These two groups are not only
different from each other; they should also be clearly distinguishable from
the average delegate to the party convention.
Table 11.4 reveals that these expected differences simply did not
materialize. In no case are the correlations for either party as high as .20.
Republican issues ideologues and tactical extremists do tend to be slightly
more religious and fundamentalist than the mainstream Republicans, but
222 Issues and Ideology
these differences are minimal. On the other factors which we have
identified, they look very much like the rest of the Republican delegates.
In short, the Republican ideologues are very much like those who were
less ideological.
Among the Democrats, the correlations are similarly weak. Once
again, born-agains and the very religious are more conservative and more
purist than the mainstream delegates. The only other factor correlating at
even .10 is education (and here only with issue extremists). The most
important finding here, however, is not the direction of the correlations,
but their weakness. This is not a distinct, divergent group. At best, it might
be described as a faint shadow of what the stereotypical view of ide-
ologues would lead us to expect.
Why then are the neoconservatives' images of the ideologues so far
off? We can only speculate. Perhaps they were swayed by the first
impressions of the most visible ideologues—those who have passed out
petitions or been visible and vocal at the conventions. Many of the highly
ideological speeches at the state conventions were in fact given by
individuals who seem to fit the stereotypical mold, but our data show that
these "spokespersons" may well have been echoes of a distant past. They
cannot be identified through analysis of sociological traits. If equivalents
of those who took over the Democratic party in 1972 were present in
1980, they were few and far between.
ACTIVISM OF THE EXTREMISTS
Finally, it seems worthwhile to look at the most important tenet of the
neoconservative critique to see if it can be sustained for even the small
groups of ideologues we have identified. The neoconservatives hold that
the presidential nominating system is open and susceptible to takeover by
individuals who have no enduring interest in party affairs and politics as
usual. That is, they argue that the parties need commitment to politics
from their activists in order to fulfill their role in our system, and that
those who participate out of allegiance to issues or a particular candidate
do not have this commitment.
The convention delegate questionnaire contains many items dealing
with delegates' involvement which we grouped into three types. The first
is the individual's involvement in the public campaign activities of the
party; we constructed a simple index measuring the number of such
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Table 11.5. Ideologues and party and interest group activism
Campaign Position in Interest group
activities party hierarchy memberships
Issues
Party role
Demo-
crats
.10
(6429)
- . 0 9
(7656)
Repub-
licans
.01
(7246)
- . 1 1
(7884)
Demo-
crats
- . 0 5
(6429)
- . 0 9
(7656)
Repub-
licans
.02
(7246)
- . 0 8
(7884)
Demo-
crats
.16
(6429)
.03
(7656)
Repub-
licans
.02
(7246)
.03
(7884)
Note: Entries are Kendall's tau-b correlations between issues and party role ideologue
scales and activism measures.
activities that an individual claims to participate in regularly. Second, we
examined the individual's position in the formal party hierarchy, whether
or not the delegate holds an office in the party at the state or local level.
Finally, we constructed a simple index measuring the number of other
organizations (e.g., labor unions, environmental groups) to which the
individual belongs. The neoconservatives would lead us to expect that the
extremists would be much less involved in public campaign activities of
the two parties, that they would not hold party offices, but that they would
be likely to be involved in other political organizations.
Table 11.5 reveals once again what has become a familiar pattern. On
almost every indicator, the ideologues are not very different from the
mainstream delegates. There are some differences between the two par-
ties, but all of the correlations are quite weak.
Democratic ideologues are more active in public campaigning than are
the mainstream delegates, not less so as the neoconservative argument
would predict. On the other hand, they are somewhat less involved in the
party hierarchy than their numbers would warrant; again, however, the
divergence is much less than one might imagine. The only place where
the expected pattern is revealed is that the ideologues do tend to be
distinctly more active outside of the Democratic party than is the case for
the rest of the Democratic delegates.
In the Republican party, patterns are even less clear. Those who score
highest on the ideological measure seem to be more, not less, active than
other delegates. The conclusion from these data for the Republicans is that
ideologues were those who felt strongly about issues and/or their candi-
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date but were still very much involved in the Republican party and its
activities.
This section of our analysis supports our earlier conclusions. The neo-
conservatives have been simply wrong in their depiction of the impact that
the reform rules have had on those involved in party decision-making; the
"mischief of faction" is more apparent than real (Ranney 1975). Whether
we analyzed what ideologues thought, what they looked like, or what they
acted like, we were unable to find any evidence of the existence, much less
the threat of an ideologically coherent, unusually active, dangerously
ideological element in either party.
We were frankly surprised by just how inaccurate the neoconservative
analysis of the parties is. Nothing in our analysis lends any support to their
fears of an ideological takeover of either major party. In 1980 few
ideologues were to be found; those whom we were able to identify did not
hold most of the views nor take most of the actions regarding party life the
neoconservatives had led us to expect.
It is possible, of course, that some different, more representative
sample would reveal a  larger, more influential cluster of ideologues.
However, we do not believe this to be the case. Our sample is drawn from a
number of states which used a variety of procedures in selecting delegates.
Delegates were chosen at differing points in the nominating process under
differing political circumstances. It seems unlikely that activists in other
states would be markedly different.
To the contrary, we feel this sample should have revealed as many
ideologues as could have been involved in the 1980 nominating process.3
It is often said that the caucuses are ripe for the plucking by ideological
groups, yet their presence at and impact on these conventions was
negligible. The system "worked," if by that one means that the parties
were dominated by their mainstream elements, rather than by ideologues.
Our findings suggest that, far from the neoconservatives' expectations,
both parties seem dominated by well-informed activists who are com-
mitted to traditional electoral strategies and mainstream electable candi-
dates. The parties are not likely to be taken over by extremist activists
whatever rules are in force.
Although the absence of extreme candidates in 1980 must temper our
conclusions, counter-reforms such as those proposed by the Hunt Com-
mission now seem unnecessary even from the neoconservatives' perspec-
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tive. If the neoconservatives were right for the Democrats in 1972 or the
Republicans in 1964, the parties have clearly "learned" since then. Again,
if one accepts the neoconservative notion that one wants moderate parties
whose activists are committed to nominating candidates who can win, our
data are in line with Will Rogers' aphorism, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it."
NOTES
1. We will use the terms "ideologue" and "extremist" interchangeably here.
There is no commonly accepted term to describe these activists, and in earlier
versions we used extremists, amateurs, radicals, and even flakes. We are con-
vinced that extremist and ideologue best describe the values and activism the
neoconservatives fear.
2. We eliminated one of the thirteen issues listed in question 19. The question
on national health insurance was not asked in Maine. Its inclusion would have
skewed our results as many of the delegates who favored Governor Brown came
from Maine.
3. It is possible that there were many other ideologues who had dropped out of
the party leaving us with a now much smaller group of these activists, limited only
to those with the most staying power. Unfortunately, we have no way of knowing if
this was the case.
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THE 1980 DELEGATE SURVEY
1. How long have you lived in (name of state)?
1. Less than 5 years ( )
2. Between 5 and 10 years ( )
3. Between 10 and 20 years ( )
4. More than 20 years ( )
2. How long have you been active in party politics in (name
of state)?
1. Less than 5 years ( )
2. Between 5 and 10 years ( )
3. Between 10 and 20 years ( )
4. More than 20 years ( )
3. How would you describe the area where you now live?
1. City with over 250,000 population ( )
2. Suburb of city with over 250,000 population ( )
3. City with between 100,000 and 250,000 population ( )
4. Suburb of city with between 100,000 and 250,000 popula-
tion ( )
5. City with between 50,000 and 100,000 population ( )
6. City with between 10,000 and 50,000 population ( )
7. Town with less than 10,000 population ( )
8. Rural area ( )
9. Other ( )
4. What county is that in?
5. What congressional district do you live in?
6. Please indicate which, if any, of the following positions
you now hold or have held in the past. (Check as many
as apply.)
Hold Held in
Now Past
Member of a local (city, county, or town)
party committee () ()
Chairman of a local party committee ( ) ( )
Other local party office () ()
Member of congressional district party
committee () ()
Member of state central committee ( ) ( )
Elected to state or national office () ()
Elected local office ( ) ( )
This survey was previously published in Nomination Politics: Party Activists and
Presidential Choice, by Alan I. Abramowitz and Walter J. Stone (New York: Praeger,
1984). It is reproduced here with the permission of the publisher.
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Appointed government or political office . . ( ) ( )
Paid campaign staff for candidate () ()
7. Before this convention, had you ever been a delegate to
a state or national party convention?
1. Yes ( ) 2. No ( )
8. How often have you been actively involved in recent state
and national political campaigns?
1. Active in all ( ) 3. Active in a few ( )
2. Active in most ( ) 4. Active in none ( )
9. What kinds of campaigns have you been active in? (Check
as many as apply.)
Local ( ) State Legislative ( ) Congressional ( )
Stateswide offices ( ) Presidential ( ) Other ( )
10. Which of the following activities, if any, have you performed
in political campaigns? (Check as many as apply.)
Clerical work ( ) Writing ads, press releases ( )
Door-to-door canvassing ( ) Speechwriting ( )
Telephone canvassing ( ) Planning strategy ( )
11. How would you describe your own party affiliation:
In state politics?
1. Strong Democrat ( )
2. Democrat, but not too strong ( )
3. Independent, closer to Democrats ( )
4. Completely independent ( )
5. Independent, closer to Republicans ( )
6. Republican, but not too strong ( )
7. Strong Republican ( )
In national politics?
1. Strong Democrat ( )
2. Democrat, but not too strong ( )
3. Independent, closer to Democrats ( )
4. Completely independent ( )
5. Independent, closer to Republicans ( )
6. Republican, but not too strong ( )
7. Strong Republican ( )
12. DEMOCRATIC DELEGATES: Was there ever a time when you
considered yourself a Republican?
1. Yes ( ) 2. No
REPUBLICAN DELEGATES: Was there ever a time when you
considered yourself a Democrat?
1. Yes ( ) 2. No ( )
13. IF YOU HAVE EVER CHANGED YOUR PARTY AFFILIATION:
In what year did you last change your party affiliation?
Year
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14. Please indicate your opinion about each of the following
statements. There are no right or wrong answers, so just
give your personal opinion.
1 2 3 4 5
Mildly
Strongly Mildly Not Dis- Strongly
Agree Agree Sure agree Disagree
A political party should
be more concerned with
issues than with winning
elections ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
The party platform should
avoid issues that are very
controversial or un-
popular ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
I'd rather lose an election
than compromise my
basic philosophy () () () () ()
A candidate should ex-
press his convictions even
if it means losing the
election ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Broad electoral appeal is
more important than a
consistent ideology () () () () ()
15. We're interested in your reasons for becoming actively
involved in this year's presidential campaign. Please
indicate how important each of the following factors was
for you.
1 2 3 4
Some- Not Not at
Very what Very All
Impor- Impor- Impor- Impor-
tant tant tant tant
To support my party () () () ()
To help my own political
career ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
To enjoy the excitement
of the campaign () () () ()
To meet other people with
similar interests () () () ()
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To support a particular
candidate I believe in ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
To work for issues I feel
very strongly about () () () ()
To enjoy the visibility of
being a delegate ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
To fulfill my civic responsi-
bilities ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
16. How would you describe your own political philosophy?
1. Very liberal ( ) 4. Somewhat conservative ( )
2. Somewhat liberal ( ) 5. Very conservative ( )
3. Middle-of-the-road ( )
17. Please indicate your opinion about each of the following
state and national political figures.
1 2 3 4 5
Some- Some-
Very what what Very
Favor- Favor- Unfavor- Unfavor-
able able Neutral able able
Jimmy Carter ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Edward Kennedy.. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Jerry Brown ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Ronald Reagan.... ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
George Bush ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
John Anderson ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
John Dalton ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Harry Byrd, J r . . . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
John Warner ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Charles Robb ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Marshall Coleman.. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
18. Was there any particular issue that caused you to become
involved in this year's election campaign?
1. Yes ( ) 2. No ( )
IF YES: What issue was that?
19. Please indicate your position on each of the following issues.
3 41 2
Strong-
iy
Favor Favor
Unde-
cided
Qp-
pose
5
Strong-
ly
Oppose
The Equal Rights Amend-
ment to the U.S.
Constitution
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A constitutional amend-
ment to prohibit abor-
tions except when the
mother's life is en-
dangered ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
A substantial increase in
defense spending even
if it requires cutting
domestic programs () () () () ()
A government sponsored
national health insurance
program ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
More rapid development
of nuclear power () () () () ()
Across-the-board cuts in
nondefense spending to
balance the federal
budget ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Affirmative action pro-
grams to increase
minority representation
in jobs and higher
education ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Deregulation of oil and
gas prices ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Mandatory wage-price
controls to deal with
inflation ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Stronger action to reduce
inflation even if it in-
creases unemployment
substantially () () () () ()
Reinstituting draft
registration () () () () ()
Ratification of the SALT II
Treaty ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Increasing U.S. military
presence in the Middle
East ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
20. How would you rate the political philosophy of each of the
following presidential candidates?
232 Appendix
Some- Middle-
Very what of-the-
Liberal Liberal Road
Jimmy Carter ( ) ( ) ( )
Edward Kennedy.. ( ) ( ) ( )
Jerry Brown ( ) ( ) ( )
Ronald Reagan ( ) ( ) ( )
George Bush ( ) ( ) ( )
John Anderson.... ( ) ( ) ( )
4
Some-
what
Conserv-
ative
Very
Conserv-
ative
21.
22.
23.
Please rank your preferences for your party's presidential
nomination.
1st choice:
2nd choice:
3rd choice:
Are you pledged to support a particular candidate at the
convention?
1. Yes ( ) 2. No ( )
IF YES: Which candidate is that?
How good a chance do you think each of the following candi-
dates would have of winning the November election if nomi-
nated by his party?
1 2 3
Definitely Probably
Would Would Might
Win Win Win
4 5
Probably Definitely
Would Would
Lose Lose
Jimmy Carter () () () () ()
Edward Kennedy.. ( ) () () () ()
Jerry Brown ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Ronald R e a g a n . . . . ( ) () () () ()
George Bush () () () () ()
J o h n A n d e r s o n . . . . ( ) () () () ()
24. Which, if any, of your party's candidates would you be
unable to support in the November election? (Check as
many as apply.)
DEMOCRATS: Carter ( ) Kennedy ( ) Brown ( )
I could support any of these ( )
REPUBLICANS: Reagan ( ) Bush ( ) Anderson ( )
I could support any of these ( )
25. How did you vote in the 1976 presidential election?
1. Carter ( ) 2. Ford ( ) 3. Neither, didn't vote ( )
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26. How would you rate the effectiveness of the Democratic
and Republican state party organizations in (name of state)?
1
Very
Effective
2
Fairly
Effective
Not Very
Effective
Not at All
Effective
8
Not
S u r e
D e m o c r a t i c
o r g a n i z a t i o n . . ( ) () () ()
R e p u b l i c a n
o r g a n i z a t i o n . . ( ) () () ()
27. At present, how important a role does your state party
organization play in each of the following areas?
Very
Impor-
tant
Providing campaign assist-
ance to candidates ( )
Taking positions on issues
to influence elected
officials ( )
Providing services and
information to elected
officials and local party
organizations between
campaigns ( )
Recruiting candidates ( )
Informing the electorate
about party goals and
positions ( )
2 3
Some- Not
what Very
Impor- Impor-
tant tant
4
Not
at All
Impor-
tant
Not
Sure
( )
( )
28. How important a role do you think your state party organi-
zation should play in each of the following areas?
Very
Impor-
tant
2
Some-
what
Impor-
tant
3
Not
Very
Impor-
tant
4 8
Not
at All
Impor- Not
tant Sure
Providing campaign assist-
ance to candidates
Taking positions on issues
to influence elected
officials
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Providing services and
information to elected
officials and local party
organizations between
campaigns () () () () ()
Recruiting candidates ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Informing the electorate
about party goals and
positions ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
29. In which of the following groups, if any, have you been
politically active? (Check as many as apply.)
Labor unions ( )
Educational or teachers organizations ( )
Other professional organizations ( )
Business organizations ( )
Church-related groups ( )
Women's rights groups ( )
Civil rights groups ( )
Conservation or ecology groups ( )
Public interest groups ( )
Antiabortion groups ( )
Farm or agricultural organizations ( )
Other issue-related groups ( )
30. How politically active were your parents when you were
growing up?
Father Mother
1. Very active () ()
2. Fairly active ( ) ( )
3. Not very active ( ) ( )
4. Not at all active ( ) ( )
5. Not sure ( ) ( )
31. In what state did you spend most of your childhood?
32. How would you describe your parents' party affiliation at
the time when you were growing up?
Father Mother
1. Strong Democrat () ()
2. Democrat, but not too strong ( ) ( )
3. Independent, closer to Democrats.... ( ) ( )
4. Completely independent ( ) ( )
5. Independent, closer to Republicans.. ( ) ( )
6. Republican, but not too strong ( ) ( )
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7. Strong Republican ( ) ( )
8. Not sure ( ) ( )
33. What is your approximate age?
1. 18-24 ( ) 5. 40-44 ( ) 9. 60-64 ( )
2. 25-29 ( ) 6. 45-49 ( ) 10. 65-69 ( )
3. 30-34 ( ) 7. 50-54 ( ) 11. 70 or over ( )
4. 35-39 ( ) 8. 55-59 ( )
34. What is your sex? 1. Female ( ) 2. Male ( )
35. What is your race?
1. White ( ) 3. Hispanic ( ) 5. American Indian ( )
2. Black ( ) 4. Oriental ( )
36. What is your religious preference? (For example, Baptist,
Methodist, Roman Catholic.)
Religious preference
36a. Do you consider yourself to be either a fundamentalist or
born-again Christian?
1. Yes ( ) 2. No ( )
37. In general, how religious do you consider yourself?
1. Very religious ( ) 3. Not very religious ( )
2. Fairly religious ( ) 4. Not at all religious ( )
38. How much formal schooling have you completed?
1. None ( )
2. Grade school only ( )
3. Some high school ( )
4. Graduated high school ( )
5. Some college ( )
6. Graduated college ( )
7. Post college ( )
39. What would you estimate your family's income will be this
year before taxes?
1. 0-$14,999 ( ) 4. $35,000-44,999 ( )
2. $15,000-24,999 ( ) 5. $45,000-59,999 ( )
3. $25,000-34,000 ( ) 6. $60,000 or more ( )
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